UNIVERSITY OF CALIF WAR CRIMES STUDIES CENTER SC Report on Rwanda Radha Webley Researcher L Introduction The crises that followed the 1994 genocide in Rwanda captured the world's attention, generating a morbid display of belated concern from around the globe. United Nations(UN) agencies, governmental bodies and nongovernmental organizations(NGos) from around the world rushed in to this tiny central African country with their humanitarian toolboxes ready for action, their sudden interest in helping Rwanda fueled by a potent cocktail of collective guilt mixed with much belated human empathy As nearly two million Rwandans fled their homes in the days, weeks and months following the genocide, approximately 2. 5 billion international aid dollars were funneled into the refugee camps that framed Rwanda's borders. In the years that followed, billions more dollars were spent by international donors toward the project of post-genocide humanitarian intervention and reconstruction in Rwanda. These dollars were critical in alleviating the surface level of the human catastrophe that faced Rwanda in July 1994. They helped to clean up the nearly one million bodies that were rotting in outhouses, roads, rivers and mass graves across the country. They provided basic healthcare services and food aid for thousands of Rwandan citizens. They assisted in the rebuilding of the many houses and buildings that had been destroyed during the months of killing. Finally, they helped to address the economic and political vacuum that was Rwanda in the months following the genocide, a project for which many international governments, agencies and organizations remain in Rwanda up to the present day Yet all of these dollars did not mask the fact that approximately 800,000 individuals had been brutally slaughtered in the space of three months, that Rwanda's pre-genocide population of approximately 8 million people had been quite literally decimated in the fastest mass killing in recorded history. They did not mask the fact that all of this had taken place while the Elizabeth Neuffer, The Key to My Neighbor's House: Seeking Justice in Bosnia and Rwanda(New York 001),249
1 War Crimes Studies Center University of California at Berkeley Report on Rwanda Radha Webley Researcher I. Introduction The crises that followed the 1994 genocide in Rwanda captured the world’s attention, generating a morbid display of belated concern from around the globe. United Nations (UN) agencies, governmental bodies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from around the world rushed in to this tiny central African country with their humanitarian toolboxes ready for action, their sudden interest in helping Rwanda fueled by a potent cocktail of collective guilt mixed with muchbelated human empathy. As nearly two million Rwandans fled their homes in the days, weeks and months following the genocide, approximately 2.5 billion international aid dollars were funneled into the refugee camps that framed Rwanda’s borders.1 In the years that followed, billions more dollars were spent by international donors toward the project of post-genocide humanitarian intervention and reconstruction in Rwanda. These dollars were critical in alleviating the surface level of the human catastrophe that faced Rwanda in July 1994. They helped to clean up the nearly one million bodies that were rotting in outhouses, roads, rivers and mass graves across the country. They provided basic healthcare services and food aid for thousands of Rwandan citizens. They assisted in the rebuilding of the many houses and buildings that had been destroyed during the months of killing. Finally, they helped to address the economic and political vacuum that was Rwanda in the months following the genocide, a project for which many international governments, agencies and organizations remain in Rwanda up to the present day. Yet all of these dollars did not mask the fact that approximately 800,000 individuals had been brutally slaughtered in the space of three months, that Rwanda’s pre-genocide population of approximately 8 million people had been quite literally decimated in the fastest mass killing in recorded history. They did not mask the fact that all of this had taken place while the 1 Elizabeth Neuffer, The Key to My Neighbor’s House: Seeking Justice in Bosnia and Rwanda (New York: Picador Books, 2001), 249
international community not only turned a blind eye to the violence that was brewing in the early months of 1994 Rwanda, but adamantly refused to take any substantive action to stop the violence once it had started. These dollars did not erase the pain of the hundreds of thousands of women and girls, some as young as two years old, who had been subjected to sexual violence of unspeakable brutality during the infernal months of 1994. Neither did they erase the pain of the many survivors who had seen their entire families slaughtered, many right before their eyes They did not return parents to the 95,000 children orphaned by the genocide. And, above all these dollars did not, could not have, dissipated the animosities, structured across ethnic lines that had provided the fuel for the genocide, and that had made this incomprehensibly gruesome political strategy an achievable reality in 1994 Rwanda Perhaps one of the most important aspects of international aid to post-genocide Rwanda however, one that seeks to address these very animosities at their socio-cultural roots, has been the concerted international involvement in supporting the process of post-genocide reconciliation in Rwanda. In recognition of the central importance of this particular process in the context of contemporary Rwanda, this paper will focus on this one facet of Rwanda's post-conflict process Noting the fundamental inseparability of the process of reconciliation from the political intricacies of post-genocide Rwanda, as well as the evident dialectical interaction between post-genocide politics and this process of reconciliation, this paper will explore and analyze some of the many aspects of the relationship between politics and reconciliation in contemporary Rwanda. Before delving into this discussion, however, it is first necessary to understand the various historical processes that led up to the 1994 genocide, and that thus created a situation in which such a process of reconciliation has become not only necessary, but truly pivotal. In this light, this It is well documented that the UN, as well as many individual governments, were aware of the plans for the genocide months before it actually began. See Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Sto"ort Genocide in Rwanda(New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999),18. Also see United Nations, "Rep Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 16 December1999,shttp://www.un.org/news/dH/latest/rwanda.htm>(7April2004) Binaifer Nowrojee, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996), 24 United Nations Childrens Fund, "Rwanda: Ten years after the genocide, n d fobycountry/rwanda genocide. html>(7 April 2004)
2 “international community” not only turned a blind eye to the violence that was brewing in the early months of 1994 Rwanda, but adamantly refused to take any substantive action to stop the violence once it had started.2 These dollars did not erase the pain of the hundreds of thousands of women and girls, some as young as two years old, who had been subjected to sexual violence of unspeakable brutality during the infernal months of 1994.3 Neither did they erase the pain of the many survivors who had seen their entire families slaughtered, many right before their eyes. They did not return parents to the 95,000 children orphaned by the genocide.4 And, above all, these dollars did not, could not have, dissipated the animosities, structured across ethnic lines, that had provided the fuel for the genocide, and that had made this incomprehensibly gruesome political strategy an achievable reality in 1994 Rwanda. Perhaps one of the most important aspects of international aid to post-genocide Rwanda, however, one that seeks to address these very animosities at their socio-cultural roots, has been the concerted international involvement in supporting the process of post-genocide reconciliation in Rwanda. In recognition of the central importance of this particular process in the context of contemporary Rwanda, this paper will focus on this one facet of Rwanda’s post-conflict process. Noting the fundamental inseparability of the process of reconciliation from the political intricacies of post-genocide Rwanda, as well as the evident dialectical interaction between post-genocide politics and this process of reconciliation, this paper will explore and analyze some of the many aspects of the relationship between politics and reconciliation in contemporary Rwanda. Before delving into this discussion, however, it is first necessary to understand the various historical processes that led up to the 1994 genocide, and that thus created a situation in which such a process of reconciliation has become not only necessary, but truly pivotal. In this light, this 2 It is well documented that the UN, as well as many individual governments, were aware of the plans for the genocide months before it actually began. See Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 18. Also see United Nations, “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” 16 December 1999, (7 April 2004). 3 Binaifer Nowrojee, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996), 24. 4 United Nations Children’s Fund, “Rwanda: Ten years after the genocide,” n.d., (7 April 2004)
chapter will now turn to an overview of select themes from Rwanda's history, and then to a background discussion of theoretical and comparative conceptualizations of the process that has become known in scholarly parlance as "post-conflict reconciliation Background to Genocide There are three principal ethnic groups in Rwanda- the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. Throughout the 20 century, the numerical breakdown of these groups was approximately 84% Hutu, 15% Tutsi and 1% Twa. Although Rwandans of Tutsi ethnicity comprised the bulk of the individuals killed during the genocide, it is generally thought that this breakdown remains largely the same today and that the many Tutsi refugees that returned to Rwanda after the 1994 genocide replaced numerically the hundreds of thousands of Tutsis who were killed during this time. Given that the Rwandan genocide involved the systematic massacre of one particular ethnic group, it is tempting to attribute the genocide merely to primordial ethnic hatred and thus to relegate it to the realm of ancient and therefore intractable conflicts. Such a simple explanation, however, does not even begin to touch on the complex interplay of political, economic, historical and cultural factors that together gave birth to this mass human tragedy. Thus, in attempting to grasp the causative origins of the genocide, scholars point to everything from ethnic animosity to economic inequalit from colonial historyto political opportunism, and from ecological pressure to the vicissitudes of the stringent economic policy reforms that accompanied the World Bank's aid and loan packages. 8 Des Forges. 31-37. 6 The Rwandan refugee diaspora was the result of the events surrounding and following the 1959"Social Revolution "in Rwanda. During this time, many large-scale massacres of Rwandan Tutsis took place causing many Tutsis to flee to neighboring countries, particularly Uganda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 7 Rwanda was first colonized by the Germans in 1897, and was taken over by Belgium in 1916 during World War I. Belgium officially relinquished its imperial control over Rwanda in 1962 For further discussions of the many factors that contributed to the 1994 genocide, see Des Forges Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in rwanda (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001); David Newbury, "Understanding Genocide, African Studies Review 41, no. 1(1998): 73-97; Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994. History of a Genocide(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Peter Uvin Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda(west Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1998)
3 chapter will now turn to an overview of select themes from Rwanda’s history, and then to a background discussion of theoretical and comparative conceptualizations of the process that has become known in scholarly parlance as “post-conflict reconciliation.” Background to Genocide There are three principal ethnic groups in Rwanda – the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. Throughout the 20th century, the numerical breakdown of these groups was approximately 84% Hutu, 15% Tutsi, and 1% Twa.5 Although Rwandans of Tutsi ethnicity comprised the bulk of the individuals killed during the genocide, it is generally thought that this breakdown remains largely the same today, and that the many Tutsi refugees that returned to Rwanda after the 1994 genocide replaced numerically the hundreds of thousands of Tutsis who were killed during this time.6 Given that the Rwandan genocide involved the systematic massacre of one particular ethnic group, it is tempting to attribute the genocide merely to primordial ethnic hatred and thus to relegate it to the realm of ancient and therefore intractable conflicts. Such a simple explanation, however, does not even begin to touch on the complex interplay of political, economic, historical and cultural factors that together gave birth to this mass human tragedy. Thus, in attempting to grasp the causative origins of the genocide, scholars point to everything from ethnic animosity to economic inequality, from colonial history7 to political opportunism, and from ecological pressure to the vicissitudes of the stringent economic policy reforms that accompanied the World Bank’s aid and loan packages.8 5 Des Forges, 31-37. 6 The Rwandan refugee diaspora was the result of the events surrounding and following the 1959 “Social Revolution” in Rwanda. During this time, many large-scale massacres of Rwandan Tutsis took place, causing many Tutsis to flee to neighboring countries, particularly Uganda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 7 Rwanda was first colonized by the Germans in 1897, and was taken over by Belgium in 1916 during World War I. Belgium officially relinquished its imperial control over Rwanda in 1962. 8 For further discussions of the many factors that contributed to the 1994 genocide, see Des Forges; Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001); David Newbury, “Understanding Genocide,” African Studies Review 41, no. 1 (1998): 73-97; Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Peter Uvin Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1998)
Without denying this complexity, however, it must be stressed that the 1994 genocide in Rwanda was, above all else, a political event. The violence of 1994 did not appear in a political vacuum Rather, it appeared in the context of a civil war in Rwanda that had begun in October 1990 as a result of military incursions into Rwanda' s northern region that were led by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Army(RPA).In light of these ongoing invasions, and in the context of growing demands from moderate political voices to bring an end to the single-party state that had governed Rwanda since 1973, the Rwandan government, under the direction of President Juvenal Habyarimana, was faced with growing threats to its power. This sense of imminent threat was only reinforced by the Arusha Accord signed into law in August 1993. This internationally- monitored peace agreement mandated a transition to a power-sharing government in Rwanda This new"transitional government was intended to include a number of different political parties, to incorporate the Rwandan Patriotic Front(RPF) into the Rwandan political structure and to integrate the armed forces with the RPA. In this context, the Arusha Accord, along with the menacing presence of the RPa on Rwanda's northern border, provided a clear enemy against which the exclusionary "Hutu Power movement. once an extremist political party relegated to the fringe" of Rwandan politics, could move into "the mainstream of respectable politics. This extremist movement forged an alliance with the akazu, the group that effectively monopolized the bulk of political power under the Habyarimana regime and that thus likewise balked at the threat of multi-party reforms. In this context, the Hutu The Rwandan Patriotic Army(RPA)was a guerrilla army originally formed in Uganda within a diasporic Rwandan population comprised primarily of Tutsi refugees(see Footnote 6). The sons of these early Rwandan refugees in Uganda eventually formed the RPA. See Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers 159-184 The Rwandan Patriotic Front, or RPF, is the political party that evolved alongside the rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) d,. Des Forges, 123-125 Bruce D. Jones, "The Arusha Peace Process, "in Howard Adelman and Astri Republic of Rwanda, "The Arusha Peace Agreement, " nd http:/www.rwandal.com/government/historvfhtmi>(9April2004 12 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 189 IS Akazu, or"little house, "is the term commonly used to denote the group of individuals associated with President Habyarimana. This group exercised significant political power during the period of Habyarimana's rule, and included individuals who had special connections to the President either through regional affiliation or through family ties. It especially included the extended family of the Presidents wife
4 Without denying this complexity, however, it must be stressed that the 1994 genocide in Rwanda was, above all else, a political event. The violence of 1994 did not appear in a political vacuum. Rather, it appeared in the context of a civil war in Rwanda that had begun in October 1990 as a result of military incursions into Rwanda’s northern region that were led by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA).9 In light of these ongoing invasions, and in the context of growing demands from moderate political voices to bring an end to the single-party state that had governed Rwanda since 1973, the Rwandan government, under the direction of President Juvénal Habyarimana, was faced with growing threats to its power. This sense of imminent threat was only reinforced by the Arusha Accord signed into law in August 1993. This internationallymonitored peace agreement mandated a transition to a power-sharing government in Rwanda. This new “transitional” government was intended to include a number of different political parties, to incorporate the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)10 into the Rwandan political structure, and to integrate the armed forces with the RPA.11 In this context, the Arusha Accord, along with the menacing presence of the RPA on Rwanda’s northern border, provided a clear enemy against which the exclusionary “Hutu Power” movement, once an extremist political party relegated to the “fringe” of Rwandan politics, could move into “the mainstream of respectable politics.”12 This extremist movement forged an alliance with the akazu,13 the group that effectively monopolized the bulk of political power under the Habyarimana regime and that thus likewise balked at the threat of multi-party reforms. In this context, the Hutu 9 The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) was a guerrilla army originally formed in Uganda within a diasporic Rwandan population comprised primarily of Tutsi refugees (see Footnote 6). The sons of these early Rwandan refugees in Uganda eventually formed the RPA. See Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 159-184. 10 The Rwandan Patriotic Front, or RPF, is the political party that evolved alongside the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). 11 Des Forges, 123-125; Bruce D. Jones, “The Arusha Peace Process,” in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds., The Path of a Genocide (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1999); Republic of Rwanda, “The Arusha Peace Agreement,” n.d., (9 April 2004). 12 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 189. 13 Akazu, or “little house,” is the term commonly used to denote the group of individuals associated with President Habyarimana. This group exercised significant political power during the period of Habyarimana’s rule, and included individuals who had special connections to the President either through regional affiliation or through family ties. It especially included the extended family of the President’s wife
Power movement, led by Colonel Bagasora(also the head of Habyarimana's Presidential Guard began to exercise unprecedented power within the politics of early 1990s Rwanda. During this time, anti-Tutsi ideologies were actively propagated, fears of"Tutsi power were revived and nurtured, and massacres against Tutsis began to be organized and implemented on a sporad basis across the country. Using the tutsis as a convenient scapegoat both for the heightening political threats and also for growing economic decline, political leaders effectively mobilized the Rwandan population against an ethnically-defined Tutsi threat. It was in this context that the 1994 genocide began, and that Rwandans of Tutsi ethnicity, as well as politically moderate Hutu individuals and their families were murdered en masse 14 Although planned, organized and implemented at the highest levels of government, the genocide was nonetheless carried out by hundreds of thousands of ordinary Rwandans who used machetes and other small arms to torture rape and kill their victims. Scholars speculate about whether this mass participation was supported by fear of the consequences of refusing to engage in the slaughter, by hopes of personal gain, by a culture in which obedience to authority was both culturally mandated and deeply instilled, or simply by raw ethnic prejudice. Whether this mass participation can be attributed to any one of these factors or whether it must instead be understood as a combination of all of them, the fact remains that this killing was, for the most part, structured around ethnicity, and that it was fueled by a discourse of ethnic prejudice Ethnicity and Power in Rwanda: a Brief History Both as an ascriptive category and as a historical process, ethnicity in Rwanda is ridden with uncertainties. Although generally considered within academic scholarship to be a category that denotes cultural difference, ethnicity in Rwanda is not in fact a cultural marker, for the different ethnic groups in this country share the same language, the same customs, and the same For a full discussion of the political background to the genocide, see Des Forges, 47-93: Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. 185-233 5 Mamdani. When Victims Become Killers.196 Ibid. 200: Prunier. 242-248
5 Power movement, led by Colonel Bagasora (also the head of Habyarimana’s Presidential Guard), began to exercise unprecedented power within the politics of early 1990s Rwanda. During this time, anti-Tutsi ideologies were actively propagated, fears of “Tutsi power” were revived and nurtured, and massacres against Tutsis began to be organized and implemented on a sporadic basis across the country. Using the Tutsis as a convenient scapegoat both for the heightening political threats and also for growing economic decline, political leaders effectively mobilized the Rwandan population against an ethnically-defined Tutsi threat. It was in this context that the 1994 genocide began, and that Rwandans of Tutsi ethnicity, as well as politically moderate Hutu individuals and their families, were murdered en masse. 14 Although planned, organized and implemented at the highest levels of government, the genocide was nonetheless carried out by hundreds of thousands of ordinary Rwandans who used machetes and other small arms to torture, rape and kill their victims.15 Scholars speculate about whether this mass participation was supported by fear of the consequences of refusing to engage in the slaughter, by hopes of personal gain, by a culture in which obedience to authority was both culturally mandated and deeply instilled, or simply by raw ethnic prejudice.16 Whether this mass participation can be attributed to any one of these factors or whether it must instead be understood as a combination of all of them, the fact remains that this killing was, for the most part, structured around ethnicity, and that it was fueled by a discourse of ethnic prejudice. Ethnicity and Power in Rwanda: a Brief History Both as an ascriptive category and as a historical process, ethnicity in Rwanda is ridden with uncertainties. Although generally considered within academic scholarship to be a category that denotes cultural difference, ethnicity in Rwanda is not in fact a cultural marker, for the different ethnic groups in this country share the same language, the same customs, and the same 14 For a full discussion of the political background to the genocide, see Des Forges, 47-93; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 185-233. 15 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 196. 16 Ibid., 200; Prunier, 242-248
culture. Because of this apparent inconsistency between the usual definition of ethnicity and the actual reality of ethnicity in Rwanda, scholars have long debated the origins of ethnic difference in Rwanda, and the question of whether this difference is based in class, better resembles the concept of"caste, or in fact reflects the distinct historical origins of the three Rwandan groupings. 18 What is resoundingly clear in examining the history of ethnicity in Rwanda, however, is that, more than anything, ethnicity in Rwanda is about power, a means of structuring access to and exclusion from political and economic power. It is for this reason that, when discussing ethnicity in the Rwandan context, the author finds it most useful to employ anthropologist Mahmood Mamdani's conception of ethnicity as political identity, a conception based on his argument that ethnic identity must be understood as a direct consequence of the way in which power is rganized in relation to the state. Such a "processual approach to ethnicity is also articulated by Catharine Newbury, a well-known historian of Rwanda, who maintains that ethnicity must be seen as a dynamic process that develops in relation to state power and political processes These particular interpretations of ethnicity are critical to understanding Rwanda, not only because they allow us to see the concrete political implications and origins of ethnicity, but also because they emphasize that ethnicity, rather than being a primordial, static, and thus insurmountable reality, is in fact a historical process. of equal importance this approach to ethnicity as "political identity allows us to extricate ourselves from the highly contested(and ultimately irresolvable)question of the historical origins of the Hutu and Tutsi groups in Rwanda 21 es Forges, 31-38; Prunier, 1-40 For a taste of these debates, see Des Forges, 31-38: D. Newbury, 73-97; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. 41-75 Mamdani. When victims Become killers. 2 Catharine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988),14 2I There are two main competing interpretations of the nature of ethnicity in precolonial Rwanda. Some claim that in the precolonial era, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa lived in harmony, and that it was European colonialism that introduced and created cleavages between these groups. Others assert that the precolonial period involved the brutal conquest of the Hutu and Twa by the Tutsi "who imposed an oppressive exploitative rule, and that colonial rule only intensified these already-deep divisions. However, as historian Catharine Newbury points out, these two stances "reflect political positions more than valid historical reconstruction"and ignore the complex historical processes that have shaped the current form of
6 culture.17 Because of this apparent inconsistency between the usual definition of ethnicity and the actual reality of ethnicity in Rwanda, scholars have long debated the origins of ethnic difference in Rwanda, and the question of whether this difference is based in class, better resembles the concept of “caste,” or in fact reflects the distinct historical origins of the three Rwandan groupings.18 What is resoundingly clear in examining the history of ethnicity in Rwanda, however, is that, more than anything, ethnicity in Rwanda is about power, a means of structuring access to and exclusion from political and economic power. It is for this reason that, when discussing ethnicity in the Rwandan context, the author finds it most useful to employ anthropologist Mahmood Mamdani’s conception of ethnicity as political identity, a conception based on his argument that ethnic identity must be understood as a direct consequence of the way in which power is organized in relation to the state.19 Such a “processual approach to ethnicity” is also articulated by Catharine Newbury, a well-known historian of Rwanda, who maintains that ethnicity must be seen as a dynamic process that develops in relation to state power and political processes.20 These particular interpretations of ethnicity are critical to understanding Rwanda, not only because they allow us to see the concrete political implications and origins of ethnicity, but also because they emphasize that ethnicity, rather than being a primordial, static, and thus insurmountable reality, is in fact a historical process. Of equal importance, this approach to ethnicity as “political identity” allows us to extricate ourselves from the highly contested (and ultimately irresolvable) question of the historical origins of the Hutu and Tutsi groups in Rwanda.21 17 Des Forges, 31-38; Prunier, 1-40. 18 For a taste of these debates, see Des Forges, 31-38; D. Newbury, 73-97; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 41-75. 19 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 22. 20 Catharine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 14. 21 There are two main competing interpretations of the nature of ethnicity in precolonial Rwanda. Some claim that in the precolonial era, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa lived in harmony, and that it was European colonialism that introduced and created cleavages between these groups. Others assert that the precolonial period involved the brutal conquest of the Hutu and Twa by the Tutsi “who imposed an oppressive, exploitative rule,” and that colonial rule only intensified these already-deep divisions. However, as historian Catharine Newbury points out, these two stances “reflect political positions more than valid historical reconstruction” and ignore the complex historical processes that have shaped the current form of
In approaching Rwandan ethnicity as"political identity, this question of origins is relegated to the background and we can instead focus on the development of the meaning attributed to these categories, and on how people understand and have understood this distinction over time With this theoretical background in mind, it is possible to trace the linkages between ethnicity and power over the course of Rwandan history. This linkage was already evident in Rwanda long before Europeans, first German and then Belgian, established a presence there in 1897 Nonetheless, there remains a great deal of uncertainty about what ethnic categories actually meant in precolonial Rwanda and on what basis they were structured Many historians, for example, note that clear physical differences existed between the hutu and the Tutsi groups ,22 but just as many scholars underline the inconsistency of such physical difference as a marker of ethnic difference in precolonial times. At the same time, while it is generally agreed that Hutu as a group tended to be primarily agriculturists while Tutsi as a group tended to be cattle-herders, 3 scholars emphasize the need to historicize this occupational pattern as an artifact"created alongside the institutionalized power of the Rwandan state. Other explanations note that Tutsi as a category tended to denote access to economic power, while Hutu as a category tended to be marked by the lack of access to such power." Whatever the scholarly disagreements, however there is a general agreement that the precolonial categories of Hutu and Tutsi were fairly flexible, and were characterized by a relatively high degree of intermarriage as well as by socio-cultural processes that allowed individuals to move, over time, between ethnic groupings Nonetheless, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the flexibility of these categories started to diminish, and their political meanings began to increase. During this time, the Tutsi ethnicity in Rwanda. See Catharine Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda, "Africa 7oday45,no.l(1999) 22 The stereotypical construction of Tutsis envisions them as"extremely tall and thin, and often displaying sharp, angular facial features"(Prunier, 5). Hutus are stereotyped as being shorter, with flatter and broader facial feature unier Mamdani, When victims Become Killers, 51 PC Newbury, The Cohesion ofOppression, 11-12 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 53-4; C. Newbury, The Cohesion ofOppression, 12
7 In approaching Rwandan ethnicity as “political identity,” this question of origins is relegated to the background and we can instead focus on the development of the meaning attributed to these categories, and on how people understand and have understood this distinction over time. With this theoretical background in mind, it is possible to trace the linkages between ethnicity and power over the course of Rwandan history. This linkage was already evident in Rwanda long before Europeans, first German and then Belgian, established a presence there in 1897. Nonetheless, there remains a great deal of uncertainty about what ethnic categories actually meant in precolonial Rwanda and on what basis they were structured. Many historians, for example, note that clear physical differences existed between the Hutu and the Tutsi groups,22 but just as many scholars underline the inconsistency of such physical difference as a marker of ethnic difference in precolonial times. At the same time, while it is generally agreed that Hutu as a group tended to be primarily agriculturists, while Tutsi as a group tended to be cattle-herders,23 scholars emphasize the need to historicize this occupational pattern as an artifact “created alongside the institutionalized power of the Rwandan state.”24 Other explanations note that Tutsi as a category tended to denote access to economic power, while Hutu as a category tended to be marked by the lack of access to such power.25 Whatever the scholarly disagreements, however, there is a general agreement that the precolonial categories of Hutu and Tutsi were fairly flexible, and were characterized by a relatively high degree of intermarriage26 as well as by socio-cultural processes that allowed individuals to move, over time, between ethnic groupings. Nonetheless, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the flexibility of these categories started to diminish, and their political meanings began to increase. During this time, the Tutsi ethnicity in Rwanda. See Catharine Newbury, “Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda,” Africa Today 45, no. 1 (1999): 7. 22 The stereotypical construction of Tutsis envisions them as “extremely tall and thin, and often displaying sharp, angular facial features” (Prunier, 5). Hutus are stereotyped as being shorter, with flatter and broader facial features. 23 Prunier, 5. 24 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 51. 25 C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 11-12 . 26 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 53-4; C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 12
monarchy, their rule once confined to the central region of present-day Rwanda, began to undertake a major territorial expansion. It was in the process of this expansion that ethnicity in Rwanda began to acquire a distinct rigidity, as well as to acquire the polarized quality that it still holds today. This expansion entailed not only the physical extension of the Tutsi monarchy's rule but also the gradual consolidation and centralization of its political and economic power. This was accomplished by changes in the manner in which chiefship were allocated by the monarchical administration, by the introduction of new structures of patron-client relations, and by the state- sponsored revision of traditional structures of land ownership As Catharine Newbury points out, the collective result of these changes was a pronounced increase in the social stratification between the increasingly oppressed Hutu peasantry and the cattle-owning Tutsi ruling class, and the rigidification of the once-flexible categories of Hutu and Tutsi. In sum, this process involved the "transformation of the tutsi nobility into a well defined social class, the increasing association of the category"Tutsi with proximity to power(even though it was only a small Tutsi minority with such access to power), and the institution of a markedly stratified and hierarchical society ruled by a small section of the Tutsi class. It is also important to note, however, that although the central monarchy was predominantly Tutsi Rwanda's nineteenth-century political structure included not only the central monarchical together served as a system of checks and balances against the monarchical state y that administration, but also a complex system of overlapping(and multi-ethnic)chiefdoms 2 The Tutsi monarchy in Rwanda, which can be traced to the 14th century, was, during of the 19thcentury led by the nyiginya clan, one of 12 Tutsi clans in 19 century Rwanda. For a fuller discussion of this topic see Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 26-30, 499; Jan Vansina, L'evolution du royaume rwanda des origines a 1900 (Bruxelles: Academie Royales des Sciences d Outre-Mer, 1999) lan Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda(Oxford: Manchester University Press, 1977), 15-16 C Newbury, The Cohesion ofOppression, 16-17, 38-40, 81-90: Vansina C. Newbury, The Cohesion ofOppression, 12, 38-72 50 Linden, 17-18 C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression,11,51 Rene lemarchand, African Kingships in Perspective: Political Change and Modernization in Monarchical Settings(London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1977), 77-8: C. Newbury, The Cohesion ofOppression, 95-150
8 monarchy,27 their rule once confined to the central region of present-day Rwanda, began to undertake a major territorial expansion. It was in the process of this expansion that ethnicity in Rwanda began to acquire a distinct rigidity, as well as to acquire the polarized quality that it still holds today. This expansion entailed not only the physical extension of the Tutsi monarchy’s rule, but also the gradual consolidation and centralization of its political and economic power. This was accomplished by changes in the manner in which chiefships were allocated by the monarchical administration, by the introduction of new structures of patron-client relations, and by the statesponsored revision of traditional structures of land ownership.28 As Catharine Newbury points out, the collective result of these changes was a pronounced increase in the social stratification between the increasingly oppressed Hutu peasantry and the cattle-owning Tutsi ruling class, and the rigidification of the once-flexible categories of Hutu and Tutsi.29 In sum, this process involved the “transformation of the Tutsi nobility into a well defined social class,” the increasing association of the category “Tutsi” with proximity to power (even though it was only a small Tutsi minority with such access to power), and the institution of a markedly stratified and hierarchical society ruled by a small section of the Tutsi class.30 It is also important to note, however, that although the central monarchy was predominantly Tutsi, Rwanda’s nineteenth-century political structure included not only the central monarchical administration, but also a complex system of overlapping (and multi-ethnic) chiefdoms that together served as a system of checks and balances against the monarchical state.31 27 The Tutsi monarchy in Rwanda, which can be traced to the 14th century, was, during of the 19th century, led by the nyiginya clan, one of 12 Tutsi clans in 19th century Rwanda. For a fuller discussion of this topic, see René Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 26-30, 499; Jan Vansina, L’évolution du royaume rwanda des origines à 1900 (Bruxelles: Academie Royales des Sciences d’Outre-Mer, 1999). 28 Ian Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda (Oxford: Manchester University Press, 1977), 15-16; C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 16-17, 38-40, 81-90; Vansina. 29 C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 12, 38-72. 30 Linden, 17-18; C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 11, 51. 31 René Lemarchand, African Kingships in Perspective: Political Change and Modernization in Monarchical Settings (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1977), 77-8; C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 95-150
An understanding of the precolonial past, however, is not sufficient to fully fathom the contemporary nature of ethnicity in Rwanda, for colonization left indelible markings on Rwanda's ethnic structure. By the end of the colonial era, the linkages between ethnicity and power had been fundamentally altered as a result of the many changes wrought by the colonial state Beginning in 1897 with the establishment of German colonial rule in Rwanda, and continuing until 1962 when Rwanda officially gained its independence from Belgium, Rwanda's colonial administrators(first German, then Belgian) critically reinforced the growing tendency toward ethnically structured social stratification The European attitude towards ethnicity in Rwanda revolved around the Hamitic hypothesis This then-fashionable theory" held that all peoples exhibiting signs of true civilization"in Africa must have been descended from a superior"Caucasoid "race originally from northeastern Africa. In relation to Rwanda, this theory led to the construction of Tutsis as a group that was considered both foreign and also distinctly superior to the Hutu majority. As anthropologist Johan Pottier explains, "Belgian colonists contributed to the ideology of (elite) Tutsi self- consciousness an explanation of physical difference in terms of ancestral migration- for which there was no firm empirical basis-and they made all Tutsi superior, all Hutu inferior. This stands in stark contrast to the precolonial linkages between Tutsi and power, in which context it was only the Tutsi elite, primarily drawn from the nyiginya clan, who were socially constructed as superior to the Hutu This perceived racial divide was not purely ideological, but was translated into concrete institutional policies Implemented by the colonial state in Rwanda, these policies explicitly In the case of Rwanda, it was assumed that the precolonial Tutsi monarchy was evidence of foreign descent, for Europeans refused to believe that such a symbol of civilization"as a monarchy could have its as a group must be of foreign descent Lemarchand, African Kingships in Perspective, 74-5; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 35, 80 88; Prunier, 7; Des Forges, 36; Christopher Taylor, Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of1994 (Oxford New York: Berg, 1999), 55-94 Johan Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),112
9 An understanding of the precolonial past, however, is not sufficient to fully fathom the contemporary nature of ethnicity in Rwanda, for colonization left indelible markings on Rwanda’s ethnic structure. By the end of the colonial era, the linkages between ethnicity and power had been fundamentally altered as a result of the many changes wrought by the colonial state. Beginning in 1897 with the establishment of German colonial rule in Rwanda, and continuing until 1962 when Rwanda officially gained its independence from Belgium, Rwanda’s colonial administrators (first German, then Belgian) critically reinforced the growing tendency towards ethnically structured social stratification. The European attitude towards ethnicity in Rwanda revolved around the “Hamitic hypothesis.” This then-fashionable “theory” held that all peoples exhibiting signs of “true civilization” in Africa must have been descended from a superior “Caucasoid” race originally from northeastern Africa.32 In relation to Rwanda, this theory led to the construction of Tutsis as a group that was considered both foreign and also distinctly superior to the Hutu majority.33 As anthropologist Johan Pottier explains, “Belgian colonists contributed to the ideology of (élite) Tutsi selfconsciousness an explanation of ‘physical difference’ in terms of ancestral migration – for which there was no firm empirical basis – and they made all Tutsi superior, all Hutu inferior.”34 This stands in stark contrast to the precolonial linkages between Tutsi and power, in which context it was only the Tutsi élite, primarily drawn from the nyiginya clan, who were socially constructed as superior to the Hutu. This perceived racial divide was not purely ideological, but was translated into concrete institutional policies. Implemented by the colonial state in Rwanda, these policies explicitly 32 In the case of Rwanda, it was assumed that the precolonial Tutsi monarchy was evidence of foreign descent, for Europeans refused to believe that such a symbol of “civilization” as a monarchy could have its origins in “savage” sub-Saharan Africa. Based on this assumption, the Europeans assumed that the Tutsis as a group must be of foreign descent. 33 Lemarchand, African Kingships in Perspective, 74-5; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 35, 80, 88; Prunier, 7; Des Forges, 36; Christopher Taylor, Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 (Oxford & New York: Berg, 1999), 55-94. 34 Johan Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 112
10 favored the Tutsi and effectively excluded the Hutu from all positions of power within both the colonial and the monarchical administrations, thus significantly sharpening the polarization of Hutu and Tutsi identities. Starting in 1926, the Belgians implemented a series of reforms under which Hutus were systematically removed from all positions of political power and the control of the existing Tutsi monarchy further centralized and concentrated. Furthermore, Hutus were indirectly excluded from access to political power by the denial of access to education, the gateway to political power under the Belgian colonial administration. These policies of ethnic differentiation were fully and finally codified with the 1933 Belgian introduction of mandatory identity cards. By including ethnic categories, these cards decisively rigidified the once flexible categories of ethnicity in Rwanda and also provided a practical means for the implementation of discriminatory policies and practices. In addition to thus constructing ethnicity as the basis both of political organization and political exclusion, the colonial era was also characterized by increasing economic exploitation along ethnic axes. This was closely linked to the process of political privilege described above, for the increased political power invested in Tutsi chiefs by the European colonial administrations, in combination with the destruction of earlier mechanisms of political accountability wrought by these administrations, effectively allowed the Tutsi chiefs to exploit their newly-enhanced power for their own economic gain 37 The result of this colonial reconfiguration of ethnicity was that on the eve of the 1959 revolution that led to Rwanda's independence, forty-three chiefs out of forty-five were Tutsi as were 549 sub-chiefs out of 559, and political power in Rwanda continued to remain largely confined within a "closed oligarchy of a few noble lineages"drawn from the ruling Tutsi class. The fundamental outcome of this system of ethnic privilege institutionalized under colonialism however, was not only increasing political and economic inequality, political oppression, and economic exploitation. More precisely, it was inequality, oppression and exploitation that carried 5> Des Forges, 35; Lemarchand, African Kingships in Perspective, 77-8; Prunier, 25 56 Linden, 152; Des Forges, 35 37 C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression,117-121,131-40,151-2 38 Prunier. 27 C. Newbury, The Cohesion ofOppression, 3
10 favored the Tutsi and effectively excluded the Hutu from all positions of power within both the colonial and the monarchical administrations, thus significantly sharpening the polarization of Hutu and Tutsi identities. Starting in 1926, the Belgians implemented a series of reforms under which Hutus were systematically removed from all positions of political power35 and the control of the existing Tutsi monarchy further centralized and concentrated. Furthermore, Hutus were indirectly excluded from access to political power by the denial of access to education, the gateway to political power under the Belgian colonial administration.36 These policies of ethnic differentiation were fully and finally codified with the 1933 Belgian introduction of mandatory identity cards. By including ethnic categories, these cards decisively rigidified the once flexible categories of ethnicity in Rwanda and also provided a practical means for the implementation of discriminatory policies and practices. In addition to thus constructing ethnicity as the basis both of political organization and political exclusion, the colonial era was also characterized by increasing economic exploitation along ethnic axes. This was closely linked to the process of political privilege described above, for the increased political power invested in Tutsi chiefs by the European colonial administrations, in combination with the destruction of earlier mechanisms of political accountability wrought by these administrations, effectively allowed the Tutsi chiefs to exploit their newly-enhanced power for their own economic gain.37 The result of this colonial reconfiguration of ethnicity was that on the eve of the 1959 revolution that led to Rwanda’s independence, “forty-three chiefs out of forty-five were Tutsi as were 549 sub-chiefs out of 559,”38 and political power in Rwanda continued to remain largely confined within a “closed oligarchy of a few noble lineages” drawn from the ruling Tutsi class.39 The fundamental outcome of this system of ethnic privilege institutionalized under colonialism, however, was not only increasing political and economic inequality, political oppression, and economic exploitation. More precisely, it was inequality, oppression and exploitation that carried 35 Des Forges, 35; Lemarchand, African Kingships in Perspective, 77-8; Prunier, 25. 36 Linden, 152; Des Forges, 35. 37 C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 117-121, 131-40, 151-2. 38 Prunier, 27. 39 C. Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 3
