international community not only turned a blind eye to the violence that was brewing in the early months of 1994 Rwanda, but adamantly refused to take any substantive action to stop the violence once it had started. These dollars did not erase the pain of the hundreds of thousands of women and girls, some as young as two years old, who had been subjected to sexual violence of unspeakable brutality during the infernal months of 1994. Neither did they erase the pain of the many survivors who had seen their entire families slaughtered, many right before their eyes They did not return parents to the 95,000 children orphaned by the genocide. And, above all these dollars did not, could not have, dissipated the animosities, structured across ethnic lines that had provided the fuel for the genocide, and that had made this incomprehensibly gruesome political strategy an achievable reality in 1994 Rwanda Perhaps one of the most important aspects of international aid to post-genocide Rwanda however, one that seeks to address these very animosities at their socio-cultural roots, has been the concerted international involvement in supporting the process of post-genocide reconciliation in Rwanda. In recognition of the central importance of this particular process in the context of contemporary Rwanda, this paper will focus on this one facet of Rwanda's post-conflict process Noting the fundamental inseparability of the process of reconciliation from the political intricacies of post-genocide Rwanda, as well as the evident dialectical interaction between post-genocide politics and this process of reconciliation, this paper will explore and analyze some of the many aspects of the relationship between politics and reconciliation in contemporary Rwanda. Before delving into this discussion, however, it is first necessary to understand the various historical processes that led up to the 1994 genocide, and that thus created a situation in which such a process of reconciliation has become not only necessary, but truly pivotal. In this light, this It is well documented that the UN, as well as many individual governments, were aware of the plans for the genocide months before it actually began. See Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Sto"ort Genocide in Rwanda(New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999),18. Also see United Nations, "Rep Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 16 December1999,shttp://www.un.org/news/dH/latest/rwanda.htm>(7April2004) Binaifer Nowrojee, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996), 24 United Nations Childrens Fund, "Rwanda: Ten years after the genocide, n d fobycountry/rwanda genocide. html>(7 April 2004)2 “international community” not only turned a blind eye to the violence that was brewing in the early months of 1994 Rwanda, but adamantly refused to take any substantive action to stop the violence once it had started.2 These dollars did not erase the pain of the hundreds of thousands of women and girls, some as young as two years old, who had been subjected to sexual violence of unspeakable brutality during the infernal months of 1994.3 Neither did they erase the pain of the many survivors who had seen their entire families slaughtered, many right before their eyes. They did not return parents to the 95,000 children orphaned by the genocide.4 And, above all, these dollars did not, could not have, dissipated the animosities, structured across ethnic lines, that had provided the fuel for the genocide, and that had made this incomprehensibly gruesome political strategy an achievable reality in 1994 Rwanda. Perhaps one of the most important aspects of international aid to post-genocide Rwanda, however, one that seeks to address these very animosities at their socio-cultural roots, has been the concerted international involvement in supporting the process of post-genocide reconciliation in Rwanda. In recognition of the central importance of this particular process in the context of contemporary Rwanda, this paper will focus on this one facet of Rwanda’s post-conflict process. Noting the fundamental inseparability of the process of reconciliation from the political intricacies of post-genocide Rwanda, as well as the evident dialectical interaction between post-genocide politics and this process of reconciliation, this paper will explore and analyze some of the many aspects of the relationship between politics and reconciliation in contemporary Rwanda. Before delving into this discussion, however, it is first necessary to understand the various historical processes that led up to the 1994 genocide, and that thus created a situation in which such a process of reconciliation has become not only necessary, but truly pivotal. In this light, this 2 It is well documented that the UN, as well as many individual governments, were aware of the plans for the genocide months before it actually began. See Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 18. Also see United Nations, “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” 16 December 1999, <http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/rwanda.htm> (7 April 2004). 3 Binaifer Nowrojee, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996), 24. 4 United Nations Children’s Fund, “Rwanda: Ten years after the genocide,” n.d., <http://unicef.org/infobycountry/rwanda_genocide.html> (7 April 2004)