De Witt Huberts et al 125 compared to dieters who did not reflect on prior restraint a later time presumably iustified peonle to act indulgently (Study 1;Effron,Monin,Miller,2013).Similar mecha- as the possibility to act in line with one's intentions in the nismshave beer bserved in the context of mo future served as a justification to break their rules in the ould ha related demonstration of how future plans and choices performed but did not,increased subsequent immoral behav can endanger current self-regulation is the evidence that forming particular justifications about undoing the negatiy gent behavior.car ing abo such ind Prior Success or Failure 26).when the weddin Sally may form compensatory intentions such as A justification relate will gox ing tomorro or"I will eat less tomorro progre As many egu (2010rev caled that part ticinants who were instructed to y from the other goal. mor e goa quent taste test than participar ted that actual h nle of the one domain led to more indulgence in the opposing domair future intentions on current self-regulation that could be (e.g.losing weight vs.choosing a hedonic snack:studying explained by a justification-based account is the finding oing o cate died in a i tion context,having failed to attain one's oal could also oon-to-be forbidden food while they still can (Urbszat Herman.Polivy.2002). the e hell effec Negative Emotional Events food intake to reach a certain weight.do not show a physio That negative emotional events and the ensuing negative ally ne rmal com pens tion effect after consuming a pre fect c also ve as justification to temporarily a ad (c an d ck,1975 regu 2012w demo ated in ou ab (I a to their n nal bodily signals r ving th their food intake after having the milkshake.Having broken pictures.The duration of exposure to the negative picture heir diet by consu or t as it is also kr having ereas found within other self regulation domains as well such as of having seen the negative nictures and thus could use the in abstinent alcoholics,s kers,and illicit drug users (e.g. tive affect as both g ed feel Future Choices and Intentions ing equally negative Similar findings have been observed in the context of s are future onal moral ling wrongee and Dhar (2007)parti nts had to cho a rela Leach 2010)Parti nts who w ucted to recall ar tively healthy or indulgent snack.Whereas the choice was occasion in which they were treated unfair were more likel framed as a single cho e opportunity for half ot the parti to refuse to help the experimenter ith a supplem tary tas pants,the f cipants w om snacks again in the following week.Participants believing lost a computer game due to an unfair reason (a glitch that they could choose again next week were more likely to in the program),they requested a more unfair money alloca anowingthatomewol avor the indulgent o choice.Me lon in tha 21 who lost the game ave again a reason(Study 3 De Witt Huberts et al. 125 compared to dieters who did not reflect on prior restraint (Study 1; Effron, Monin, & Miller, 2013). Similar mecha￾nisms have been observed in the context of moral behavior, with recent evidence demonstrating that thoughts of fore￾gone misdeeds by thinking of bad deeds that one could have performed but did not, increased subsequent immoral behav￾ior compared with participants whose foregone misdeeds had not been made salient (Effron, Miller, & Monin, 2012). Prior Success or Failure A justification related to prior restraint is perceived goal progress. As many self-regulation dilemmas often involve trade-off between two opposing goals (e.g., Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Stroebe, Papies, & Aarts, 2008), progress toward one goal often implies moving away from the other goal. A series of studies in the context of the goal progress model (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Louro, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2007) demonstrated that actual or perceived goal progress in one domain led to more indulgence in the opposing domain (e.g., losing weight vs. choosing a hedonic snack; studying vs. going out with friends). Conversely, although not explicitly studied in a justifica￾tion context, having failed to attain one’s goal could also serve as a justification to even further abandon one’s goal. Notorious in this regard is the “what the hell effect” in restrained eaters. Numerous studies demonstrated that restrained eaters, people who have the goal of restricting food intake to reach a certain weight, do not show a physio￾logically normal compensation effect after consuming a pre￾load (cf. Herman & Mack, 1975). Whereas normal eaters decrease their food intake after a preload milkshake, listen￾ing to their normal bodily signals, restrained eaters increased their food intake after having the milkshake. Having broken their diet by consuming a milkshake apparently serves as a reason to completely abandon their diet for the day. This abstinence violation effect, as it is also known by, has been found within other self-regulation domains as well, such as in abstinent alcoholics, smokers, and illicit drug users (e.g., Collins & Lapp, 1991; Shiffman et al., 1996; Stephens & Curtin, 1994). Future Choices and Intentions Another type of frequently studied justifications are future choices and intentions. For example, in a study by Khan and Dhar (2007) participants had to choose between a rela￾tively healthy or indulgent snack. Whereas the choice was framed as a single choice opportunity for half of the partici￾pants, the other half of the participants were informed that they would have the possibility to choose between the two snacks again in the following week. Participants believing that they could choose again next week were more likely to favor the indulgent option in the present choice. Merely knowing that one would have the option to choose again at a later time presumably justified people to act indulgently, as the possibility to act in line with one’s intentions in the future served as a justification to break their rules in the present. A related demonstration of how future plans and choices can endanger current self-regulation is the evidence that forming particular justifications about undoing the negative effect of the indulgent behavior, can bring about such indul￾gent behavior (also see Rabiau, Knäuper, & Miquelon, 2006). In other words, when confronted with the wedding cake, Sally may form compensatory intentions such as “I will go exercising tomorrow” or “I will eat less tomorrow,” which will allow her to violate her dieting rules now and indulge in the cake. Indeed, a study by Kronick and Knäuper (2010) revealed that participants who were instructed to make plans to exercise later that day consumed more M&Ms in a subsequent taste test than participants who had not been asked to make concrete plans for physical activity. Another compelling example of the detrimental effect of future intentions on current self-regulation that could be explained by a justification-based account is the finding that restrained eaters who plan to start a weight-loss diet will use that future intention as justification to indulge in the soon-to-be forbidden food while they still can (Urbszat, Herman, & Polivy, 2002). Negative Emotional Events That negative emotional events and the ensuing negative affect can also serve as justification to temporarily abandon self-regulatory goals was demonstrated in our lab (De Witt Huberts et al., 2012a). In three studies, a negative affective state was induced in participants by showing them aversive pictures. The duration of exposure to the negative pictures was manipulated such that one group was highly aware of having seen the pictures whereas the other group was only minimally aware. Only participants who were highly aware of having seen the negative pictures, and thus could use the negative affective triggers as justification, consumed more hedonic snack foods in a subsequent taste test. Importantly, the increase in hedonic consumption could not be attributed to differences in negative affect as both groups reported feel￾ing equally negative. Similar findings have been observed in the context of emotional moral events, demonstrating that feeling wronged leads to more selfish behavior (Zitek, Jordan, Monin, & Leach, 2010). Participants who were instructed to recall an occasion in which they were treated unfair were more likely to refuse to help the experimenter with a supplementary task than participants who had to recall a time when they were bored (Study 1; Zitek et al., 2010). Likewise, when partici￾pants lost a computer game due to an unfair reason (a glitch in the program), they requested a more unfair money alloca￾tion in a future task than did participants who lost the game for a fair reason (Study 3; Zitek et al., 2010). Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015