democracy depends on the morality of the ends it pursues and the means chosen to pursue hose ends The objective moral law -the natural law written on every human heart-must serve as the obligatory point of reference for civil law itself. This objective moral law serves fundamentally to articulate essential values that flow from the very truth of human being and that express and safeguard the dignity of every human person. The civil law serves a limited purpose in relationship to this moral law -it ensures the common good through the recognition and defense of fundamental human rights and the promotion of ordered social existence in peace and true justice First among the fundamental human rights that positive civil law must recognize, respect, guarantee, and promote is the inviolable right to life of every innocent human being. The legal toleration of abortion or euthanasia is therefore an abdication of the state's primary duty to safeguard human rights through law. Civil laws that contravene the moral order are unjust, conflict with the possibility of achieving the common good, lack the true nature of law, and have no binding force in conscience. Consequently, a civil law authorizing abortion or euthanasia ceases by that very fact to be a true, morally binding civil law Lawmakers have a duty in conscience to work to remove such unjust laws, or at ast to strive to restrict such practices through less permissive laws than those currently in force. While doing whatever is reasonably attainable in pursuit of the re- establishment of a just order in defense of life, lawmakers must, at the same time, work to enact social policies that will help to eliminate the underlying causes of attacks on life relationship between the moral law and the civil law in a religiously pluralistic sociep b Clearly, a number of significant and interrelated questions must be taken seriousl by anyone seeking to heed the Pope s call to recover the basic elements of a vision of the 1. What can we reasonably expect the civil law to do in the absence of moral consensus in a pluralistic society? 4 Does law shape culture or does culture shape law ?55 See McCormick, supra note 8, at 10-17. In the face of moral dissensus regarding the moral status of the fetus, for example, McCormick notes that"public policy will remain sharply contentious and the task of legislators correspondingly complex. Indeed a strong case can be made that the attempt to solve the.,. problem [of divergent evaluations of the status of the fetus] by legislation bypasses our duty to persuade, to change hearts and minds. ld. at 13 See David Hollenbach, S.J., The Gospel of life and the Culture of Death: A Response to John Conley, in CHOOSING LIFE, supra note 8, at 37-45. Hollenbach concludes that the law "must generally follow the cultural consensus rather than lead or form it. He holds this view not out of skepticism or sullen tolerance, which he sees as deadly characteristics of our public philosophy and culture that he joins the Pope in criticizing. Instead, his conclusion flows from a"hope that the route of education and ikely to improve the moral quality of our culture than is a premature reach for law, which remains coercive even when it intends to be educative. Americans are likely to be suspicious of the ntrusion of the coercive arm of the state into areas where they experience moral uncertainty. Such suspicion is not likely to result in conversion of the culture. ld. at 43-44. C. John Paul ll, Civil La, supra note 47, at 273 (stating that vast change in"mentalities and morals"must"precede[ and accompany] ange9 democracy depends on the morality of the ends it pursues and the means chosen to pursue those ends. The objective moral law – the natural law written on every human heart – must serve as the obligatory point of reference for civil law itself. This objective moral law serves fundamentally to articulate essential values that flow from the very truth of human being and that express and safeguard the dignity of every human person. The civil law serves a limited purpose in relationship to this moral law – it ensures the common good through the recognition and defense of fundamental human rights and the promotion of ordered social existence in peace and true justice. First among the fundamental human rights that positive civil law must recognize, respect, guarantee, and promote is the inviolable right to life of every innocent human being. The legal toleration of abortion or euthanasia is therefore an abdication of the state’s primary duty to safeguard human rights through law. Civil laws that contravene the moral order are unjust, conflict with the possibility of achieving the common good, lack the true nature of law, and have no binding force in conscience. Consequently, a civil law authorizing abortion or euthanasia ceases by that very fact to be a true, morally binding civil law. Lawmakers have a duty in conscience to work to remove such unjust laws, or at the very least to strive to restrict such practices through less permissive laws than those currently in force. While doing whatever is reasonably attainable in pursuit of the re￾establishment of a just order in defense of life, lawmakers must, at the same time, work to enact social policies that will help to eliminate the underlying causes of attacks on life. Clearly, a number of significant and interrelated questions must be taken seriously by anyone seeking to heed the Pope’s call to recover the basic elements of a vision of the relationship between the moral law and the civil law in a religiously pluralistic society: 1. What can we reasonably expect the civil law to do in the absence of moral consensus in a pluralistic society?54 Does law shape culture or does culture shape law?55 54 See McCormick, supra note 8, at 10-17. In the face of moral dissensus regarding the moral status of the fetus, for example, McCormick notes that “public policy will remain sharply contentious and the task of legislators correspondingly complex. Indeed a strong case can be made that the attempt to solve the . . . problem [of divergent evaluations of the status of the fetus] by legislation bypasses our duty to persuade, to change hearts and minds.” Id. at 13. 55 See David Hollenbach, S.J., The Gospel of Life and the Culture of Death: A Response to John Conley, in CHOOSING LIFE, supra note 8, at 37-45. Hollenbach concludes that the law “must generally follow the cultural consensus rather than lead or form it.” He holds this view not out of skepticism or “sullen tolerance,” which he sees as deadly characteristics of our public philosophy and culture that he joins the Pope in criticizing. Instead, his conclusion flows from a “hope that the route of education and persuasion is more likely to improve the moral quality of our culture than is a premature reach for law, which remains coercive even when it intends to be educative.” Americans are likely to be suspicious of the intrusion of the coercive arm of the state into areas where they experience moral uncertainty. Such suspicion is not likely to result in conversion of the culture. Id. at 43-44. Cf. John Paul II, Civil Law, supra note 47, at 273 (stating that vast change in “mentalities and morals” must “precede[ ] and accompan[y]” legal change)