60 International Organization American society.World War I dramatically strengthened the overseas eco- nomic interests of many major U.S.banks and corporations,who fought hard for more political involvement by the United States in world affairs. Yet domestically oriented economic groups remained extremely powerful within the United States and sought to maintain a relatively isolated America.Through the 1920s and early 1930s,the two broad coalitions battled to dominate foreign economic policy.The result was an uneasy stand-off in which the two camps entrenched themselves in different por- tions of the state apparatus,so that policy often ran on two tracks and was sometimes internally contradictory.Only the crisis of the 1930s and the eventual destruction of most of America's overseas competitors led to an "internationalist''victory that allowed for the construction of the American- led post-World War II international political economy. The problem To virtually all observers then and since,at the end of World War I the United States seemed to dominate the international political economy.It had financed the victorious war effort and provided most of the war materiel that went into it;its industry was by far the world's largest and most produc- tive.Despite its traditional economic insulation,the sheer size of the U.S. economy made the country the world's largest trading power.The center of world finance had shifted from London to New York.The United States clearly had the military,industrial,and financial capacity to impose its will on Europe.Yet after World War I the United States,in the current arcane iconography of the field,did not play the part of international eco- nomic hegemon,arbiter,and bankroller of the world economic order.The United States was capable of hegemonic action,and President Woodrow Wilson had hegemonic plans,but they were defeated.The problem was not in Europe,for although the British and French were stronger in 1919 than they would be in 1946,they could hardly have stood in the way of American hegemony.Indeed,European complaints about the United States after World War I were in much the opposite direction:the Europeans bitterly protested America's refusal to accept the responsibilities of leadership.The Euro- peans charged that the United States was stingy with its government finance, hostile in its trade policy,scandalous in its refusal to join the League of Nations, unwilling to get involved in overseeing and smoothing Europe's squabbles. The British and French tried for years to entice and cajole a reluctant America into leadership.America would not be budged,at least until 1940. The world's most powerful nation pursued a contradictory and shifting set of foreign economic policies.The country both asserted and rejected world leadership,simultaneously initiated and blocked efforts at European stabili- zation,and began such major cooperative ventures as the League of Nations60 International Organization American society. World War I dramatically strengthened the overseas eco￾nomic interests of many major U.S. banks and corporations, who fought hard for more political involvement by the United States in world affairs. Yet domestically oriented economic groups remained extremely powerful within the United States and sought to maintain a relatively isolated America. Through the 1920s and early 1930s, the two broad coalitions battled to dominate foreign economic policy. The result was an uneasy stand-off in which the two camps entrenched themselves in different por￾tions of the state apparatus, so that policy often ran on two tracks and was sometimes internally contradictory. Only the crisis of the 1930s and the eventual destruction of most of America's overseas competitors led to an "internationalist" victory that allowed for the construction of the American￾led post-World War I1 international political economy. The problem To virtually all observers then and since, at the end of World War I the United States seemed to dominate the international political economy. It had financed the victorious war effort and provided most of the war materiel that went into it; its industry was by far the world's largest and most produc￾tive. Despite its traditional economic insulation, the sheer size of the U.S. economy made the country the world's largest trading power. The center of world finance had shifted from London to New York. The United States clearly had the military, industrial, and financial capacity to impose its will on Europe. Yet after World War I the United States, in the current arcane iconography of the field, did not play the part of international eco￾nomic hegemon, arbiter, and bankroller of the world economic order. The United States was capable of hegemonic action, and President Woodrow Wilson had hegemonic plans, but they were defeated. The problem was not in Europe, for although the British and French were stronger in 1919 than they would be in 1946, they could hardly have stood in the way of American hegemony. Indeed, European complaints about the United States after World War I were in much the opposite direction: the Europeans bitterly protested America's refusal to accept the responsibilities of leadership. The Euro￾peans charged that the United States was stingy with its government finance, hostile in its trade policy, scandalous in its refusal to join the League of Nations, unwilling to get involved in overseeing and smoothing Europe's squabbles. The British and French tried for years to entice and cajole a reluctant America into leadership. America would not be budged, at least until 1940. The world's most powerful nation pursued a contradictory and shifting set of foreign economic policies. The country both asserted and reject~d world leadership, simultaneously initiated and blocked efforts at European stabili￾zation, and began such major cooperative ventures as the League of Nations