CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS 561 inform all Customs Commissioners that they must not endorse any loan guarantees without having received orders to this effect from the Inspector General,who would do so on the orders of the Zongli Yamen.27 The Yamen in a letter urged Zeng Guofan that in future the Customs Commissioners should be employed to help negotiate the loans,and Hart should be informed of the arrangements so that he could prevent a repeat of the situation.28 Hart used the situation to implement a new policy:local loans could only be guaranteed by foreign Customs Officials with Zongli Yamen approval.A circular to all Customs Officials on this matter was issued 9 September 1867.29 There was a very important consequence:the Zongli Yamen would have to be consulted on any future use of loans guaranteed by Customs revenues. Hart's motivations were twofold.First,he was seeking to reinforce central authority.Put more cynically,he was strengthening the hand of his Zongli Yamen patrons vis-a-vis the leading provincial officials. But Hart was also hoping that the Qing government would seek to use foreign loans more extensively and systematically to support reform, and that the Customs would get to play a major role in negotiating such loans on the London financial markets.The Zongli Yamen accepted its new influence with alacrity,moving on two occasions to stop loans that they believed were negotiated at above market rates by Zuo Zongtang and his agent Hu Guangyong.But while they consulted with Hart on these issues regularly,they were not willing to turn negotiations over to him.Hart,while disappointed,didn't press the issue.30 In the 186os Hart was an extremely valuable agent of the Zongli Yamen.He was,unlike his predecessor,H.N.Lay,ultimately accept- ing of his subordinate position.Indeed,at a time when provincial leaders were getting much of the attention from foreigners,he acted to strengthen the position of the Zongli Yamen.While Hart could and did 27 ZY 01-32/1(1),Hede (Robert Hart)-Zongli Yamen TZ6.6.21(22July 1867). ZY o1-32/1(1),Zongli Yamen-Zeng Guofan,TZ6.7.1 (31 July 1867). 29 A circular to all Customs commissioners on this matter was issued 9 September 867.See China,Imperial Maritime Customs:Inspector Generals Circulars,First Series 1861- 1867(Shanghai,1878),p.122.Hart to FitzRoy 22.January,1868 in China,Maritime Customs,Documents Illustrative ofthe Origin,Development and Activities ofthe Chinese Customs Service (Shanghai:Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs, 1971940,i,228. On Hart's attitudes see also Stanley F.Wright,363-5;on the role of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in the Qing foreign loans see Frank H.H.King,The Hong Kong Bank in Late Imperial China(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1987),535- 62.On the Zongli Yamen's intervention,Horowitz,'Central Power,'239-41.CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS 561 inform all Customs Commissioners that they must not endorse any loan guarantees without having received orders to this effect from the Inspector General, who would do so on the orders of the Zongli Yamen.27 The Yamen in a letter urged Zeng Guofan that in future the Customs Commissioners should be employed to help negotiate the loans, and Hart should be informed of the arrangements so that he could prevent a repeat of the situation.28 Hart used the situation to implement a new policy: local loans could only be guaranteed by foreign Customs Officials with Zongli Yamen approval. A circular to all Customs Officials on this matter was issued 9 September 1867. 29 There was a very important consequence: the Zongli Yamen would have to be consulted on any future use of loans guaranteed by Customs revenues. Hart’s motivations were twofold. First, he was seeking to reinforce central authority. Put more cynically, he was strengthening the hand of his Zongli Yamen patrons vis-`a-vis the leading provincial officials. But Hart was also hoping that the Qing government would seek to use foreign loans more extensively and systematically to support reform, and that the Customs would get to play a major role in negotiating such loans on the London financial markets. The Zongli Yamen accepted its new influence with alacrity, moving on two occasions to stop loans that they believed were negotiated at above market rates by Zuo Zongtang and his agent Hu Guangyong. But while they consulted with Hart on these issues regularly, they were not willing to turn negotiations over to him. Hart, while disappointed, didn’t press the issue.30 In the 1860s Hart was an extremely valuable agent of the Zongli Yamen. He was, unlike his predecessor, H. N. Lay, ultimately accept￾ing of his subordinate position. Indeed, at a time when provincial leaders were getting much of the attention from foreigners, he acted to strengthen the position of the Zongli Yamen. While Hart could and did 27 ZY 01-32/1 (1), Hede (Robert Hart)–Zongli Yamen TZ6.6.21 (22 July 1867). 28 ZY 01–32/1 (1), Zongli Yamen–Zeng Guofan, TZ 6.7.1 (31 July 1867). 29 A circular to all Customs commissioners on this matter was issued 9 September 1867. See China, Imperial Maritime Customs: Inspector Generals Circulars, First Series 1861– 1867 (Shanghai, 1878), p. 122. Hart to FitzRoy 22 January, 1868 in China, Maritime Customs, Documents Illustrative of the Origin, Development and Activities of the Chinese Customs Service (Shanghai: Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs, 1937–1940), vi, 228. 30 On Hart’s attitudes see also Stanley F. Wright, 363–5; on the role of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in the Qing foreign loans see Frank H. H. King, The Hong Kong Bank in Late Imperial China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 535– 62. On the Zongli Yamen’s intervention, Horowitz, ‘Central Power,’ 239–41