Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies hegemonic population having politically relevant ex- and under our direct supervision.Our sample includes clusionary preferences toward low-status minorities 439 subjects,all of whom are Jewish Israelis.Since has obvious parallels in the other societies(Gidron and we are interested in the implications of exclusion,we Hall 2017).For example,the tendency for poor whites choose to focus on the hegemonic majority group be- in the United States to oppose the social integration of cause that is the group with the power to exclude.We African Americans has a long been noted (Key 1949). used quotas for gender and age to generate a balanced In some analyses below,we divide the sample into sample on these covariates.While the sample is broadly secular and ultra-Orthodox based on respondents'self- representative of the Jewish population of Israel,ultra- identification.By dividing the sample,we can see Orthodox Jews are intentionally overrepresented (see whether the exclusionary preferences of the low-status Table A.1 in the Online Appendix). ultra-Orthodox group are higher than those of other Respondents were selected to participate in our Jews.Additionally,we compare preferences for exclu- study using a random walk strategy,with a partici- sion and cooperative behaviors of Jews toward PCl pation rate of about 17%.Participation took around with preferences for exclusion and cooperative behav- 40 minutes and was conducted inside participants' iors toward ultra-Orthodox and secular Jews.This al- homes.Participants were told that this research deals lows us to compare the preferences and behaviors to- with "Israeli society"and worked independently on ward a Jewish outgroup to preferences and behaviors computers provided by our fieldworkers.Compensa- toward the PCI outgroup. tion for participation was determined by randomly se- lecting the outcome of one of the economic decision- DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN making games. Participants were first asked to play a public goods Our data was collected through lab-in-the-field experi- game with three rounds in a random order:against ments across twenty locations in Israel,with wide varia a PCI,Jewish secular,or ultra-Orthodox opposing tion in the local proportion PCI.Not only does using a player.The opposing players were all real people, 4r元 laboratory allow for careful measurement of play in the whose decisions in the public goods game,as we ex- economic games necessary for this design,but bringing plained to subjects,were recorded in advance.10 Par- the lab to the respondents-rather than the other way ticipants were shown a picture of the opposing play- & around-increases the external validity of the results in ers next to their name,age,and city of residence.The two primary ways.First,we are able to have a sample names provided a strong indicator whether the op- that is more representative of the Israeli Jewish popu- posing player was Jewish or PCI,and the distinctive lation than could be obtained when relying on univer- clothes of the ultra-Orthodox players clearly distin- sity students-a limitation that may be especially prob- guished them from Jewish secular players.Almost 95% lematic when needing variation in exclusionary inter- of our players were able to identify the ethnicity of the group attitudes.College students tend to have a distinct opposing player based on these cues. psychological profile(Sears 1986;Jones 2010),includ- The structure of our public goods game is drawn ing strong norms of equality and low levels of preju- from previous work on intergroup relations in eth- dice (Sidanius et al.2008)and their play in economic nically diverse societies (Habyarimana et al.2009). games varies substantially from the play of other pop- In each round,participants were given twenty Israeli ulations (Henrich et al.2006).Second,and of particu Shekels(NIS)and had to decide whether to cooperate lar importance for the focus of this research,stationary by sharing the full sum or defect by keeping the full sum to themselves.After announcing their decision. 8 laboratory experiments,in contrast to lab-in-the-field experiments,are limited in their ability "to inform the they were informed of the opposing player's decision. study of cooperation in social dilemmas"(Grossman which we recorded in advance.In line with the standard 2011).And as Baldassarri(2015)notes,lab-in-the-field procedure of the public goods game,payoffs were mul- experiments,especially-as in our case-when compli- tiplied by 1.5 and divided equally between the two par- mented by additional survey data,can overcome the ticipants.This means that if both sides cooperated,each limited ability of laboratory experiments to represent participant ended the game with 30 NIS.If one cooper- the contexts in which group identities and norms of co- ated and the other did not,the person who cooperated operation operate. received 15 NIS and the person who did not cooperate Fieldwork and data collection were conducted dur received 35 NIS.If both sides did not cooperate,both ing the summer of 2013 by a professional survey team remained with their initial sum of 20 NIS.Thus,as is the eys standard in the public goods game,cooperation is the Data was collected in the following cities:Ashdod,Kiryat Malachi. mutually beneficial strategy. Elad,Arad,Bet Shemesh,Kiryat Gat,Haifa,Bnei Brak,Tve- We measure cooperation as a binary variable mea- ria,Safed,Rehovot,Zichron Yaakov,Ofakim,Netivot,Modi'in Makabim-Reut,Tel Aviv.We also sampled four neighborhoods in sured by play in the game against the PCI player,coded Jerusalem:Neve Yaakov,Ramat Shlomo,City Center,and Kiryat one if the subject cooperated,zero otherwise.Over- Yovel.The share of non-Jewish (mostly PCI)population in these all,only 33%(N =147)of subjects cooperated with locations vary from 0 to 37%,according to Israel's Central Bureau the PCI player,while 61%cooperated with the secular of Statistics census data from 2008.In analysis to follow,we use non- Jewish population rather than percent PCI because Israeli Census /:sony does not include ethnicity of non-Jewish residents and some of the 10 Note that playing against pre-recorded moves of opposing players non-Jewish population may not be PCI.However,it is reasonable to has been used successfully in previous lab-in-the-field studies (Enos assume that the overwhelming share of this population is PCI. and Gidron 2016;Whitt and Wilson 2007). 747Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies hegemonic population having politically relevant ex￾clusionary preferences toward low-status minorities has obvious parallels in the other societies (Gidron and Hall 2017). For example, the tendency for poor whites in the United States to oppose the social integration of African Americans has a long been noted (Key 1949). In some analyses below, we divide the sample into secular and ultra-Orthodox based on respondents’ self￾identification. By dividing the sample, we can see whether the exclusionary preferences of the low-status ultra-Orthodox group are higher than those of other Jews. Additionally, we compare preferences for exclu￾sion and cooperative behaviors of Jews toward PCI with preferences for exclusion and cooperative behav￾iors toward ultra-Orthodox and secular Jews. This al￾lows us to compare the preferences and behaviors to￾ward a Jewish outgroup to preferences and behaviors toward the PCI outgroup. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN Our data was collected through lab-in-the-field experi￾ments across twenty locations in Israel, with wide varia￾tion in the local proportion PCI.9 Not only does using a laboratory allow for careful measurement of play in the economic games necessary for this design, but bringing the lab to the respondents—rather than the other way around—increases the external validity of the results in two primary ways. First, we are able to have a sample that is more representative of the Israeli Jewish popu￾lation than could be obtained when relying on univer￾sity students—a limitation that may be especially prob￾lematic when needing variation in exclusionary inter￾group attitudes. College students tend to have a distinct psychological profile (Sears 1986; Jones 2010), includ￾ing strong norms of equality and low levels of preju￾dice (Sidanius et al. 2008) and their play in economic games varies substantially from the play of other pop￾ulations (Henrich et al. 2006). Second, and of particu￾lar importance for the focus of this research, stationary laboratory experiments, in contrast to lab-in-the-field experiments, are limited in their ability “to inform the study of cooperation in social dilemmas” (Grossman 2011). And as Baldassarri (2015) notes, lab-in-the-field experiments, especially—as in our case—when compli￾mented by additional survey data, can overcome the limited ability of laboratory experiments to represent the contexts in which group identities and norms of co￾operation operate. Fieldwork and data collection were conducted dur￾ing the summer of 2013 by a professional survey team 9 Data was collected in the following cities: Ashdod, Kiryat Malachi, Elad, Arad, Bet Shemesh, Kiryat Gat, Haifa, Bnei Brak, Tve￾ria, Safed, Rehovot, Zichron Yaakov, Ofakim, Netivot, Modi’in￾Makabim-Reut, Tel Aviv. We also sampled four neighborhoods in Jerusalem: Neve Yaakov, Ramat Shlomo, City Center, and Kiryat Yovel. The share of non-Jewish (mostly PCI) population in these locations vary from 0 to 37%, according to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics census data from 2008. In analysis to follow, we use non￾Jewish population rather than percent PCI because Israeli Census does not include ethnicity of non-Jewish residents and some of the non-Jewish population may not be PCI. However, it is reasonable to assume that the overwhelming share of this population is PCI. and under our direct supervision. Our sample includes 439 subjects, all of whom are Jewish Israelis. Since we are interested in the implications of exclusion, we choose to focus on the hegemonic majority group be￾cause that is the group with the power to exclude. We used quotas for gender and age to generate a balanced sample on these covariates.While the sample is broadly representative of the Jewish population of Israel, ultra￾Orthodox Jews are intentionally overrepresented (see Table A.1 in the Online Appendix). Respondents were selected to participate in our study using a random walk strategy, with a partici￾pation rate of about 17%. Participation took around 40 minutes and was conducted inside participants’ homes. Participants were told that this research deals with “Israeli society” and worked independently on computers provided by our fieldworkers. Compensa￾tion for participation was determined by randomly se￾lecting the outcome of one of the economic decision￾making games. Participants were first asked to play a public goods game with three rounds in a random order: against a PCI, Jewish secular, or ultra-Orthodox opposing player. The opposing players were all real people, whose decisions in the public goods game, as we ex￾plained to subjects, were recorded in advance.10 Par￾ticipants were shown a picture of the opposing play￾ers next to their name, age, and city of residence. The names provided a strong indicator whether the op￾posing player was Jewish or PCI, and the distinctive clothes of the ultra-Orthodox players clearly distin￾guished them from Jewish secular players. Almost 95% of our players were able to identify the ethnicity of the opposing player based on these cues. The structure of our public goods game is drawn from previous work on intergroup relations in eth￾nically diverse societies (Habyarimana et al. 2009). In each round, participants were given twenty Israeli Shekels (NIS) and had to decide whether to cooperate by sharing the full sum or defect by keeping the full sum to themselves. After announcing their decision, they were informed of the opposing player’s decision, which we recorded in advance. In line with the standard procedure of the public goods game, payoffs were mul￾tiplied by 1.5 and divided equally between the two par￾ticipants.This means that if both sides cooperated, each participant ended the game with 30 NIS. If one cooper￾ated and the other did not, the person who cooperated received 15 NIS and the person who did not cooperate received 35 NIS. If both sides did not cooperate, both remained with their initial sum of 20 NIS. Thus, as is the standard in the public goods game, cooperation is the mutually beneficial strategy. We measure cooperation as a binary variable mea￾sured by play in the game against the PCI player, coded one if the subject cooperated, zero otherwise. Over￾all, only 33% (N = 147) of subjects cooperated with the PCI player, while 61% cooperated with the secular 10 Note that playing against pre-recorded moves of opposing players has been used successfully in previous lab-in-the-field studies (Enos and Gidron 2016; Whitt and Wilson 2007). 747 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000266