398 International Organization also bolsters the case for the causal power of ideas by recounting an instance where a leading policymaker changed his mind at considerable political and personal cost. This analysis provides further evidence of the value in combining modern social scientific frameworks with the "old history"focus on pivotal actors'shifting responses to evolving material circumstances.In the language of modern social science,Britain's imperial crisis in the 1770s and 1780s constituted a "critical juncture"-a "relatively short [period]of time during which there [was]a substan- tially heightened probability that agents'choices will affect the outcome of inter- est."At such points,"contingency...becomes paramount."2 But to say that outcomes are contingent is not to say that they cannot be studied with analytic rigor.Scholars in a range of fields have employed numerous approaches-formal and informal-to grapple with contingent events.3 Recently,Capoccia and Kele- men synthesized these disparate approaches into two highly specified techniques: "counterfactual analysis and narrative process tracing.This article utilizes both methods to explain Britain's radical policy reorientation in the 1780s. I first challenge the hegemonic stability theorists'choice of dependent variable, showing that their focus on the "openness"achieved,rather than the commercial strategy pursued,is problematic theoretically and empirically.After reviewing the dominant(materialist)explanations for the reforms of the 1780s,the next section proposes that key policymakers'ideas played a crucial role in initiating Britain's shift.Making way for ideational variables,however,requires challenging the con- sensus that Britain's reforms followed inevitably as a result of its military defeat in the American Revolution.I issue that challenge using counterfactual analysis and specify a model showing how intellectuals influence policy at critical junctures.I then develop a narrative that demonstrates the influence both of Smith on Shel- burne and of Shelburne on the transformation of British foreign economic policy. The Dependent Variable:Commercial Strategy versus“Openness'' Krasner attempted to explain the "structure of the international trading system," which he gauged according to observed policies and economic outcomes.For Kras- ner,policymakers'ideas were irrelevant."Stupidity,"after all,"is not a very inter- esting analytic category."5 But interesting or not,"stupidity"is a crucial analytic category.A growing literature recognizes that policymakers'ideas shape not just 11.Rakove2004,3. 12.Capoccia and Kelemen 2007,343,348. 13.These approaches include everything from "analytic narratives"to "virtual history."See Bates et al.1998;and Ferguson 1999. 14.Capoccia and Kelemen 2007,343. 15.Krasner1976.319,323-32.also bolsters the case for the causal power of ideas by recounting an instance where a leading policymaker changed his mind at considerable political and personal cost+ This analysis provides further evidence of the value in combining modern social scientific frameworks with the “old history” focus on pivotal actors’ shifting responses to evolving material circumstances+ 11 In the language of modern social science, Britain’s imperial crisis in the 1770s and 1780s constituted a “critical juncture”—a “relatively short @period# of time during which there @was# a substan￾tially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of inter￾est+” At such points, “contingency +++ becomes paramount+”12 But to say that outcomes are contingent is not to say that they cannot be studied with analytic rigor+ Scholars in a range of fields have employed numerous approaches—formal and informal—to grapple with contingent events+ 13 Recently, Capoccia and Kele￾men synthesized these disparate approaches into two highly specified techniques: “counterfactual analysis and narrative process tracing+”14 This article utilizes both methods to explain Britain’s radical policy reorientation in the 1780s+ I first challenge the hegemonic stability theorists’ choice of dependent variable, showing that their focus on the “openness” achieved, rather than the commercial strategy pursued, is problematic theoretically and empirically+ After reviewing the dominant ~materialist! explanations for the reforms of the 1780s, the next section proposes that key policymakers’ ideas played a crucial role in initiating Britain’s shift+ Making way for ideational variables, however, requires challenging the con￾sensus that Britain’s reforms followed inevitably as a result of its military defeat in the American Revolution+ I issue that challenge using counterfactual analysis and specify a model showing how intellectuals influence policy at critical junctures+ I then develop a narrative that demonstrates the influence both of Smith on Shel￾burne and of Shelburne on the transformation of British foreign economic policy+ The Dependent Variable: Commercial Strategy versus “Openness” Krasner attempted to explain the “structure of the international trading system,” which he gauged according to observed policies and economic outcomes+ For Kras￾ner, policymakers’ ideas were irrelevant+ “Stupidity,” after all, “is not a very inter￾esting analytic category+”15 But interesting or not, “stupidity” is a crucial analytic category+ A growing literature recognizes that policymakers’ ideas shape not just 11+ Rakove 2004, 3+ 12+ Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 343, 348+ 13+ These approaches include everything from “analytic narratives” to “virtual history+” See Bates et al+ 1998; and Ferguson 1999+ 14+ Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 343+ 15+ Krasner 1976, 319, 323–32+ 398 International Organization