Tainted Altruism However.in the case of the within-subiects presenta- earned for the charitable cause,the more profits go tion, participants rated the targets to be equivalent in to Daniel P.and his staff. morality (Ms =).11an 5.33).and they ratec d the h .0251 than when he volunteered at the coffee shop (M=4.90. native promoter.They were then presented with a series SE=0.27).59)=4.67.D<001 of 10 binary hiring decisions.Each decision provided information ab Discussion nty and h ow ne decisio The results of the first study were consistent with the was as follows: hypothesized tainted-altruism effect.Participants evalu terested behavior that produced a charitabl anan en the two scenarios were not rated differently in terms of Option B:Your charity earns S1.000.000:other their overall benefit to society when they were presented organizer earns $10.000 rate th always cha generated for the charity.The information provided in ing doing some good as worse than doing no good at all. the options ranged from both promoters generating the same amount for the charity (both $1 million)to Daniel's Experiment 2:Sacrificing Social gene Benefits Participants in the co oration condition wer In Experiment 2.we tested whether the tainted-altruism sented with a nearly identical set of instructions and stim examined people were ling to the the he d of a co than a charity. son raising the mon ey also ondition Metbod Daniel's firm (who charged more but poter atemative promoter (wh both conditio Daniel's firm ated on a for from the same online subiect pool and were randomly profit basis.and all of the dollar amounts were identical assigned to one of two between-subjects conditions.An cross the two conditions.In addition. at the beginning al 21 adults participated but we exc rial,participants were pr with a ch o mee criteria. P's firm (ie d m Participants in the charity condition were asked to as a comprehension check,and participants who failed imagine that they were the head of a large charitable this were excluded from subsequent analyses (n =12) organization and wer charge of s ing a promote fter ma ng the nd-rai choices,participants in both con Th ing eventh ons rate lity and benefi s in the ning.promotion.and execution of maior fundraising drives to raise donations for charity."However,they also Data analysis.We conducted the primary analysis by learned that ing the point at which participants sw ed fron hiring t Daniel p's who chose the altemative firm,then Daniel's firm,and tled,he and his staff take a percentage of the then the alternative firm again were excluded from sub- remaining funds.Therefore,the more money that is sequent analyses (n=9).Tainted Altruism 3 However, in the case of the within-subjects presenta￾tion, participants rated the targets to be equivalent in morality (Ms = 5.11 and 5.33), and they rated the target’s actions to be significantly more beneficial when he vol￾unteered at the homeless shelter (M = 6.46, SE = 0.25) than when he volunteered at the coffee shop (M = 4.90, SE = 0.27), t(59) = 4.67, p < .001. Discussion The results of the first study were consistent with the hypothesized tainted-altruism effect. Participants evalu￾ated a self-interested behavior that produced a charitable benefit as less moral than an equivalent self-interested behavior that produced no charitable benefit. In addition, the two scenarios were not rated differently in terms of their overall benefit to society when they were presented between participants. However, when they were evalu￾ated simultaneously, participants did rate the charitable behavior as more beneficial, which suggests that, to some extent, participants recognized the inconsistency in rat￾ing doing some good as worse than doing no good at all. Experiment 2: Sacrificing Social Benefits In Experiment 2, we tested whether the tainted-altruism effect extends to participants’ behavioral intentions. We examined whether people were willing to forgo the opportunity to earn more money for a charity if the per￾son raising the money also earned a substantial profit. Method Participants. Ninety-three adult participants (mean age = 31.7 years; 62% female, 38% male) were recruited from the same online subject pool and were randomly assigned to one of two between-subjects conditions. An additional 21 adults participated but were excluded from the analyses because of failure to meet the study criteria, as described later in this section. Participants in the charity condition were asked to imagine that they were the head of a large charitable organization and were in charge of selecting a promoter for an upcoming fund-raising event. They then read about Daniel P., whose organization “handles the plan￾ning, promotion, and execution of major fundraising drives to raise donations for charity.” However, they also learned that Daniel P.’s organization is a for-profit company. After all of the organizational costs have been set￾tled, he and his staff take a percentage of the remaining funds. Therefore, the more money that is earned for the charitable cause, the more profits go to Daniel P. and his staff. Participants were instructed that their task was to decide whether they would hire Daniel’s firm or an alter￾native promoter. They were then presented with a series of 10 binary hiring decisions. Each decision provided information about how much money could be earned for their charity and how much would go to either Daniel P. or the alternative promoter. For example, one decision was as follows: Option A: Your charity earns $1,100,000; Daniel P. earns $55,000. Option B: Your charity earns $1,000,000; other organizer earns $10,000. The alternative promoter always charged a flat rate of $10,000, whereas Daniel’s firm charged 5% of the amount generated for the charity. The information provided in the options ranged from both promoters generating the same amount for the charity (both $1 million) to Daniel’s firm generating twice as much as the alternative pro￾moter (see the Supplemental Material available online). Participants in the corporation condition were pre￾sented with a nearly identical set of instructions and stim￾uli. However, they were asked to imagine that they were the head of a corporation, rather than a charity, and were planning a major fund-raising drive to raise seed money from investors. As in the charity condition, participants were presented with a series of binary choices between Daniel’s firm (who charged more but potentially raised more) and an alternative promoter (who charged less but also raised less). In both conditions, Daniel’s firm operated on a for￾profit basis, and all of the dollar amounts were identical across the two conditions. In addition, at the beginning of each trial, participants were presented with a choice in which the alternative promoter strictly dominated Daniel P.’s firm (i.e., charged less and earned more). This served as a comprehension check, and participants who failed this were excluded from subsequent analyses (n = 12). After making these choices, participants in both condi￾tions rated Daniel using the same morality and benefit measures as in the previous experiment. Data analysis. We conducted the primary analysis by recording the point at which participants switched from hiring the alternative promoter to hiring Daniel’s firm (recorded as the lower of the two values). Participants who chose the alternative firm, then Daniel’s firm, and then the alternative firm again were excluded from sub￾sequent analyses (n = 9). Downloaded from pss.sagepub.com by Cai Xing on January 21, 2014