《社会心理学》课程教学资源（文献资料）prosocial——Tainted Altruism - When Doing Some Good Is Evaluated as Worse Than Doing No Good at All

Psychological Science OnlineFirst,published on January 2014 as doi:10.1177/0956797613504785 aos Research Article PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE Tainted Altruism:When Doing Some Th 201 ints and per Good Is Evaluated as Worse Than Doing No Good at All SAGE Daylian M.Cain Abstract In four experiments,we found that the presence of self-interest in the charitable domain was seen as tainting:People eoth chantable and perona benefitsr than anahat no charitable be This tainted-altrinsn enect w observed in a variety of contexts an ed to both mora s)This effect did not ofits would b realized at the direct cost of charitable benefits,or the explicit use of charity as a means to an end.Rather,we found that it was related to the accessibility of different counterfactuals:When someone was charitable for self-interested oewas only s people mo Received 4/8/3:Revision accepted 8/18/13 People ofen FoLexample.consider the fateanic orks,handled major fund-raising drives for causes such as research on benefits as worse (less moral,ethical,etc.)than equiva AIDS and breast cancer.Pallotta's company raised more lent self-interested behaviors that produced no charitable than $305 on for va ous chari s over the course of h himself eamned nearly $00.000 per year.When this infor Tetlock.1997 McGraw&Tetlock.2005:Tetlock,Kristel mation became public,Pallotta faced an outpouring of Elson,Green,Lerner,2000).For example,several esearchers】 ave proposed a fundamenta distinction becunainguE en social worked.He reported,for example,that donations from market-exchange which are bsed one annual fund-raiser dropped from $71 million to stricter cost-benefit analysis (e.g.,Clark Mills,1979. $11 million (Kristof,2008). 1993;Fiske,1992;Goffman,1959).Consistent with this m people might insist that Pa we report here indicate that people have a more general bias against the very notion of seeking personal gains

Psychological Science 201X, Vol XX(X) 1–8 © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0956797613504785 pss.sagepub.com Research Article People often criticize charitable efforts that provide per￾sonal gains. For example, consider the fate of Daniel Pallotta. His company, Pallotta Teamworks, handled major fund-raising drives for causes such as research on AIDS and breast cancer. Pallotta’s company raised more than $305 million for various charities over the course of 9 years (Kristof, 2008). However, Pallotta’s company was not a charity—it was a for-profit organization, and Pallotta himself earned nearly $400,000 per year. When this infor￾mation became public, Pallotta faced an outpouring of criticism, and his company soon collapsed. Moreover, Pallotta’s exit from charitable fund-raising resulted in a loss of revenue for many of the charities with which he worked. He reported, for example, that donations from one annual fund-raiser dropped from $71 million to $11 million (Kristof, 2008). Although some people might insist that Pallotta’s share of the proceeds was simply too large, or that his profits came at the cost of charitable earnings, the experiments we report here indicate that people have a more general bias against the very notion of seeking personal gains from charity. Indeed, the studies reported here found that even when no direct trade-off was present, people evalu￾ated charitable actions that were “tainted” by personal benefits as worse (less moral, ethical, etc.) than equiva￾lent self-interested behaviors that produced no charitable benefit. One could interpret this as an instance of blurring the boundary between the sacred and the profane (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; McGraw & Tetlock, 2005; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). For example, several researchers have proposed a fundamental distinction between social-communal relationships, which are based on demonstrating genuine concern for other people, and market-exchange relationships, which are based on a stricter cost-benefit analysis (e.g., Clark & Mills, 1979, 1993; Fiske, 1992; Goffman, 1959). Consistent with this 504785PSSXXX10.1177/0956797613504785Newman, CainTainted Altruism research-article2014 Corresponding Author: George E. Newman, School of Management, Yale University, 135 Prospect St., New Haven, CT 06511 E-mail: george.newman@yale.edu Tainted Altruism: When Doing Some Good Is Evaluated as Worse Than Doing No Good at All George E. Newman and Daylian M. Cain School of Management, Yale University Abstract In four experiments, we found that the presence of self-interest in the charitable domain was seen as tainting: People evaluated efforts that realized both charitable and personal benefits as worse than analogous behaviors that produced no charitable benefit. This tainted-altruism effect was observed in a variety of contexts and extended to both moral evaluations of other agents and participants’ own behavioral intentions (e.g., reported willingness to hire someone or purchase a company’s products). This effect did not seem to be driven by expectations that profits would be realized at the direct cost of charitable benefits, or the explicit use of charity as a means to an end. Rather, we found that it was related to the accessibility of different counterfactuals: When someone was charitable for self-interested reasons, people considered his or her behavior in the absence of self-interest, ultimately concluding that the person did not behave as altruistically as he or she could have. However, when someone was only selfish, people did not spontaneously consider whether the person could have been more altruistic. Keywords morality, social cognition Received 4/8/13; Revision accepted 8/18/13 Psychological Science OnlineFirst, published on January 8, 2014 as doi:10.1177/0956797613504785 Downloaded from pss.sagepub.com by Cai Xing on January 21, 2014

2 Newman,Cain proposal,previous research has found that people are Method tha 2009.H 2004 In additio ema nal reminders of money can lead people to engage in a studies we included only the participants who took at number of antisocial behaviors,such as reduced least 20 s to read the vignette(s)and respond to the items ne other peopl .Good distin sum. Ito be the minimum amount o are many reasons to think that people may criticize chari table efforts that also provide personal gains.However,it failed to meet this requirement Participants were randomly assigned to one of three is unclear why such may be perceived as worse ing nothat this conditions.In two (between-subjects)conditions,the elated to the wh ity of different counterfactuals:When people co nsider a r per week voluntee ring at her place of work.One charitable effort that also realizes a personal benefit, ast betw (charitable-benefit condition),whereas anothe as conside d at nization)did not alth man's intentio self in ed he behave as altruistically as he or she could have. As a ervers are likely to one type less shelter or the coffee shop).Participants in the third t In thi ）condit The firs arget (o more altruistic;as a result,the y do not view the agent We predicted,therefo as ssed the target's morality.Participar nts rated hov re,that action hat pro and pe ethical he was (1 he was (1 e efit.We refer to this as the tainted-altruism effect of his tested this predicti on acros range of cont an ini highly correlated (a 92)and were averaged to create the the effec secon me of a hiring decision.In Expe riment 3 we te ted the sp ved orality. mhe targ cific proposal regarding counterfactual reasoning.In beneficial"they were (uot atall 9=tery hen Experiment 4, we examined whether this effect results extent to which they "made the world from eplic chan to an eficiab),and the er plac not at al ity These onducted ove ndms were als highly c period from April 2012 to March 2013,and 10.3%of the sure of benefit. participants were involved in at least two experiments Experiment 1:Between-versus within. Results Subjects Comparison We first compared ratings across the two between-sub In Experiment 1,we tested the tainted-altruism effect as jects conditions.Participants judged the target to be sig volunte ed at t e home he h0=562E-026100-227. that the self-interested behavior resulted in a charitable 025.In addition,they rated the agent's actions as equally benefit,whereas another group read that the behavior beneficial when he volunteered at the homeless shelte resulted in a neutral benefit.A third group of participants =6.33.SE=0.24)and when he volunteered at the evaluated both scenarios hop(M=5.83,SE=0.28),p=.18 muy21.214

2 Newman, Cain proposal, previous research has found that people are reluctant to accept monetary compensation for tasks that are perceived to be social favors (Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009; Heyman & Ariely, 2004). In addition, even sublimi￾nal reminders of money can lead people to engage in a number of antisocial behaviors, such as reduced helpful￾ness toward other people (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). In sum, there seems to be an important psychological distinction between charity and profitability; hence, there are many reasons to think that people may criticize chari￾table efforts that also provide personal gains. However, it is unclear why such efforts may be perceived as worse than doing no good at all. We propose that this effect is related to the accessibil￾ity of different counterfactuals: When people consider a charitable effort that also realizes a personal benefit, there is an inherent contrast between charitable behavior and selfish behavior. People consider the same behavior as it might occur in the absence of self-interest and ulti￾mately conclude that the person (or organization) did not behave as altruistically as he or she could have. As a result, observers are likely to rate the target negatively. However, when someone is only selfish, only one type of behavior is present. In this case, people do not spontane￾ously consider whether the person could have been more altruistic; as a result, they do not view the agent negatively. We predicted, therefore, that actions that pro￾duce both charitable and personal benefits will be evalu￾ated as worse than equivalent self-interested behaviors that produce no charitable benefit. We refer to this as the tainted-altruism effect. We tested this prediction across a range of contexts. Experiment 1 was an initial demonstration of the effect. In Experiment 2, we replicated the effect in the context of a hiring decision. In Experiment 3, we tested the spe￾cific proposal regarding counterfactual reasoning. In Experiment 4, we examined whether this effect results from explicit use of charity as a means to an end or merely from the presence of profitability alongside char￾ity. These experiments were conducted over a 1-year period from April 2012 to March 2013, and 10.3% of the participants were involved in at least two experiments. Experiment 1: Between- Versus Within￾Subjects Comparison In Experiment 1, we tested the tainted-altruism effect as well as the extent to which people explicitly endorsed it. Participants read about a target whose behavior was motivated by self-interest. One group of participants read that the self-interested behavior resulted in a charitable benefit, whereas another group read that the behavior resulted in a neutral benefit. A third group of participants evaluated both scenarios. Method Participants were 162 adults (mean age = 35.7 years; 53% female, 47% male) who were recruited from an online subject pool maintained by a private university. In all studies, we included only the participants who took at least 20 s to read the vignette(s) and respond to the items. This was predetermined to be the minimum amount of time necessary to read through the materials. In this study, an additional 11 adults completed the survey but failed to meet this requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In two (between-subjects) conditions, they read a brief vignette. The vignette described a man who, in order to gain a woman’s affection, spent several hours per week volunteering at her place of work. One group of participants read that the woman worked at a homeless shelter (charitable-benefit condition), whereas another group of participants read that she worked at a coffee shop (neutral-benefit condition). Both vignettes stated that although the man’s intentions were self-interested, he nev￾ertheless did a good job at helping out (at either the home￾less shelter or the coffee shop). Participants in the third (within-subjects) condition read both vignettes. In all conditions, participants then rated the target (or targets) along two separate measures. The first measure assessed the target’s morality. Participants rated how ethical he was (1 = completely unethical, 9 = completely ethical), how moral he was (1 = completely immoral, 9 = completely moral), and the extent to which they approved or disapproved of his actions (1 = definitely not, 9 = definitely so). Responses to these items were highly correlated (α = .92) and were averaged to create a single measure of morality. The second measure assessed the perceived benefit of the target’s actions. Specifically, participants rated the actions in terms of “how beneficial” they were (1 = not at all, 9 = very ben￾eficial), and the extent to which they “made the world a better place” (1 = not at all, 9 = very much so). Responses to these two items were also highly correlated (r = .66, p < .001) and were averaged to produce a single mea￾sure of benefit. Results We first compared ratings across the two between-sub￾jects conditions. Participants judged the target to be sig￾nificantly less moral when he volunteered at the homeless shelter (M = 4.75, SE = 0.28) than when he volunteered at the coffee shop (M = 5.62, SE = 0.26), t(100) = 2.27, p = .025. In addition, they rated the agent’s actions as equally beneficial when he volunteered at the homeless shelter (M = 6.33, SE = 0.24) and when he volunteered at the coffee shop (M = 5.83, SE = 0.28), p = .18. Downloaded from pss.sagepub.com by Cai Xing on January 21, 2014

Tainted Altruism However.in the case of the within-subiects presenta- earned for the charitable cause,the more profits go tion, participants rated the targets to be equivalent in to Daniel P.and his staff. morality (Ms =).11an 5.33).and they ratec d the h .0251 than when he volunteered at the coffee shop (M=4.90. native promoter.They were then presented with a series SE=0.27).59)=4.67.D<001 of 10 binary hiring decisions.Each decision provided information ab Discussion nty and h ow ne decisio The results of the first study were consistent with the was as follows: hypothesized tainted-altruism effect.Participants evalu terested behavior that produced a charitabl anan en the two scenarios were not rated differently in terms of Option B:Your charity earns S1.000.000:other their overall benefit to society when they were presented organizer earns $10.000 rate th always cha generated for the charity.The information provided in ing doing some good as worse than doing no good at all. the options ranged from both promoters generating the same amount for the charity (both $1 million)to Daniel's Experiment 2:Sacrificing Social gene Benefits Participants in the co oration condition wer In Experiment 2.we tested whether the tainted-altruism sented with a nearly identical set of instructions and stim examined people were ling to the the he d of a co than a charity. son raising the mon ey also ondition Metbod Daniel's firm (who charged more but poter atemative promoter (wh both conditio Daniel's firm ated on a for from the same online subiect pool and were randomly profit basis.and all of the dollar amounts were identical assigned to one of two between-subjects conditions.An cross the two conditions.In addition. at the beginning al 21 adults participated but we exc rial,participants were pr with a ch o mee criteria. P's firm (ie d m Participants in the charity condition were asked to as a comprehension check,and participants who failed imagine that they were the head of a large charitable this were excluded from subsequent analyses (n =12) organization and wer charge of s ing a promote fter ma ng the nd-rai choices,participants in both con Th ing eventh ons rate lity and benefi s in the ning.promotion.and execution of maior fundraising drives to raise donations for charity."However,they also Data analysis.We conducted the primary analysis by learned that ing the point at which participants sw ed fron hiring t Daniel p's who chose the altemative firm,then Daniel's firm,and tled,he and his staff take a percentage of the then the alternative firm again were excluded from sub- remaining funds.Therefore,the more money that is sequent analyses (n=9)

Tainted Altruism 3 However, in the case of the within-subjects presenta￾tion, participants rated the targets to be equivalent in morality (Ms = 5.11 and 5.33), and they rated the target’s actions to be significantly more beneficial when he vol￾unteered at the homeless shelter (M = 6.46, SE = 0.25) than when he volunteered at the coffee shop (M = 4.90, SE = 0.27), t(59) = 4.67, p < .001. Discussion The results of the first study were consistent with the hypothesized tainted-altruism effect. Participants evalu￾ated a self-interested behavior that produced a charitable benefit as less moral than an equivalent self-interested behavior that produced no charitable benefit. In addition, the two scenarios were not rated differently in terms of their overall benefit to society when they were presented between participants. However, when they were evalu￾ated simultaneously, participants did rate the charitable behavior as more beneficial, which suggests that, to some extent, participants recognized the inconsistency in rat￾ing doing some good as worse than doing no good at all. Experiment 2: Sacrificing Social Benefits In Experiment 2, we tested whether the tainted-altruism effect extends to participants’ behavioral intentions. We examined whether people were willing to forgo the opportunity to earn more money for a charity if the per￾son raising the money also earned a substantial profit. Method Participants. Ninety-three adult participants (mean age = 31.7 years; 62% female, 38% male) were recruited from the same online subject pool and were randomly assigned to one of two between-subjects conditions. An additional 21 adults participated but were excluded from the analyses because of failure to meet the study criteria, as described later in this section. Participants in the charity condition were asked to imagine that they were the head of a large charitable organization and were in charge of selecting a promoter for an upcoming fund-raising event. They then read about Daniel P., whose organization “handles the plan￾ning, promotion, and execution of major fundraising drives to raise donations for charity.” However, they also learned that Daniel P.’s organization is a for-profit company. After all of the organizational costs have been set￾tled, he and his staff take a percentage of the remaining funds. Therefore, the more money that is earned for the charitable cause, the more profits go to Daniel P. and his staff. Participants were instructed that their task was to decide whether they would hire Daniel’s firm or an alter￾native promoter. They were then presented with a series of 10 binary hiring decisions. Each decision provided information about how much money could be earned for their charity and how much would go to either Daniel P. or the alternative promoter. For example, one decision was as follows: Option A: Your charity earns $1,100,000; Daniel P. earns $55,000. Option B: Your charity earns $1,000,000; other organizer earns $10,000. The alternative promoter always charged a flat rate of $10,000, whereas Daniel’s firm charged 5% of the amount generated for the charity. The information provided in the options ranged from both promoters generating the same amount for the charity (both $1 million) to Daniel’s firm generating twice as much as the alternative pro￾moter (see the Supplemental Material available online). Participants in the corporation condition were pre￾sented with a nearly identical set of instructions and stim￾uli. However, they were asked to imagine that they were the head of a corporation, rather than a charity, and were planning a major fund-raising drive to raise seed money from investors. As in the charity condition, participants were presented with a series of binary choices between Daniel’s firm (who charged more but potentially raised more) and an alternative promoter (who charged less but also raised less). In both conditions, Daniel’s firm operated on a for￾profit basis, and all of the dollar amounts were identical across the two conditions. In addition, at the beginning of each trial, participants were presented with a choice in which the alternative promoter strictly dominated Daniel P.’s firm (i.e., charged less and earned more). This served as a comprehension check, and participants who failed this were excluded from subsequent analyses (n = 12). After making these choices, participants in both condi￾tions rated Daniel using the same morality and benefit measures as in the previous experiment. Data analysis. We conducted the primary analysis by recording the point at which participants switched from hiring the alternative promoter to hiring Daniel’s firm (recorded as the lower of the two values). Participants who chose the alternative firm, then Daniel’s firm, and then the alternative firm again were excluded from sub￾sequent analyses (n = 9). Downloaded from pss.sagepub.com by Cai Xing on January 21, 2014

Newman,Cain Results Experiment 3:Counterfactuals Results ant3.we tested the mechanism ofco ual rea the c porate condition C $59.090.SE $25459) (tainted altruism).observers spontancously consider 91)=2.10,p=.039 (see Fig.1).In addition,as observed counterfactual situation of giving for selfless reasons. in the previous However,epon a purely selfish casof server n9 condition (M=6.24,SE=0.19),9D=2.22.p=.029.and less moral in the case of tainted altruism. they rated his actions as equally beneficial across the two On the basis of this hypothesis,we predicted that pro conditions (M=6.00 for the charity condition and M= viding information regarding an alte ative state of the 5.72 for the corporate condition,p=.38). the enect: Discussion of morality,whereas in the other case,reminding them In this experiment,the presence of self-interest in a chari- that the selfish person could have do nated money to table domain s context)mad charity shoul of th ngs of morality .1o p vide hl%of the the potential earnings).In addition,participants in the charity behaved as charitably as he could have),and we expected that answers to this item would mediate the effect of con- e corporate h dition on ratings of morality. nditic Uhlmann,Diermeier,2011).This result is informative Metbod because it demonstrates that taints ,328e orts but also can change the lling to make regarding them same online subject pool as that used in the previous vere randomly ass signed to one of fou ....Charitable Condition ng) 100 additional adults completed the sur 多90 responses in less than 20s (the same criteria as used in the previous studies).Data from these participants were not 量70 60 owner who wanted to g 。hgi sfor his stores.To do so,he either donated millions of dollars to charity (charity condition)or invested millions in adver 40 counterfactual con 30 20 Keep in mind that if he wanted to.Mulberry could 10 have instead invested the money in advertising Idonated the money to charity Extra Amount Earned by Daniel's Firm (in thousands) Participants then used 9-point scales to indicate how ethical and moral they thought the arget (M Derry)was ems were averaged

4 Newman, Cain Results Results from this experiment indicated that participants in the charity condition were willing to forgo significantly more money (M = $173,470, SE = $48,161) than those in the corporate condition (M = $59,090, SE = $25,459), t(91) = 2.10, p = .039 (see Fig. 1). In addition, as observed in the previous experiment, participants in the charity condition rated the target as significantly less moral (M = 5.53, SE = 0.25) than did the participants in the corporate condition (M = 6.24, SE = 0.19), t(91) = 2.22, p = .029, and they rated his actions as equally beneficial across the two conditions (M = 6.00 for the charity condition and M = 5.72 for the corporate condition, p = .38). Discussion In this experiment, the presence of self-interest in a chari￾table domain (as opposed to a business context) made participants more willing to forgo the opportunity to make more money for the charity (roughly 11% of the potential earnings). In addition, participants in the charity condition rated the target as less moral than did the par￾ticipants in the corporate condition, which suggests that participants did not generally view seeking profit as mor￾ally bad across both conditions (see Tannenbaum, Uhlmann, & Diermeier, 2011). This result is informative because it demonstrates that self-interest not only taints evaluations of prosocial efforts but also can change the decisions people are willing to make regarding them. Experiment 3: Counterfactuals In Experiment 3, we tested the mechanism of counterfac￾tual reasoning. Specifically, we hypothesized that when someone benefits personally from behaving charitably (tainted altruism), observers spontaneously consider a counterfactual situation of giving for selfless reasons. However, we hypothesized that in a purely selfish case, observers fail to consider the counterfactual situation of donating to charity. Therefore, the target is perceived as less moral in the case of tainted altruism. On the basis of this hypothesis, we predicted that pro￾viding information regarding an alternative state of the world should essentially reverse the effect: In the case of the charitable benefit, reminding people that the target could have not donated to charity should increase ratings of morality, whereas in the other case, reminding them that the selfish person could have donated money to charity should reduce ratings of morality. To provide a converging test of the mechanism, we asked participants directly about the counterfactual (i.e., whether the target behaved as charitably as he could have), and we expected that answers to this item would mediate the effect of con￾dition on ratings of morality. Method Participants were 145 adults (mean age = 32.8 years; 64% female, 36% male) who were recruited from the same online subject pool as that used in the previous experiments and were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (domain: charity, advertising) × 2 (coun￾terfactual: present, absent) between-subjects design. An additional 7 adults completed the survey but submitted responses in less than 20 s (the same criteria as used in the previous studies). Data from these participants were not analyzed further. In this experiment, participants read about a business owner who wanted to generate more business for his stores. To do so, he either donated millions of dollars to charity (charity condition) or invested millions in adver￾tising (advertising condition). In the counterfactual con￾ditions, participants also read the following text: Keep in mind that if he wanted to, Mulberry could have instead invested the money in advertising [donated the money to charity]. This would have also increased the reputation of his company, but none [all] of the money would have gone to charity. Participants then used 9-point scales to indicate how ethical and moral they thought the target (Mulberry) was, how much they approved of his behavior, and how much they liked him. Ratings on these items were averaged to 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Participants Who Chose Daniel’s Firm (%) Extra Amount Earned by Daniel’s Firm (in thousands) Charitable Condition Corporate Condition $100 $0 $200 $300 $400 $500 $600 $700 $800 $900 $1,000 Fig. 1. Results from Study 2: percentage of participants who chose Daniel’s firm as a function of the extra amount earned by Daniel’s firm and experimental condition. Downloaded from pss.sagepub.com by Cai Xing on January 21, 2014

Tainted Altruism form a single scale (a =87).On a separate page,partici- less moral than individuals who are selfish and do no pants also good at all:in addition,providing relevant counterfactual information appea s to revers this effect Results that the charitable en efit was previous studie as the by-product of some other selfish intention.Therefore,it A 2x 2 analysis of variance revealed a significant interac- could be that this effect arises only in cases in which 1335 an en s the agent b naves cha 001.A To address this possibility we asked participants in information was provided,participants evaluated the tar Experiment 4 to evaluate a real-world prosocial cause get more negatively whe he donated money to the Gap (RED)c ed 50%c 634eeo2esed4e40 the fight the =052.In contrast.when the counterfactual information malaria).In this experiment.the key manipulation was was provided.the pattern of results reversed,such that whether the profit to the company(the 50%of profits no participants rated the target more po ely when he donated to charity)was highlighted e 0. inclu ions:In the 0.23),K(141)=3.22.p=.002.Moreover,within-domain the Gap.but no information about any charitable pro comparisons revealed that the presence of counterfactual grams.In the altruism condition,participants read about information increased ratings of the targ et in the charity 14 was sta sm con profit to the compa Hayes,2008)to determine whether agreement with the other 50%)were stated.Finally.in the counterfactual counterfactual item explained the effect on ratings of the information condition,after reading that the Gap (RED) The wo-w mnteraction was use cha ption that the tar acted as altruistically money to charity as he could have"was the mediator,and the two main Our hypothesis was based on the previous results effects were included as covariates.This analysis indi cated with the counte the tion was highlighted.However,following the logic of Discussion Experiment 3,we predicted that when the relevant coun terfactua informatio participants would that h effect.In the case of charity,presenting the counterfac Metbod tual information (i.e.. that the target could have no ted money)significantly increased ratings of mora Participants wer nterfactual infom that u sed in th have donated money to charity)had the opp osite effect. were randomly ass subjects Moreover,agreement with the counterfactual item fully conditions.An additional 8 adults participated,but sub mediated morality ratings of the target onses in less than 20 s (the me on pre Experiment 4:Ambiguous Intentions In the control condition,participants read basic infor Experiments 1 through 3 established that people rate mation about the Gap company.In the altruism condi- individuals who do good for self-interested reasons as tion,participants read the same information as in the

Tainted Altruism 5 form a single scale (α = .87). On a separate page, partici￾pants also rated whether the target “acted as altruistically as he could have” (1 = absolutely not, 9 = absolutely). Results A 2 × 2 analysis of variance revealed a significant interac￾tion between domain (charity, advertising) and the pres￾ence/absence of counterfactual information, F(1, 141) = 13.35, p < .001. A series of planned contrast analyses indicated that, as predicted, when no counterfactual information was provided, participants evaluated the tar￾get more negatively when he donated money to charity (M = 5.70, SE = 0.26) than when he invested the same money in advertising (M = 6.34, SE = 0.21), t(141) = 1.96, p = .052. In contrast, when the counterfactual information was provided, the pattern of results reversed, such that participants rated the target more positively when he gave to charity (M = 6.53, SE = 0.21) than when he invested the same money in advertising (M = 5.49, SE = 0.23), t(141) = 3.22, p = .002. Moreover, within-domain comparisons revealed that the presence of counterfactual information increased ratings of the target in the charity domain, t(141) = 2.50, p = .013, but significantly reduced them in the advertising domain, t(141) = 2.67, p = .009. We then conducted a bootstrap analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) to determine whether agreement with the counterfactual item explained the effect on ratings of the target. The two-way interaction was used as a predictor variable, ratings of the target were used as the dependent variable, perception that the target “acted as altruistically as he could have” was the mediator, and the two main effects were included as covariates. This analysis indi￾cated that agreement with the counterfactual item signifi￾cantly mediated the two-way interaction, b = 0.55, SE = 0.22, 95% confidence interval = [0.21, 1.09]. Discussion Results from this experiment provide support for the proposition that counterfactual thinking explains the effect. In the case of charity, presenting the counterfac￾tual information (i.e., that the target could have not donated money) significantly increased ratings of moral￾ity. In the comparison case, however, presenting the counterfactual information (i.e., that the target could have donated money to charity) had the opposite effect. Moreover, agreement with the counterfactual item fully mediated morality ratings of the target. Experiment 4: Ambiguous Intentions Experiments 1 through 3 established that people rate individuals who do good for self-interested reasons as less moral than individuals who are selfish and do no good at all; in addition, providing relevant counterfactual information appears to reverse this effect. However, one limitation of the previous studies was that the charitable benefit was always presented as the by-product of some other selfish intention. Therefore, it could be that this effect arises only in cases in which people or organizations explicitly use charity as a means to an end—that is, the agent behaves charitably only to achieve some other goal. To address this possibility, we asked participants in Experiment 4 to evaluate a real-world prosocial cause, the Gap (RED) campaign. In 2006, Gap pledged 50% of the profits earned from the sale of certain (RED) products to fight the spread of infectious disease (HIV/AIDS and malaria). In this experiment, the key manipulation was whether the profit to the company (the 50% of profits not donated to charity) was highlighted. This experiment included four conditions: In the con￾trol condition, participants were given information about the Gap, but no information about any charitable pro￾grams. In the altruism condition, participants read about the Gap and the (RED) campaign, but only the donation was stated (50% to charity). In the tainted-altruism condi￾tion, participants read about the Gap (RED) campaign, and both the donation and the profit to the company (the other 50%) were stated. Finally, in the counterfactual￾information condition, after reading that the Gap (RED) raised money for charity and earned a profit, participants were reminded that the Gap did not have to donate any money to charity. Our hypothesis was based on the previous results: Participants would view the charitable effort as tainted (by the potential for self-interest) and would therefore judge the company more negatively when information about profits was highlighted than when only the dona￾tion was highlighted. However, following the logic of Experiment 3, we predicted that when the relevant coun￾terfactual information was provided, participants would rate the company much more favorably. Method Participants were 206 adults (mean age = 39.4 years; 62% female, 38% male) who were recruited from the same online pool as that used in the previous experiments and were randomly assigned to one of four between-subjects conditions. An additional 8 adults participated, but sub￾mitted responses in less than 20 s (the same criteria as used in all of the previous studies). The information pre￾sented to participants was taken from Wikipedia. In the control condition, participants read basic infor￾mation about the Gap company. In the altruism condi￾tion, participants read the same information as in the Downloaded from pss.sagepub.com by Cai Xing on January 21, 2014

6 Newman,Cain control condition along with a second paragraph that Morality.For ratings of morality,the predicted contrast the Gap was also signincant,(202) 99,1 003.The patterr in the well as an additional sen morality th the ontrol (M 5.86.SE= tence.which highlighted the profit to the company 0.19)and tainted-altruism (M=5.93.SE=0.24)condi Finally,in the counterfactual-information condition,pa tions compared with the altruism C=7 .12,5E=0.19 ame in the tainte and 6.91,SE=0.19 inded pa donate any mone to charity.(See the Supplemental Manipulativeness.Ratings of the Gap as selfish and Material for the full text used in each condition.) manipulative were consistent with the predicted pattern the company along the follow but the mora 202 ded) coded).They also rated how much they liked the com- Discussion pany,trusted it,and were willing to purchase its products All ratings were made on scales from 1 (low)to(high) Expe s were presented was ran experiment is notable for a number of reasons.First.it Results was ecologically valid in that it assessed evaluations in a real-world context (an ongoing charitable program by a otation indi ated tha th -kn any hat (ratings of liking.trust,and willingness to purchase the (merely calling attention to the fact that the com pany alsc ble,and altruistic the company Is tions of the company as well as participants 87).and manipulativen this sing their proc An 63).For each of these measures.we conducted a con terfactual thinking as an explanation of the effect.becaus trast analysis testing the prediction that ratings would be the salience of the profitability information was the criti significantly lower in the tainted-altruism condition than cal factor that differed across conditions in General Discussion Liking.The contrast analysis comparing the tainted- The experiments reported here demonstrate the exis altruism condition with the other three conditions was tence of a novel psychological phenomen on:the tainted 8, As we prec t.In sum.we that the presence 5.16.SE=0.29)than in the control (M=5.74.SE=0.23) ing.such that ple udged efforts that realized both altruism (M=5.91,SE=0.24),and counterfactual-infor personal and charitable benefits to be less moral than 5.83.SE=0.21).which did not sself-interested ehaviors that produced no This effect was observed across a Table 1.Mean Scores for Items Loading on Each Factor in Experiment 4 Factor Condition Liking Morality Manipulativeness 612 712135 Tainted altruisn 5.16(2.05 5.93(1.73 5.14(1.79) Counterfactual information 5.83(1.51) 6.91(1.34 5.46(1.97 Cai Xing on Jausry 21.2014

6 Newman, Cain control condition along with a second paragraph that described the Gap (RED) campaign. In the tainted-altru￾ism condition, participants read the same information as in the altruism condition as well as an additional sen￾tence, which highlighted the profit to the company. Finally, in the counterfactual-information condition, par￾ticipants read the same information as in the tainted￾altruism condition, along with an additional sentence that reminded participants that the Gap did not have to donate any money to charity. (See the Supplemental Material for the full text used in each condition.) Participants then rated the company along the follow￾ing dimensions: moral, ethical, acceptable, altruistic, manipulative (reverse-coded), and selfish (reverse￾coded). They also rated how much they liked the com￾pany, trusted it, and were willing to purchase its products. All ratings were made on scales from 1 (low) to 9 (high). The order in which the items were presented was ran￾domized for each participant. Results A factor analysis with varimax rotation indicated that the dependent measures loaded onto three factors: liking (ratings of liking, trust, and willingness to purchase the company’s products; α = .83), morality (ratings of how moral, ethical, acceptable, and altruistic the company is; α = .87), and manipulativeness (ratings of how manipula￾tive and selfish the company was perceived to be; α = .63). For each of these measures, we conducted a con￾trast analysis testing the prediction that ratings would be significantly lower in the tainted-altruism condition than in the control, altruism, or counterfactual-information conditions (see Table 1). Liking. The contrast analysis comparing the tainted￾altruism condition with the other three conditions was significant, t(202) = 2.38, p = .018. As we predicted, rat￾ings were lower in the tainted-altruism condition (M = 5.16, SE = 0.29) than in the control (M = 5.74, SE = 0.23), altruism (M = 5.91, SE = 0.24), and counterfactual-infor￾mation conditions (M = 5.83, SE = 0.21), which did not differ from one another. Morality. For ratings of morality, the predicted contrast was also significant, t(202) = 2.99, p = .003. The pattern, however, was somewhat different, because ratings of morality were lower in both the control (M = 5.86, SE = 0.19) and tainted-altruism (M = 5.93, SE = 0.24) condi￾tions compared with the altruism (M = 7.12, SE = 0.19) and counterfactual-information (M = 6.91, SE = 0.19) conditions. Manipulativeness. Ratings of the Gap as selfish and manipulative were consistent with the predicted pattern, but the contrast analysis was only marginally significant, t(202) = 1.43, p = .15. Discussion Results from Experiment 4 indicated that merely high￾lighting the potential for self-interest significantly under￾mined evaluations of a company’s charitable efforts. This experiment is notable for a number of reasons. First, it was ecologically valid in that it assessed evaluations in a real-world context (an ongoing charitable program by a well-known company). Second, the effect itself was shown to be quite powerful in that a subtle manipulation (merely calling attention to the fact that the company also earned a profit, the other 50%) had an effect on evalua￾tions of the company as well as participants’ behavioral intentions (interest in purchasing their products). And finally, this experiment provides further support for coun￾terfactual thinking as an explanation of the effect, because the salience of the profitability information was the criti￾cal factor that differed across conditions. General Discussion The experiments reported here demonstrate the exis￾tence of a novel psychological phenomenon: the tainted￾altruism effect. In sum, we found that the presence of self-interest in the charitable domain was seen as taint￾ing, such that people judged efforts that realized both personal and charitable benefits to be less moral than analogous self-interested behaviors that produced no charitable benefit. This effect was observed across a Table 1. Mean Scores for Items Loading on Each Factor in Experiment 4 Condition Factor Liking Morality Manipulativenessa Control 5.74 (1.65) 5.86 (1.33) 5.74 (1.80) Altruism 5.91 (1.73) 7.12 (1.35) 5.49 (1.77) Tainted altruism 5.16 (2.05) 5.93 (1.73) 5.14 (1.79) Counterfactual information 5.83 (1.51) 6.91 (1.34) 5.46 (1.97) Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. a Higher numbers indicate more-favorable evaluations. Downloaded from pss.sagepub.com by Cai Xing on January 21, 2014

Tainted Altruism 1 variety of scenarios,both real and hypothetical,and In any case,the present experiments identify impo extended to evaluations of the target as well as partici- tant conditions surrounding the evaluation of charitable pantsown behavior intentions Moreover,this behavio of and that in some cases,public asses may trump any by the presence of deception,or by the explicit use of charity as a means to an end.Rather,this effect seems to Author Contributions be importanty related to the access G.E.Newman developed the study concept.Both authors cor meone ther tributed to the study design.Testing.data colection and data might have engaged in the same charitable behavior drafted the manuscrint and D M.Cain provided critical rv e.Ho Declaration of Conflicting Interests The authors declared that they had no conficts of interest with Although we have identified the basic effect several respect to their authorship or the publication of this article. interesting questions remain for future research.Fo Supplemental Material be found at http://ps Experiments 3 and 4 support this idea.However,the of a person to act as altruisti References ne xplanation might have to do with the desire to Ariely.D..Bracha.A&Meier.s.(20)Doingo oin predict other people's likelihood of being generous in the ne or American Economic Review,99.544-555 future.For example,people might place ea premium on Mls,J(1979 it is highly pre y37.12- The diff etween com heliefs that are more culturally specific (e identification with prototypes such as the "saintly do-gooder.Or per im19.684-69 haps there is a more fundamental psychological principle &Dunning.D.(2011 No go vork.For exa recent dlies have found ple 两o场2m25ma Tetlock.2012).that people are likely to question the motives of wealthy philanthropists (Critcher&Dunning ity:Framework for a unified theory of social relations. that ge the domain of relationships personal connection to the cause are given less credit for Goffman.E.(19).The presentation of self in everyday life. their good works (Lin-Healy Small,2012).Perhaps all of phenomena (indlu ng the tai nted-altruisn Hey Garden cy NY:Double A tale of om th 1 Hsee 2004).us social behavior. c pandas,anc From an applied perspective,one might wonder about Kristo mber 24 The the types of framings that may attenuate or reverse this hut the :h in mind-set that lead pe Lin- F., (2012 ple to focus more on the actual charitable gains (e.g.Hsee Rotter eich.2004)may also reduce or potentially reverse this effect 117,269-274

Tainted Altruism 7 variety of scenarios, both real and hypothetical, and extended to evaluations of the target as well as partici￾pants’ own behavioral intentions. Moreover, this effect did not seem to be driven by expectations that profits would be realized at the direct cost of charitable benefits, by the presence of deception, or by the explicit use of charity as a means to an end. Rather, this effect seems to be importantly related to the accessibility of different counterfactuals: When someone is charitable for self￾interested reasons, people consider whether the agent might have engaged in the same charitable behavior without serving self-interest, ultimately concluding that the person did not behave as altruistically as he or she could have. However, when someone is purely selfish, people do not spontaneously consider whether the per￾son could have been more altruistic. Although we have identified the basic effect, several interesting questions remain for future research. For example, why does this asymmetry in counterfactual thinking exist? We suggest that it is due in part to the accessibility of different kinds of information. Indeed, Experiments 3 and 4 support this idea. However, the question still remains: Why is the “failure” of a person to act as altruistically as he or she could have interpreted negatively? One explanation might have to do with the desire to predict other people’s likelihood of being generous in the future. For example, people might place a premium on genuine altruism because it is highly predictive of future behavior. Alternatively, these effects might result from beliefs that are more culturally specific (e.g., identification with prototypes such as the “saintly do-gooder”). Or per￾haps there is a more fundamental psychological principle at work. For example, recent studies have found that peo￾ple react negatively toward religious and health-oriented organizations that seek profit (McGraw, Schwartz, & Tetlock, 2012), that people are likely to question the motives of wealthy philanthropists (Critcher & Dunning, 2011), that people seem to expect that genuine prosocial behavior precludes even unrelated personal benefits (Lin￾Healy & Small, 2013), and that charitable donors with a personal connection to the cause are given less credit for their good works (Lin-Healy & Small, 2012). Perhaps all of these phenomena (including the tainted-altruism effect) result from the same underlying mechanism having to do with the negative evaluation of self-interest alongside pro￾social behavior. From an applied perspective, one might wonder about the types of framings that may attenuate or reverse this bias. Presenting counterfactual information seems to be one, but there may be many others. For example, changes in mind-set that lead people to focus more on the actual charitable gains (e.g., Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004) may also reduce or potentially reverse this effect. In any case, the present experiments identify impor￾tant conditions surrounding the evaluation of charitable behavior and suggest that in some cases, public assess￾ments of charitable actions as genuine may trump any actual benefits realized from those efforts. Author Contributions G. E. Newman developed the study concept. Both authors con￾tributed to the study design. Testing, data collection, and data analysis were performed by G. E. Newman. G. E. Newman drafted the manuscript, and D. M. Cain provided critical revi￾sions. Both authors approved the final version of the manu￾script for submission. Declaration of Conflicting Interests The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with respect to their authorship or the publication of this article. 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