Voluntas and Edmonds 2008;Guiheux and Kuah 2009;Zhao 2001,2010).Semi-authoritarian regimes are ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracies,the existence of some formal democratic institutions,and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially authoritarian traits Such regimes are determined to maintain the appearance of democracy without exposing themselves to the political risk that free competition entails (Ottaway 2003,p.3).In the PRC today,we find such a situation,with formal state limitations on freedom of association and speech alongside increased social spaces for civic and voluntary action (Ho and Edmonds 2008).This context is characterized by a duality: it is simultaneously restrictive and conducive to nationwide collective action (Ho 2007,p.189).Its restrictive nature is characterized by a power asymmetry favoring state actors over (challenging)collective social actors,as state actors remain the unchallenged setters of the 'rules of the game'(Hildebrandt 2013,p.15). Conversely,the PRC's polity can be conducive to collective action because the boundaries between official and non-state organizations are becoming increasingly blurred,leading to the development of increased opportunities for social actors (Ho 2007,pp.189).This trend toward increased space for social actors began with the Reform and Open Policies initiated at the end of the 1970s by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).Until these reforms,social activism was only permitted under the leadership of official party-state mass organizations (Ma 2009).The reforms were predominantly economic rather than political (Wesoky 2002,p.8), which is commonly situated as a reason for the Tiananmen upheaval in 1989 (Esherick and Wasserstrom 1994).Nonetheless,these reforms-with their shifts of responsibility from state to social actors (individual and collective)-led to increased space for social actors to not only engage in social service provision (Fulda et al.2012),but also to function as advocates (Guo et al.2013)and advisors in the policy formulation process (Yang and Alpermann 2014).These positive developments,interrupted by the political consequences of the Tiananmen incident, received a further boost through the Fourth World Conference on Women(FWCW 一第四届世界妇女大会)，held in 19995 in Beijing.In the aftermath of Tiananmen, the CCP actively embraced the FWCW to ease criticism and legitimacy crises abroad and at home (Wesoky 2002).Until then,DV had occasionally been addressed by the CCP,but most related activities were superficial public displays of goodwill rather than attempts to actively ameliorate the issue(Milwertz 2003).Due to the sensitivity of the issue-not only among the general public but also among the still heavily patriarchal Chinese polity-ADV organizations and activists felt that they were barred (Interview 7)from using tactics employed by organizations in other fields.At the FWCW,DV was situated as a core issue and broadly discussed by international scholars,including-for the first time-both Chinese practitioners and scholars (UN Women Fourth World Conference;Interview 2).All of these 7 The soci-political turmoils of the 1950-1970sand deeply rooted patriarchal traditions meant that early attempts to ameliorate DV in the PRC came to nothing (Milwertz 2003).The PRC is still a predominantly patriarchal society characterized by a patrilineal kinship system and social organizations and patrilocal post-residence patterns(Du 2011,p.2).The patriarchal gender system of the (Han)Chinese is intertwined with the CCP's politics.As a result,traditional practices of gender inequality have (re-) emerged in new forms during the post-socialist era(Du 2011,p.4). ②Springerand Edmonds 2008; Guiheux and Kuah 2009; Zhao 2001, 2010). Semi-authoritarian regimes are ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracies, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially authoritarian traits. Such regimes are determined to maintain the appearance of democracy without exposing themselves to the political risk that free competition entails (Ottaway 2003, p. 3). In the PRC today, we find such a situation, with formal state limitations on freedom of association and speech alongside increased social spaces for civic and voluntary action (Ho and Edmonds 2008). This context is characterized by a duality: it is simultaneously restrictive and conducive to nationwide collective action (Ho 2007, p. 189). Its restrictive nature is characterized by a power asymmetry favoring state actors over (challenging) collective social actors, as state actors remain the unchallenged setters of the ‘rules of the game’ (Hildebrandt 2013, p. 15). Conversely, the PRC’s polity can be conducive to collective action because the boundaries between official and non-state organizations are becoming increasingly blurred, leading to the development of increased opportunities for social actors (Ho 2007, pp. 189). This trend toward increased space for social actors began with the Reform and Open Policies initiated at the end of the 1970s by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Until these reforms, social activism was only permitted under the leadership of official party-state mass organizations (Ma 2009). The reforms were predominantly economic rather than political (Wesoky 2002, p. 8), which is commonly situated as a reason for the Tiananmen upheaval in 1989 (Esherick and Wasserstrom 1994). Nonetheless, these reforms—with their shifts of responsibility from state to social actors (individual and collective)—led to increased space for social actors to not only engage in social service provision (Fulda et al. 2012), but also to function as advocates (Guo et al. 2013) and advisors in the policy formulation process (Yang and Alpermann 2014). These positive developments, interrupted by the political consequences of the Tiananmen incident, received a further boost through the Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW —第四届世界妇女大会), held in 1995 in Beijing. In the aftermath of Tiananmen, the CCP actively embraced the FWCW to ease criticism and legitimacy crises abroad and at home (Wesoky 2002). Until then, DV had occasionally been addressed by the CCP, but most related activities were superficial public displays of goodwill rather than attempts to actively ameliorate the issue7 (Milwertz 2003). Due to the sensitivity of the issue—not only among the general public but also among the still heavily patriarchal Chinese polity—ADV organizations and activists felt that they were barred (Interview 7) from using tactics employed by organizations in other fields. At the FWCW, DV was situated as a core issue and broadly discussed by international scholars, including—for the first time—both Chinese practitioners and scholars (UN Women Fourth World Conference; Interview 2). All of these 7 The socio-political turmoils of the 1950s–1970s and deeply rooted patriarchal traditions meant that early attempts to ameliorate DV in the PRC came to nothing (Milwertz 2003). The PRC is still a predominantly patriarchal society characterized by a patrilineal kinship system and social organizations and patrilocal post-residence patterns (Du 2011, p. 2). The patriarchal gender system of the (Han) Chinese is intertwined with the CCP’s politics. As a result, traditional practices of gender inequality have (re-) emerged in new forms during the post-socialist era (Du 2011, p. 4). Voluntas 123