TR Voluntas D0I10.1007/s11266-015-9610-2 CrossMark INTERNATIONAL SOCIETT FOR THIRD-SECTOR RESEARCH ORIGINAL PAPER Becoming Public:Tactical Innovation in the Beijing Anti-domestic Violence Movement Stephanie BrauerI International Society for Third-Sector Research and The Johns Hopkins University 2015 Abstract Since 2011,a new mobilization strategy has emerged in the Beijing anti- domestic violence (ADV)movement:performance art public interest advocacy, consisting of live performances in public places for public audiences (A CDB special report,2013).Drawing on the social movement literature,particularly concepts of political opportunity and mobilizing structure,framing strategy,and tactical innovation (Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930-1970,2nd edn,1999;Dynamics of contention,2001),this article investigates the following questions:What was the rationale behind the introduction of per- formance art advocacy into the tactical repertoire of Beijing ADV organizations, and what impact has this tactic had on the Beijing ADV movement?Based on content analysis of 14 semi-structured interviews with ADV movement activists and media reports,it will illustrate that this innovative strategy relied heavily on pro- fessional Beijing ADV organizations;performance art public interest advocacy broadened and mobilized the Beijing ADV movement to work toward improved legal protections against DV,triggered nationwide responses,and improved citi- zens'awareness of DV. Resume Depuis 2011,une nouvelle strategie de mobilisation a vu le jour dans le mouvement de lutte contre la violence familiale de Beijing:la defense de I'interet public des performances artistiques,qui consiste en cing spectacles donnes dans des lieux publics pour des audiences publiques (CDB 2013).S'appuyant sur les litteratures en faveur des mouvements sociaux,en particulier les notions d'oppor- tunite politique et les structures de mobilisation,I'encadrement de strategies et ☒Stephanie Brauer braeuer@uni-muenster.de EFESEIIS-Project,Research Training Group Risk and East Asia,Institute of Political Science, University of Muinster,Schlossplatz 2,Munster,Germany Published online:24 June 2015 ②Springer
ORIGINAL PAPER Becoming Public: Tactical Innovation in the Beijing Anti-domestic Violence Movement Stephanie Bräuer1 © International Society for Third-Sector Research and The Johns Hopkins University 2015 Abstract Since 2011, a new mobilization strategy has emerged in the Beijing antidomestic violence (ADV) movement: performance art public interest advocacy, consisting of live performances in public places for public audiences (A CDB special report, 2013). Drawing on the social movement literature, particularly concepts of political opportunity and mobilizing structure, framing strategy, and tactical innovation (Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930–1970, 2nd edn, 1999; Dynamics of contention, 2001), this article investigates the following questions: What was the rationale behind the introduction of performance art advocacy into the tactical repertoire of Beijing ADV organizations, and what impact has this tactic had on the Beijing ADV movement? Based on content analysis of 14 semi-structured interviews with ADV movement activists and media reports, it will illustrate that this innovative strategy relied heavily on professional Beijing ADV organizations; performance art public interest advocacy broadened and mobilized the Beijing ADV movement to work toward improved legal protections against DV, triggered nationwide responses, and improved citizens’ awareness of DV. Résumé Depuis 2011, une nouvelle strate´gie de mobilisation a vu le jour dans le mouvement de lutte contre la violence familiale de Beijing: la de´fense de l’inte´reˆt public des performances artistiques, qui consiste en cinq spectacles donne´s dans des lieux publics pour des audiences publiques (CDB 2013). S’appuyant sur les litte´ratures en faveur des mouvements sociaux, en particulier les notions d’opportunite´ politique et les structures de mobilisation, l’encadrement de strate´gies et & Stephanie Bra¨uer braeuer@uni-muenster.de 1 EFESEIIS - Project, Research Training Group Risk and East Asia, Institute of Political Science, University of Mu¨nster, Schlossplatz 2, Mu¨nster, Germany 123 Voluntas DOI 10.1007/s11266-015-9610-2
Voluntas I'innovation tactique (McAdam 1999;McAdam et al.(2001),cet article etudie les questions suivantes:quelle etait la logique de I'introduction de la defense des performances artistiques dans le repertoire tactique des organisations de lutte contre la violence familiale de Beijing,et quel a ete I'impact de cette tactique sur le mouvement de lutte contre la violence familiale de Beijing.Reposant sur I'analyse du contenu des 14 entrevues semi-structurees aupres des militants des mouvements de lutte contre la violence familiale et de rapports de medias,il illustrera que cette strategie innovante s'est fortement appuyee sur des organisations professionnelles de lutte contre la violence familiale de Beijing,que la defense de I'interet public des performances artistiques a elargi et mobilise ce mouvement pour cuvrer en faveur de meilleures protections legales contre la violence familiale,a declenche des reactions dans tout le pays et ameliore la prise de conscience des citoyens envers la violence familiale. Zusammenfassung Seit 2011 hat sich eine neue Mobilisierungsstrategie in der Pekinger Bewegung gegen hausliche Gewalt aufgetan:eine offentliche Interessen- vertretung,die darstellende Kunst nutzt und offentliche Live-Veranstaltungen an offentlichen Platzen durchfuhrt (CDB 2013).Beruhend auf der Literatur zur sozialen Bewegung und insbesondere auf den Konzepten der politischen Opportu- nitats-und Mobilisierungsstruktur,der Framing-Strategie und taktischer Innovation (McAdam 1999;McAdam et al.2001)diskutiert dieser Beitrag die folgenden Fragen:Was waren die Gruinde dafuir,eine Interessenvertretung,die darstellende Kunst anwendet,in das taktische Repertoire der Pekinger Organisationen gegen hausliche Gewalt aufzunehmen und wie hat sich diese Taktik auf die Pekinger Bewegung gegen hausliche Gewalt ausgewirkt?Anhand einer Inhaltsanalyse von 14 semi-strukturierten Befragungen von Aktivisten der Bewegung gegen hausliche Gewalt und beruhend auf Medienberichten wird gezeigt,dass diese innovative Strategie stark auf die professionellen Pekinger Organisationen gegen hausliche Gewalt angewiesen waren.Die darstellende Kunst einsetzende offentliche Interes- senvertretung erweiterte und mobilisierte die Pekinger Bewegung gegen hausliche Gewalt in Richtung eines verbesserten Rechtsschutzes fuir Opfer hauslicher Gewalt, loste landesweite Reaktionen aus und erhohte das Bewusstsein der Buirger uber hausliche Gewalt. Resumen Desde 2011,ha surgido una nueva estrategia de movilizacion en el movimiento contra la violencia en el hogar de Pekin (anti-domestic violence "ADV"):defensa del interes publico mediante las artes escenicas,consistente en actuaciones en vivo en lugares publicos para audiencias publicas (CDB 2013). Recurriendo al material publicado sobre movimientos sociales,en particular los conceptos de oportunidad politica y estructura de movilizacion,estrategia de enmarque e innovacion tactica (McAdam 1999;McAdam et al.2001),el presente articulo investiga las siguientes cuestiones:i.Cual fue la justificacion subyacente a la introduccion de la defensa mediante las artes escenicas en el repertorio tactico de las organizaciones ADV de Pekin y que impacto ha tenido esta tactica en el movi- miento ADV de Pekin?Basandose en el analisis de contenido de 14 entrevistas semiestructuradas con activistas del movimiento ADV e informes de medios de Springer
l’innovation tactique (McAdam 1999; McAdam et al. (2001), cet article e´tudie les questions suivantes: quelle e´tait la logique de l’introduction de la de´fense des performances artistiques dans le re´pertoire tactique des organisations de lutte contre la violence familiale de Beijing, et quel a e´te´ l’impact de cette tactique sur le mouvement de lutte contre la violence familiale de Beijing. Reposant sur l’analyse du contenu des 14 entrevues semi-structure´es aupre`s des militants des mouvements de lutte contre la violence familiale et de rapports de me´dias, il illustrera que cette strate´gie innovante s’est fortement appuye´e sur des organisations professionnelles de lutte contre la violence familiale de Beijing, que la de´fense de l’inte´reˆt public des performances artistiques a e´largi et mobilise´ ce mouvement pour œuvrer en faveur de meilleures protections le´gales contre la violence familiale, a de´clenche´ des re´actions dans tout le pays et ame´liore´ la prise de conscience des citoyens envers la violence familiale. Zusammenfassung Seit 2011 hat sich eine neue Mobilisierungsstrategie in der Pekinger Bewegung gegen ha¨usliche Gewalt aufgetan: eine o¨ffentliche Interessenvertretung, die darstellende Kunst nutzt und o¨ffentliche Live-Veranstaltungen an o¨ffentlichen Pla¨tzen durchfu¨hrt (CDB 2013). Beruhend auf der Literatur zur sozialen Bewegung und insbesondere auf den Konzepten der politischen Opportunita¨ts- und Mobilisierungsstruktur, der Framing-Strategie und taktischer Innovation (McAdam 1999; McAdam et al. 2001) diskutiert dieser Beitrag die folgenden Fragen: Was waren die Gru¨nde dafu¨r, eine Interessenvertretung, die darstellende Kunst anwendet, in das taktische Repertoire der Pekinger Organisationen gegen ha¨usliche Gewalt aufzunehmen und wie hat sich diese Taktik auf die Pekinger Bewegung gegen ha¨usliche Gewalt ausgewirkt? Anhand einer Inhaltsanalyse von 14 semi-strukturierten Befragungen von Aktivisten der Bewegung gegen ha¨usliche Gewalt und beruhend auf Medienberichten wird gezeigt, dass diese innovative Strategie stark auf die professionellen Pekinger Organisationen gegen ha¨usliche Gewalt angewiesen waren. Die darstellende Kunst einsetzende o¨ffentliche Interessenvertretung erweiterte und mobilisierte die Pekinger Bewegung gegen ha¨usliche Gewalt in Richtung eines verbesserten Rechtsschutzes fu¨r Opfer ha¨uslicher Gewalt, lo¨ste landesweite Reaktionen aus und erho¨hte das Bewusstsein der Bu¨rger u¨ber ha¨usliche Gewalt. Resumen Desde 2011, ha surgido una nueva estrategia de movilizacio´n en el movimiento contra la violencia en el hogar de Pekı´n (anti-domestic violence “ADV”): defensa del intere´s pu´blico mediante las artes esce´nicas, consistente en actuaciones en vivo en lugares pu´blicos para audiencias pu´blicas (CDB 2013). Recurriendo al material publicado sobre movimientos sociales, en particular los conceptos de oportunidad polı´tica y estructura de movilizacio´n, estrategia de enmarque e innovacio´n ta´ctica (McAdam 1999; McAdam et al. 2001), el presente artı´culo investiga las siguientes cuestiones: ¿Cua´l fue la justificacio´n subyacente a la introduccio´n de la defensa mediante las artes esce´nicas en el repertorio ta´ctico de las organizaciones ADV de Pekı´n y que´ impacto ha tenido esta ta´ctica en el movimiento ADV de Pekı´n? Basa´ndose en el ana´lisis de contenido de 14 entrevistas semiestructuradas con activistas del movimiento ADV e informes de medios de Voluntas 123
Voluntas comunicacion,se ilustrara que esta estrategia innovadora se baso enormemente en las organizaciones ADV profesionales de Pekin;la defensa del interes publico mediante las artes escenicas amplio y movilizo al movimiento ADV de Pekin para trabajar hacia una mejora de las protecciones legales contra la violencia en el hogar, activo respuestas a nivel nacional y mejoro la concienciacion de los ciudadanos sobre la violencia en el hogar. Keywords Beijing ADV movement.Mobilization process.Tactical innovation. Civic engagement.Domestic violence Introduction Domestic violence (DV)is a severe problem in the People's Republic of China (PRC),with prevalence rates between 24.7 and 54.6%depending on the study (All China Women's Federation(Quanguo Fulian)2011,p.4).Since 1995,bolstered by the efforts of Beijing anti-domestic violence (ADV)organizations,the issue slowly received more attention-not only from the public,but also from policy makers- and legal protection against DV has improved since.Nonetheless,the PRC still has no specific DV law.In April 2013,the National People's Congress (NPC)finally stated that ADV legislation would be included in a review of pivotal laws that year (制定反家暴力法)，3 prompting ADV activists to believe that such a law would soon become reality (Interview 1). Despite sensitization to DV among the public,the lack of legal protection from DV and a perceived unwillingness of the party-state to sufficiently support ADV organizations forced such organizations to invent new tactics.The latest of these is performance art advocacy,which has become part of Beijing ADV organizations' mobilization since 2011.It centers on live performance in public spaces for a public audience (Guo et al.2013),thus differing significantly from traditional advocacy tools such as lobbying (Wang 2012),seminars for policy elites,or legal recommendations.Performance art advocacy is an inclusive strategy and holds the potential to receive broad media coverage due to its public event character;as such,it is an apt tool to raise public awareness and rally support for policy reforms. Domestic violence refers in the PRC context mostly to three sets of actions:physical violence 力)，psychic violence(精神暴力)，and/or sexual violence(性暴力).For an in-depth discussion,.see Zhang and Meng (2004). 2 Beijing anti-domestic violence organizations are often working on several issues relating to women's or human rights.The mobilization for improved legal protection against DV is one priority among many.In this article,anti-domestic violence organizations are abbreviated to ADV organizations. 3 C.f.working plan of the NPC:http://www.npe.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/syxw/2013-04/27/content_1793635. htm,accessed 4th May 2014. 4 A list of all interviews cited in this article can be found in the Appendix. 5 In this article,performance art public interest advocacy is abbreviated to performance art advocacy. Advocacy is understood in this article as performed by organizations and individuals who exist primarily to promote a common good that extends beyond the narrow economic or sectarian goal of organizations' members and supporters(Heaney 2007).As such,it refers not only to policy advocacy,but also to the setting of public agendas and the mobilization for public support. ②Springer
comunicacio´n, se ilustrara´ que esta estrategia innovadora se baso´ enormemente en las organizaciones ADV profesionales de Pekı´n; la defensa del intere´s pu´blico mediante las artes esce´nicas amplio´ y movilizo´ al movimiento ADV de Pekı´n para trabajar hacia una mejora de las protecciones legales contra la violencia en el hogar, activo´ respuestas a nivel nacional y mejoro´ la concienciacio´n de los ciudadanos sobre la violencia en el hogar. Keywords Beijing ADV movement · Mobilization process · Tactical innovation · Civic engagement · Domestic violence Introduction Domestic violence (DV)1 is a severe problem in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), with prevalence rates between 24.7 and 54.6 % depending on the study (All China Women’s Federation (Quanguo Fulian) 2011, p. 4). Since 1995, bolstered by the efforts of Beijing anti-domestic violence (ADV) organizations,2 the issue slowly received more attention—not only from the public, but also from policy makers— and legal protection against DV has improved since. Nonetheless, the PRC still has no specific DV law. In April 2013, the National People’s Congress (NPC) finally stated that ADV legislation would be included in a review of pivotal laws that year (制定反家暴力法),3 prompting ADV activists to believe that such a law would soon become reality (Interview 14 ). Despite sensitization to DV among the public, the lack of legal protection from DV and a perceived unwillingness of the party-state to sufficiently support ADV organizations forced such organizations to invent new tactics. The latest of these is performance art advocacy,5 which has become part of Beijing ADV organizations’ mobilization since 2011. It centers on live performance in public spaces for a public audience (Guo et al. 2013), thus differing significantly from traditional advocacy tools such as lobbying (Wang 2012), seminars for policy elites, or legal recommendations. Performance art advocacy is an inclusive strategy and holds the potential to receive broad media coverage due to its public event character; as such, it is an apt tool to raise public awareness and rally support for policy reforms. 1 Domestic violence refers in the PRC context mostly to three sets of actions: physical violence (身体暴 力), psychic violence (精神暴力), and/or sexual violence (性暴力). For an in-depth discussion, see Zhang and Meng (2004). 2 Beijing anti-domestic violence organizations are often working on several issues relating to women’s or human rights. The mobilization for improved legal protection against DV is one priority among many. In this article, anti-domestic violence organizations are abbreviated to ADV organizations. 3 C.f. working plan of the NPC: http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/syxw/2013-04/27/content_1793635. htm, accessed 4th May 2014. 4 A list of all interviews cited in this article can be found in the Appendix. 5 In this article, performance art public interest advocacy is abbreviated to performance art advocacy. Advocacy is understood in this article as performed by organizations and individuals who exist primarily to promote a common good that extends beyond the narrow economic or sectarian goal of organizations’ members and supporters (Heaney 2007). As such, it refers not only to policy advocacy, but also to the setting of public agendas and the mobilization for public support. Voluntas 123
Voluntas Performance art advocacy in ADV mobilization has been perceived to be independent from organizations (Wang 2012).However,contrary to Man's finding, my own research shows that such advocacy is largely initiated,coordinated,and supported by ADV organizations.It has also been claimed that performance art advocacy would receive broad media coverage and would thus support activists' cause (Wang 2012).However,as I will show,coverage in official media remained moderate.Furthermore,while performance art advocacy is supposed to mobilize broad public support,it is not immediately clear how and why broad social backing can enable such mobilization in a semi-authoritarian political environment characterized by a one-party system. What was the rationale behind the introduction of performance art advocacy into the tactical repertoire of Beijing ADV organizations,and what impact has this tactical innovation on the Beijing ADV mobilization in general?To address these questions,I will draw on two case studies from within the Beijing ADV movement: the Injured Brides'activism and the activism accompanying the final court hearing of Kim Lee's divorce case.The data gained through a survey of media reports in both case studies are complemented by semi-structured interviews with activists from Beijing's ADV organizations and analyzed using content analysis with ex-ante fixed analytical categories.The effects of performance art as tactical innovation will also be assessed through a sample analysis of relevant media coverage. In the remainder of this article,I will use the theoretical concepts of opportunity structure,mobilizing structures,framing strategy,and tactical innovation(McAdam 1999,1996;McAdam et al.2001;Benford and Snow 2000)to explore the mobilization of social actors for better legal protection against DV.I will then provide a brief overview of the development of Beijing ADV organizations' mobilization and DV legislation in the PRC,before turning to the description of both cases of performance art advocacy.Against this background,I will analyze the mobilizing structure and the framing of these activist events,before turning to a discussion of the effects of this tactical approach.I will conclude by contextualizing the findings alongside the development of civic engagement in Beijing. The Political Environment and the Emergence of Opportunities for Social Action The political environment forms an external factor to (collective)social actors' mobilization.It shapes the political opportunity structure (POS),the specific configurations of resources,institutional arrangements,and historic precedents for social mobilization (Kitschelt 1986),which provide opportunities to act and influence policy as well as a conducive context for the claims that actors make (Meyer 2004).Possible opportunities within the political environment create potential for the exercise of political leverage by challenging social actors (McAdam 1997,p.340).Social actors are only able to mobilize if the POS is conducive.The PRC today is characterized by its semi-authoritarian context (Ho 6 Kim Lee's role in the mobilization process will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 2Springer
Performance art advocacy in ADV mobilization has been perceived to be independent from organizations (Wang 2012). However, contrary to Man’s finding, my own research shows that such advocacy is largely initiated, coordinated, and supported by ADV organizations. It has also been claimed that performance art advocacy would receive broad media coverage and would thus support activists’ cause (Wang 2012). However, as I will show, coverage in official media remained moderate. Furthermore, while performance art advocacy is supposed to mobilize broad public support, it is not immediately clear how and why broad social backing can enable such mobilization in a semi-authoritarian political environment characterized by a one-party system. What was the rationale behind the introduction of performance art advocacy into the tactical repertoire of Beijing ADV organizations, and what impact has this tactical innovation on the Beijing ADV mobilization in general? To address these questions, I will draw on two case studies from within the Beijing ADV movement: the Injured Brides’ activism and the activism accompanying the final court hearing of Kim Lee’s divorce case.6 The data gained through a survey of media reports in both case studies are complemented by semi-structured interviews with activists from Beijing’s ADV organizations and analyzed using content analysis with ex-ante fixed analytical categories. The effects of performance art as tactical innovation will also be assessed through a sample analysis of relevant media coverage. In the remainder of this article, I will use the theoretical concepts of opportunity structure, mobilizing structures, framing strategy, and tactical innovation (McAdam 1999, 1996; McAdam et al. 2001; Benford and Snow 2000) to explore the mobilization of social actors for better legal protection against DV. I will then provide a brief overview of the development of Beijing ADV organizations’ mobilization and DV legislation in the PRC, before turning to the description of both cases of performance art advocacy. Against this background, I will analyze the mobilizing structure and the framing of these activist events, before turning to a discussion of the effects of this tactical approach. I will conclude by contextualizing the findings alongside the development of civic engagement in Beijing. The Political Environment and the Emergence of Opportunities for Social Action The political environment forms an external factor to (collective) social actors’ mobilization. It shapes the political opportunity structure (POS), the specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements, and historic precedents for social mobilization (Kitschelt 1986), which provide opportunities to act and influence policy as well as a conducive context for the claims that actors make (Meyer 2004). Possible opportunities within the political environment create potential for the exercise of political leverage by challenging social actors (McAdam 1997, p. 340). Social actors are only able to mobilize if the POS is conducive. The PRC today is characterized by its semi-authoritarian context (Ho 6 Kim Lee’s role in the mobilization process will be discussed in the following paragraphs. Voluntas 123
Voluntas and Edmonds 2008;Guiheux and Kuah 2009;Zhao 2001,2010).Semi-authoritarian regimes are ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracies,the existence of some formal democratic institutions,and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially authoritarian traits Such regimes are determined to maintain the appearance of democracy without exposing themselves to the political risk that free competition entails (Ottaway 2003,p.3).In the PRC today,we find such a situation,with formal state limitations on freedom of association and speech alongside increased social spaces for civic and voluntary action (Ho and Edmonds 2008).This context is characterized by a duality: it is simultaneously restrictive and conducive to nationwide collective action (Ho 2007,p.189).Its restrictive nature is characterized by a power asymmetry favoring state actors over (challenging)collective social actors,as state actors remain the unchallenged setters of the 'rules of the game'(Hildebrandt 2013,p.15). Conversely,the PRC's polity can be conducive to collective action because the boundaries between official and non-state organizations are becoming increasingly blurred,leading to the development of increased opportunities for social actors (Ho 2007,pp.189).This trend toward increased space for social actors began with the Reform and Open Policies initiated at the end of the 1970s by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).Until these reforms,social activism was only permitted under the leadership of official party-state mass organizations (Ma 2009).The reforms were predominantly economic rather than political (Wesoky 2002,p.8), which is commonly situated as a reason for the Tiananmen upheaval in 1989 (Esherick and Wasserstrom 1994).Nonetheless,these reforms-with their shifts of responsibility from state to social actors (individual and collective)-led to increased space for social actors to not only engage in social service provision (Fulda et al.2012),but also to function as advocates (Guo et al.2013)and advisors in the policy formulation process (Yang and Alpermann 2014).These positive developments,interrupted by the political consequences of the Tiananmen incident, received a further boost through the Fourth World Conference on Women(FWCW 一第四届世界妇女大会)，held in 19995 in Beijing.In the aftermath of Tiananmen, the CCP actively embraced the FWCW to ease criticism and legitimacy crises abroad and at home (Wesoky 2002).Until then,DV had occasionally been addressed by the CCP,but most related activities were superficial public displays of goodwill rather than attempts to actively ameliorate the issue(Milwertz 2003).Due to the sensitivity of the issue-not only among the general public but also among the still heavily patriarchal Chinese polity-ADV organizations and activists felt that they were barred (Interview 7)from using tactics employed by organizations in other fields.At the FWCW,DV was situated as a core issue and broadly discussed by international scholars,including-for the first time-both Chinese practitioners and scholars (UN Women Fourth World Conference;Interview 2).All of these 7 The soci-political turmoils of the 1950-1970sand deeply rooted patriarchal traditions meant that early attempts to ameliorate DV in the PRC came to nothing (Milwertz 2003).The PRC is still a predominantly patriarchal society characterized by a patrilineal kinship system and social organizations and patrilocal post-residence patterns(Du 2011,p.2).The patriarchal gender system of the (Han)Chinese is intertwined with the CCP's politics.As a result,traditional practices of gender inequality have (re-) emerged in new forms during the post-socialist era(Du 2011,p.4). ②Springer
and Edmonds 2008; Guiheux and Kuah 2009; Zhao 2001, 2010). Semi-authoritarian regimes are ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracies, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially authoritarian traits. Such regimes are determined to maintain the appearance of democracy without exposing themselves to the political risk that free competition entails (Ottaway 2003, p. 3). In the PRC today, we find such a situation, with formal state limitations on freedom of association and speech alongside increased social spaces for civic and voluntary action (Ho and Edmonds 2008). This context is characterized by a duality: it is simultaneously restrictive and conducive to nationwide collective action (Ho 2007, p. 189). Its restrictive nature is characterized by a power asymmetry favoring state actors over (challenging) collective social actors, as state actors remain the unchallenged setters of the ‘rules of the game’ (Hildebrandt 2013, p. 15). Conversely, the PRC’s polity can be conducive to collective action because the boundaries between official and non-state organizations are becoming increasingly blurred, leading to the development of increased opportunities for social actors (Ho 2007, pp. 189). This trend toward increased space for social actors began with the Reform and Open Policies initiated at the end of the 1970s by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Until these reforms, social activism was only permitted under the leadership of official party-state mass organizations (Ma 2009). The reforms were predominantly economic rather than political (Wesoky 2002, p. 8), which is commonly situated as a reason for the Tiananmen upheaval in 1989 (Esherick and Wasserstrom 1994). Nonetheless, these reforms—with their shifts of responsibility from state to social actors (individual and collective)—led to increased space for social actors to not only engage in social service provision (Fulda et al. 2012), but also to function as advocates (Guo et al. 2013) and advisors in the policy formulation process (Yang and Alpermann 2014). These positive developments, interrupted by the political consequences of the Tiananmen incident, received a further boost through the Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW —第四届世界妇女大会), held in 1995 in Beijing. In the aftermath of Tiananmen, the CCP actively embraced the FWCW to ease criticism and legitimacy crises abroad and at home (Wesoky 2002). Until then, DV had occasionally been addressed by the CCP, but most related activities were superficial public displays of goodwill rather than attempts to actively ameliorate the issue7 (Milwertz 2003). Due to the sensitivity of the issue—not only among the general public but also among the still heavily patriarchal Chinese polity—ADV organizations and activists felt that they were barred (Interview 7) from using tactics employed by organizations in other fields. At the FWCW, DV was situated as a core issue and broadly discussed by international scholars, including—for the first time—both Chinese practitioners and scholars (UN Women Fourth World Conference; Interview 2). All of these 7 The socio-political turmoils of the 1950s–1970s and deeply rooted patriarchal traditions meant that early attempts to ameliorate DV in the PRC came to nothing (Milwertz 2003). The PRC is still a predominantly patriarchal society characterized by a patrilineal kinship system and social organizations and patrilocal post-residence patterns (Du 2011, p. 2). The patriarchal gender system of the (Han) Chinese is intertwined with the CCP’s politics. As a result, traditional practices of gender inequality have (re-) emerged in new forms during the post-socialist era (Du 2011, p. 4). Voluntas 123
Voluntas developments contributed liberal elements to a still restrictive political context.It is within this paradoxically restrictive and conducive Chinese political system that social movements in the PRC are situated,including Beijing ADV organizations. Collective social actors today remain densely controlled by the party-state through various measures,among them the need to work under a responsible mother organization(Lingdao Danwei)in order to receive an official registration(Ma 2009) and obstacles to receive registration as a non-governmental organization,which would grant them possible tax benefits and/or the possibility of obtaining funding from foreign organizations(Ma 2009).Despite all of these restrictions,the POS in the PRC today is far more conducive to social activism (providing such activism does not challenge the CCP's supremacy)than it was in the late 1980s.Moreover, the FWCW brought DV into official discourse and onto the radar of a broader (party-elite)audience.In this way,the conference led to a boom in women's organizations,including professional ADV organizations and a diversification of their services (Howell 1997;Liu 2000;Milwertz and Bu 2007).Following this boom,Beijing became a hub of organized action against DV. Despite the growth of women's and ADV organizations after 1995,the number of organizations combating DV remained relatively small.This is particularly evident when compared with sectors strongly supported by the government such as environmental agencies (Interview 3).The China Development Brief (2013),an organization observing third-sector development in the PRC,states that there are 18 nationwide ADV organizations compared to,for example,226 environmental agencies(cf.China Development Brief).Nonetheless,the FCWC marks the initial spark of the formation of an organized ADV movement,initially centered around Beijing. However,the most conducive POS is no guarantee for successful mobilization (McAdam 1999);activists must also decide whether the 'time is ripe'-and,if so, employ their organizational strength and tailored tactics to exploit these opportu- nities.I argue that the POS in the PRC improved overall,and that innovations in actors'tactics resulted in clear changes in Beijing ADV activism. Innovation is Key:The Role of Tactical Innovation in Mobilization Beijing ADV activists aim at mobilizing public and political support for better legal protection against DV.Tactical innovations play a crucial role here;they are, however,embedded within the broader mobilization of Beijing ADV activists. Social actors'mobilization rests on external factors [a conducive political environment (POS)]and internal factors (the indigenous organization)(Rucht s The China Development Brief counts only legally registered organizations:furthermore,due to anti- competition regulation,it is officially forbidden for more than one social organization working on the same topic to exist (Ma 2009.p.66). Mobilization refers to the activities of movements,organizations or individual social actors to gain more control over resources that contribute to achieving their goals (Opp 2009,p.140)Resources can be understood as something that can potentially be used by a movement to further its goals(Edwards and McCarthy 2004). 2Springer
developments contributed liberal elements to a still restrictive political context. It is within this paradoxically restrictive and conducive Chinese political system that social movements in the PRC are situated, including Beijing ADV organizations. Collective social actors today remain densely controlled by the party-state through various measures, among them the need to work under a responsible mother organization (Lingdao Danwei) in order to receive an official registration (Ma 2009) and obstacles to receive registration as a non-governmental organization, which would grant them possible tax benefits and/or the possibility of obtaining funding from foreign organizations (Ma 2009). Despite all of these restrictions, the POS in the PRC today is far more conducive to social activism (providing such activism does not challenge the CCP’s supremacy) than it was in the late 1980s. Moreover, the FWCW brought DV into official discourse and onto the radar of a broader (party-elite) audience. In this way, the conference led to a boom in women’s organizations, including professional ADV organizations and a diversification of their services (Howell 1997; Liu 2000; Milwertz and Bu 2007). Following this boom, Beijing became a hub of organized action against DV. Despite the growth of women’s and ADV organizations after 1995, the number of organizations combating DV remained relatively small. This is particularly evident when compared with sectors strongly supported by the government such as environmental agencies (Interview 3). The China Development Brief (2013), an organization observing third-sector development in the PRC, states that there are 18 nationwide ADV organizations compared to, for example, 226 environmental agencies (cf. China Development Brief).8 Nonetheless, the FCWC marks the initial spark of the formation of an organized ADV movement, initially centered around Beijing. However, the most conducive POS is no guarantee for successful mobilization (McAdam 1999); activists must also decide whether the ‘time is ripe’—and, if so, employ their organizational strength and tailored tactics to exploit these opportunities. I argue that the POS in the PRC improved overall, and that innovations in actors’ tactics resulted in clear changes in Beijing ADV activism. Innovation is Key: The Role of Tactical Innovation in Mobilization Beijing ADV activists aim at mobilizing public and political support for better legal protection against DV. Tactical innovations play a crucial role here; they are, however, embedded within the broader mobilization of Beijing ADV activists. Social actors’ mobilization9 rests on external factors [a conducive political environment (POS)] and internal factors (the indigenous organization) (Rucht 8 The China Development Brief counts only legally registered organizations; furthermore, due to anticompetition regulation, it is officially forbidden for more than one social organization working on the same topic to exist (Ma 2009, p. 66). 9 Mobilization refers to the activities of movements, organizations or individual social actors to gain more control over resources that contribute to achieving their goals (Opp 2009, p. 140) Resources can be understood as something that can potentially be used by a movement to further its goals (Edwards and McCarthy 2004). Voluntas 123
Voluntas 1996;Meyer 2004;Meyer and Minkoff 2001;McCarthy and Zald 1977;McAdam 1999).This indigenous organization serves to mobilize resources and supplies leaders to direct their use(McAdam and Snow 1997,p.340),and is situated within a mobilizing structure of social actors,composed of networks,infrastructures and organizations-formal and informal-through which people and resources are engaged in collective action (McAdam et al.1996).This structure includes pre- existing (professional)groups,movement organizations,and formal and informal networks among potential activists(Caren 2007).The indigenous organization is thus situated in a structure within which tactics and tactical innovations are devised and carried out (McAdam 1997,p.340).Tactics only become important when external and internal factors are conducive to mobilization. The significance of tactics for mobilization of social actors rests on social actors' positions in the political system.Social actors are challengers or outsiders of the polity,and as such must devise ways to overcome their relative institutional powerlessness.Polity outsiders aim at bypassing routine decision-making channels and seek,often by applying non-institutionalized tactics,to force their opponents to deal with them in spaces within which they are more powerful-often outside of traditional arenas.Scholars argue that challenging social actors gain influence when they break out of routine decision-making channels,disrupting the social order and applying pressure to the established polity to make concessions (Gamson 1975; Piven and Cloward 1979).They achieve this through strategically framing their issue to create common understandings of the world and themselves that legitimate and motivate their actions (McAdam 1996;Benford and Snow 2000).Strategic framing is thus the means by which actors sell their activities,their claims,and their right to existence to non-activists.In this sense,they form an integral part of the tactical repertoire of(collective)social actors. In the PRC,due to the political environment,(collective)social actors initially have to choose a general tactical approach:are they aiming to set up legal operations and hence officially register or are they remaining in legal limbo (Yang and Alpermann 2014)?Both approaches entail possibilities and limitations.Social actors working under an official legal registration,a tactical orientation considered in this article,largely adopt either a corporatist or a challenging approach toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).Especially with regard to the adaption of a challenging orientation,the application of one tactic for a long time allows activists' opponents-party-state actors-to devise effective counter-measures,forcing social actors to consistently add innovative tactics to their repertoire if they want to gain or maintain influence (McAdam and Snow 1997).It is within this context that tactical innovation-the creativity of insurgents to devise new tactical forms-gains crucial importance (McAdam 1997).The performance art advocacy applied by Beijing ADV activists can be understood as such a tactical innovation.It consists of live performances in public places which,by disturbing the social order,aim at stirring up bystanders and gaining media attention-and,through the latter,the support of the general public (Wang 2012;Guo et al.2013).It is an inexpensive advocacy strategy dependent on creativity and individual dedication rather than the employment of expensive experts and materials typical of traditional strategies.It is also an inclusive strategy,which allows diverse activists to join forces ②Springer
1996; Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2001; McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam 1999). This indigenous organization serves to mobilize resources and supplies leaders to direct their use (McAdam and Snow 1997, p. 340), and is situated within a mobilizing structure of social actors, composed of networks, infrastructures and organizations—formal and informal—through which people and resources are engaged in collective action (McAdam et al. 1996). This structure includes preexisting (professional) groups, movement organizations, and formal and informal networks among potential activists (Caren 2007). The indigenous organization is thus situated in a structure within which tactics and tactical innovations are devised and carried out (McAdam 1997, p. 340). Tactics only become important when external and internal factors are conducive to mobilization. The significance of tactics for mobilization of social actors rests on social actors’ positions in the political system. Social actors are challengers or outsiders of the polity, and as such must devise ways to overcome their relative institutional powerlessness. Polity outsiders aim at bypassing routine decision-making channels and seek, often by applying non-institutionalized tactics, to force their opponents to deal with them in spaces within which they are more powerful—often outside of traditional arenas. Scholars argue that challenging social actors gain influence when they break out of routine decision-making channels, disrupting the social order and applying pressure to the established polity to make concessions (Gamson 1975; Piven and Cloward 1979). They achieve this through strategically framing their issue to create common understandings of the world and themselves that legitimate and motivate their actions (McAdam 1996; Benford and Snow 2000). Strategic framing is thus the means by which actors sell their activities, their claims, and their right to existence to non-activists. In this sense, they form an integral part of the tactical repertoire of (collective) social actors. In the PRC, due to the political environment, (collective) social actors initially have to choose a general tactical approach: are they aiming to set up legal operations and hence officially register or are they remaining in legal limbo (Yang and Alpermann 2014)? Both approaches entail possibilities and limitations. Social actors working under an official legal registration, a tactical orientation considered in this article, largely adopt either a corporatist or a challenging approach toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Especially with regard to the adaption of a challenging orientation, the application of one tactic for a long time allows activists’ opponents—party-state actors—to devise effective counter-measures, forcing social actors to consistently add innovative tactics to their repertoire if they want to gain or maintain influence (McAdam and Snow 1997). It is within this context that tactical innovation—the creativity of insurgents to devise new tactical forms—gains crucial importance (McAdam 1997). The performance art advocacy applied by Beijing ADV activists can be understood as such a tactical innovation. It consists of live performances in public places which, by disturbing the social order, aim at stirring up bystanders and gaining media attention—and, through the latter, the support of the general public (Wang 2012; Guo et al. 2013). It is an inexpensive advocacy strategy dependent on creativity and individual dedication rather than the employment of expensive experts and materials typical of traditional strategies. It is also an inclusive strategy, which allows diverse activists to join forces. Voluntas 123
Voluntas The remainder of this article will discuss the political environment and the changing opportunity structure for Beijing ADV activism,followed by an assessment of the mobilization process prior to the emergence of ADV performance art advocacy.Subsequently,two examples of performance art advocacy as manifestations of tactical innovation in the Beijing ADV movement are illustrated. The aim of this discussion is to illustrate the rationale behind a turn within ADV activism:from traditional tactics aimed at incremental policy reform to rather more disruptive tactics.The article outlines the effects that this change of tactics had on overall ADV mobilization,as well as shedding light on the current status of civic engagement in the PRC. From Expert Advisor Groups to Performance Art Displays:The Tactical Repertoire of Beijing ADV Organizations Until recently,Beijing ADV activism comprised expert organizations driven by charismatic leaders rather than individual activists (Interview 7).The founders, employees,and volunteers of such organizations are mostly experts in their particular fields;for instance,legal scholars in legal aid organizations or social workers in organizations providing educational seminars for cadres.These experts have often been committed to tackling DV for a long time (Interviews 1,10,11,and 12)and have well-established links to the political system,either through their networks or as a result of being embedded in established political and academic institutions (Interviews 1 and 10).In Beijing,four organizations are crucially important to the ADV professional movement,12 all of which hold an official registration.To obtain their official registration status,these organizations are associated with state entities3(Ma 2009);as such,the state entities are responsible for their activities and thus function as a control mechanism.As a result of both official registration with incorporated supervision and the networks of leaders in the polity,Beijing ADV organizations have a rather corporatist and non-challenging tactical orientation. Cadres are elites of party and state institutions.They can be understood as policy elires.While elires can be understood as those who control large resource pools (McCarthy and Zald 1977,p.1221),policy elites refers to state actors with some influence over the direction,shape,and timing of policy making and implementation(Skrenntny 2006,p.1766). To protect the anonymity of these organizations,they are given the pseudonyms Orgnizion B.C. or D.All four organizations are based in Beijing Organization A focuses on women's rights issues using new media and with increasing expertise in performance art advocacy.Organization B specializes in ADV legal advocacy.Organization C is an NGO specializing in human rights advocacy,which only started to work on women's rights in 2012.Organization D focuses on legal aid and legal improvements. A professional movement differs from a public movement primarily regarding the involved actors. While public movements rely mainly on large numbers of volunteers and the support of the general public,professional movements are formed by (a small number of)professional organizations(Opp 2009). 13 The affiliation of two Beijing ADV organizations changed at the end of 2010 and they were forced to re-register independently from a supervising state institution. 2Springer
The remainder of this article will discuss the political environment and the changing opportunity structure for Beijing ADV activism, followed by an assessment of the mobilization process prior to the emergence of ADV performance art advocacy. Subsequently, two examples of performance art advocacy as manifestations of tactical innovation in the Beijing ADV movement are illustrated. The aim of this discussion is to illustrate the rationale behind a turn within ADV activism: from traditional tactics aimed at incremental policy reform to rather more disruptive tactics. The article outlines the effects that this change of tactics had on overall ADV mobilization, as well as shedding light on the current status of civic engagement in the PRC. From Expert Advisor Groups to Performance Art Displays: The Tactical Repertoire of Beijing ADV Organizations Until recently, Beijing ADV activism comprised expert organizations driven by charismatic leaders rather than individual activists (Interview 7). The founders, employees, and volunteers of such organizations are mostly experts in their particular fields; for instance, legal scholars in legal aid organizations or social workers in organizations providing educational seminars for cadres.10 These experts have often been committed to tackling DV for a long time (Interviews 1, 10, 11, and 12) and have well-established links to the political system, either through their networks or as a result of being embedded in established political and academic institutions (Interviews 1 and 10). In Beijing, four organizations11 are crucially important to the ADV professional movement,12 all of which hold an official registration. To obtain their official registration status, these organizations are associated with state entities13 (Ma 2009); as such, the state entities are responsible for their activities and thus function as a control mechanism. As a result of both official registration with incorporated supervision and the networks of leaders in the polity, Beijing ADV organizations have a rather corporatist and non-challenging tactical orientation. 10 Cadres are elites of party and state institutions. They can be understood as policy elites. While elites can be understood as those who control large resource pools (McCarthy and Zald 1977, p. 1221), policy elites refers to state actors with some influence over the direction, shape, and timing of policy making and implementation (Skrenntny 2006, p. 1766). 11 To protect the anonymity of these organizations, they are given the pseudonyms Organization A, B, C, or D. All four organizations are based in Beijing Organization A focuses on women’ s rights issues using new media and with increasing expertise in performance art advocacy. Organization B specializes in ADV legal advocacy. Organization C is an NGO specializing in human rights advocacy, which only started to work on women’s rights in 2012. Organization D focuses on legal aid and legal improvements. 12 A professional movement differs from a public movement primarily regarding the involved actors. While public movements rely mainly on large numbers of volunteers and the support of the general public, professional movements are formed by (a small number of) professional organizations (Opp 2009). 13 The affiliation of two Beijing ADV organizations changed at the end of 2010 and they were forced to re-register independently from a supervising state institution. Voluntas 123
Voluntas Turning to Corporatist Tactics Supporting the CCPs Line One Gender Equality Prior to 1995,the psychological and emotional support of DV victims was the cornerstone of ADV organizations'efforts.After 1995,ADV organizations increasingly turned to the legal dimension of DV and to raising awareness about the issue (Interview 10).However,the corporate tactical approach adopted by ADV actors toward the party-state remained the same pre-and post-1995;they adapted to the prevailing political environment in which the party-state officially remained the dominant policy decision-maker.As such,ADV organizations raised awareness (including through small-scale community campaigns),provided legal recommen- dations,seminars,and workshops for policy cadres and other multipliers,and conducted pilot projects on DV prevention.Most of these activities were,supported by the official state women's institution,the All China Women's Federation (ACWF).14 One organization also offered legal counseling and representation for DV victims.Initially,this service was provided to everyone,but demand grew so immensely that the organization started to select only those cases with the most potential to improve overall legal protection against DV for all Chinese citizens (Interviews 2 and 10). These mobilization efforts were framed as supportive to the CCP's efforts.As a result,organizations were able to establish themselves as important advisors for policy cadres regarding legal protection against DV (Interview 1).In this sense, professional ADV organizations function(ed)as service providers and professional advocacy organizations simultaneously.Initially,their advocacy was directed to a wide range of recipients ranging from policy elites [such as members of the ACWF and National People's Congress (NPC)]to lawyers and judges. More recently,dissemination activities gained increasing importance in the tactical approach of Beijing ADV organizations.Such dissemination is no longer only directed at policy cadres but also to official and new media as well as scientific publication channels(nterview6,Guo et al..2003;中国法学会反对家庭暴力网络 2010).Scientific support for social actor's demands has recently been identified as a crucial factor in gaining party-state elites'support for collective social actors'goals (Yang and Alpermann 2014).New media,particularly the internet,has also gained increasing importance as a mobilization and information tool for collective social actors (Yang 2003,2009),and an alternative source of information to censored official state media.Moreover,DV experts argue that awareness of DV among the general public has increased significantly through ADV organizations'activities (Interviews 1 and 10);their mobilization through media and activities can support these professional activists'claims. Through this tactical approach,activists were able to establish themselves as advisors on legal aspects of DV for policy elites.In this sense,their mobilization 14 The All Chinese Women's Federation(ACWF)was established in 1949 as the official representative of women's rights and interests and the link between women and the CCP(Liu 2001).The ACWF has branches at all administrative levels.Following the emergence of independent women's organizations after 1995,the ACWF came under increasing pressure to adequately represent women's interests.Due to this rising pressure,the ACWF has undergone several reforms (Howell 1997). ②Springer
Turning to Corporatist Tactics Supporting the CCPs Line One Gender Equality Prior to 1995, the psychological and emotional support of DV victims was the cornerstone of ADV organizations’ efforts. After 1995, ADV organizations increasingly turned to the legal dimension of DV and to raising awareness about the issue (Interview 10). However, the corporate tactical approach adopted by ADV actors toward the party-state remained the same pre- and post-1995; they adapted to the prevailing political environment in which the party-state officially remained the dominant policy decision-maker. As such, ADV organizations raised awareness (including through small-scale community campaigns), provided legal recommendations, seminars, and workshops for policy cadres and other multipliers, and conducted pilot projects on DV prevention. Most of these activities were, supported by the official state women’s institution, the All China Women’s Federation (ACWF).14 One organization also offered legal counseling and representation for DV victims. Initially, this service was provided to everyone, but demand grew so immensely that the organization started to select only those cases with the most potential to improve overall legal protection against DV for all Chinese citizens (Interviews 2 and 10). These mobilization efforts were framed as supportive to the CCP’s efforts. As a result, organizations were able to establish themselves as important advisors for policy cadres regarding legal protection against DV (Interview 1). In this sense, professional ADV organizations function(ed) as service providers and professional advocacy organizations simultaneously. Initially, their advocacy was directed to a wide range of recipients ranging from policy elites [such as members of the ACWF and National People’s Congress (NPC)] to lawyers and judges. More recently, dissemination activities gained increasing importance in the tactical approach of Beijing ADV organizations. Such dissemination is no longer only directed at policy cadres but also to official and new media as well as scientific publication channels (Interview 6, Guo et al. 2003; 中国法学会反对家庭暴力网络 2010). Scientific support for social actor’s demands has recently been identified as a crucial factor in gaining party-state elites’ support for collective social actors’ goals (Yang and Alpermann 2014). New media, particularly the internet, has also gained increasing importance as a mobilization and information tool for collective social actors (Yang 2003, 2009), and an alternative source of information to censored official state media. Moreover, DV experts argue that awareness of DV among the general public has increased significantly through ADV organizations’ activities (Interviews 1 and 10); their mobilization through media and activities can support these professional activists’ claims. Through this tactical approach, activists were able to establish themselves as advisors on legal aspects of DV for policy elites. In this sense, their mobilization 14 The All Chinese Women’s Federation (ACWF) was established in 1949 as the official representative of women’s rights and interests and the link between women and the CCP (Liu 2001). The ACWF has branches at all administrative levels. Following the emergence of independent women’s organizations after 1995, the ACWF came under increasing pressure to adequately represent women’s interests. Due to this rising pressure, the ACWF has undergone several reforms (Howell 1997). Voluntas 123
Voluntas efforts aimed to institutionalize their advocacy within the polity.Only recently the public has been considered as useful pillar in the mobilization process for better legal protection against DV,due to an increase in awareness of DV. ADV activists argue that the outcomes of this tactical approach are evident.The increased awareness for DV among all Chinese,(policy)cadres,scientists,and the general public would only be the most obvious of these outcomes (Interview 6). With regard to legal improvements,ADV activists argue that incremental improvements since 1995,especially since the turn of the millennium,have been a direct consequence of their mobilization (Interviews 2,6,and 11).Among these improvements are the revision of the Marriage Law in 2001,which included DV as an acceptable reason for divorce (Lui 2011),and the creation of local rules or policies dealing with DV in 28 out of 34 provinces or equivalent administrative regions(Creasey et al.2013).Performance art advocacy,while strongly embedded in this movement,differs from this previous tactical approach significantly. Performance Art Advocacy as Tactical Innovation in the Beijing ADV Movement Performance art advocacy deviates significantly from the previously discussed tactics: The young people have a different way than the old (...)the previously existing approach basing on experience and expert knowledge is completely different.(...)The old approach relied on articles,experts,or the ACWF.But this new approach is a very direct activity;it is the freedom of speech of the public.(...)These activities try to make the public discuss such hot topic. (Interview 7,translation by author) In the following discussion,two prominent cases of performance art advocacy-the Injured Brides activism and the activism accompanying Kim Lee's final court hearing-will be described and their effects for ADV mobilization in general will be analyzed. The Injured Brides Activism15 In 2012,three women in western-style wedding dresses adorned with red marks symbolizing blood stains paraded through the Qianmen pedestrian street holding signs drawing attention to the social problem of DV(Chen 2012).Their signs stated that love is no excuse for violence(爱不是暴力的借口)，proclaimed a violence-free zone since equality is the precondition for harmony(暴力无特区平：平等才和谐)， and questioned why the majority stayed silent despite DV occurring in close proximity to them(你依然沉默？暴力在身本).The Injured Brides event was the Par42 The name'Injured Brides'is a translation of受伤的新w娘，the name that the activists used to refer to their own activities. 2Springer
efforts aimed to institutionalize their advocacy within the polity. Only recently the public has been considered as useful pillar in the mobilization process for better legal protection against DV, due to an increase in awareness of DV. ADV activists argue that the outcomes of this tactical approach are evident. The increased awareness for DV among all Chinese, (policy) cadres, scientists, and the general public would only be the most obvious of these outcomes (Interview 6). With regard to legal improvements, ADV activists argue that incremental improvements since 1995, especially since the turn of the millennium, have been a direct consequence of their mobilization (Interviews 2, 6, and 11). Among these improvements are the revision of the Marriage Law in 2001, which included DV as an acceptable reason for divorce (Lu¨ 2011), and the creation of local rules or policies dealing with DV in 28 out of 34 provinces or equivalent administrative regions (Creasey et al. 2013). Performance art advocacy, while strongly embedded in this movement, differs from this previous tactical approach significantly. Performance Art Advocacy as Tactical Innovation in the Beijing ADV Movement Performance art advocacy deviates significantly from the previously discussed tactics: The young people have a different way than the old (…) the previously existing approach basing on experience and expert knowledge is completely different. (…) The old approach relied on articles, experts, or the ACWF. But this new approach is a very direct activity; it is the freedom of speech of the public. (…) These activities try to make the public discuss such hot topic. (Interview 7, translation by author) In the following discussion, two prominent cases of performance art advocacy—the Injured Brides activism and the activism accompanying Kim Lee’s final court hearing—will be described and their effects for ADV mobilization in general will be analyzed. The Injured Brides Activism15 In 2012, three women in western-style wedding dresses adorned with red marks symbolizing blood stains paraded through the Qianmen pedestrian street holding signs drawing attention to the social problem of DV (Chen 2012). Their signs stated that love is no excuse for violence (爱不是暴力的借口), proclaimed a violence-free zone since equality is the precondition for harmony (暴力无特区平: 平等才和谐), and questioned why the majority stayed silent despite DV occurring in close proximity to them (你依然沉默?暴力在身本). The Injured Brides event was the Par42 The name ‘Injured Brides’ is a translation of受伤的新娘, the name that the activists used to refer to their own activities. Voluntas 123
