DENNETT'S VIEW o Dennett (1987, e.g. argues that all intentionality is derived Attributions ofintentionality-to animals, other people, even ourselves-are instrumental and allow us to predict behavior, but they are not descriptions ofintrinsic properties. As we have seen, Dennett is concerned about the slow speed of things in the chinese room but he argues that once a system is working up to speed, it has all that is needed for intelligence and derived intentionality- and derived intentionality is the only kind that there is according to Dennett. A machine can be an intentional system because intentional explanations work in predicting the machine's behavior. Dennett also suggests that searle conflates intentionality with awareness ofintentionality In his syntax-semantic arguments, Searle has apparently confused a claim about the underivability of semantics from syntax with a claim about the underivability of the consciousness of semantics from syntax(336)DENNETT’S VIEW  Dennett (1987, e.g.) argues that all intentionality is derived. Attributions of intentionality—to animals, other people, even ourselves—are instrumental and allow us to predict behavior, but they are not descriptions of intrinsic properties. As we have seen, Dennett is concerned about the slow speed of things in the Chinese Room, but he argues that once a system is working up to speed, it has all that is needed for intelligence and derived intentionality— and derived intentionality is the only kind that there is, according to Dennett. A machine can be an intentional system because intentional explanations work in predicting the machine's behavior. Dennett also suggests that Searle conflates intentionality with awareness of intentionality. In his syntax-semantic arguments, “Searle has apparently confused a claim about the underivability of semantics from syntax with a claim about the underivability of the consciousness of semantics from syntax” (336)