The Power of the Multitude perpetuity.s Without reinforcement from strong inde- features that cannot be replicated by a centralized po- pendent incentives-such as those provided by institu- litical meritocracy.10 tionalized uncertainty and the separation of parties- Despite these vastly more favorable conditions,of principled commitment to maintaining independent course,even science is hardly a perfect meritocracv. power centers will eventually succumb to the siren song From its origins to the present,systematic biases of political expediency.Institutions that foster legiti- and exclusions have profoundly affected its character mate opposition and open competition for power thus (Longino 2013;Marks 2009).In other realms where it render the capture of the state by tyrannical,extractive is often invoked,meanwhile,the ideal of meritocracy is elites less likely than institutions that effectively allow even further from realization,and is often simply used incumbents to select their own replacements. to legitimize unjust inequalities(McNamee and Miller In my view,the severity of this danger is more than 2013).These challenges do not render the concept of enough reason to abandon the idea of political meritoc meritocracy incoherent or inherently reactionary-on racy.It is also worth noting,however,that the increased the contrary,meritocracy is a necessary feature of any risk of tyrannical rule is not offset by great prospective modern political system,including electoral democ- rewards.Even when incumbents do not actively consol- racy.Yet no meritocracy is immune to bias,capture,or idate power,they will still be subject to more mundane corruption (Fricker 2009;Medina 2012),and given the forms of capture and corruption,undermining meri- intense strains they must bear,such defects will be es- tocracy's claim to possess significant advantages over pecially significant in political meritocracies democracy. Acknowledging the extensive corruption of China's Consider the strict conditions enabling the progress existing political structure,Bell often draws on the of natural science-perhaps the most obviously suc- success of political meritocracy in Singapore and cessful meritocracy in existence.Especially within Kuh- Hong Kong to demonstrate that these flaws might nian"normal science,"standards of merit are relatively be remedied (2015,31-3,113,117).According to uncontroversial.Where disagreement exists,it is usu many other scholars of the region,however,the 4号 ally resolved methodically within structures of open opposite trend is more likely.Political meritocracy competition,which are themselves supported by a de- in Singapore and Hong Kong is already decaying. centralized disciplinary structure.Finally,few scientific they observe-and will continue to do so,absent questions have significant consequences for the distri- democratization-while China's is unlikely to become bution of social power,meaning that scientific institu- less corrupt (Hui 2015,2016;Tan 2008).Ironically, tions are rarely targeted for capture by outside inter- they conclude.meritocracies function best under ests. democratic political conditions. In politics,by contrast,the distributive stakes are far That said,we need not deny that political meri- higher.Political meritocracies are thus,predictably,the tocracies can govern well-perhaps even outperform- target of intense competition for capture among fac- ing electoral democracies in certain cases.Rather,my 是 tions seeking to advance their interests.Given the in- claim here is that political meritocracies are unlikely evitable limits to open competition under a central- to enjoy either systematic or substantial advantages ized hierarchy,these factions are forced to displace the over comparably situated electoral democracies in the weight of their political disagreements onto the def- long run-especially those that successfully integrate inition and application of meritocratic standards.Yet healthy meritocratic institutions at other levels.Given these standards are far more ambiguous than those this,the increased risk of authoritarian consolidation of science-thanks partly to wider disagreement on easily counts as a decisive argument against political the ultimate ends to be served (Jenco 2016)-and meritocracy. consequently less capable of withstanding such strain. Though scientific meritocracies have enabled remark- able progress through the methodical resolution of dis- Franchise Qualifications and the Necessity agreements,therefore,this is only in virtue of several of Universal Suffrage We turn next to the franchise qualifications proposed by Brennan (2016,204-30;see also Caplan 2007 8 See Andrew Nathan(2016,155).who contests Bell's"perfected" 197-8).He acknowledges the injustice of historical conception of human nature,and(citing Madison)expresses doubt restrictions grounded on morally irrelevant factors that "any political system can be induced to operate on the basis of such as race,sex,or possession of property.Given eys moral virtue alone."Lynette Ong (2016)voices similar concerns. the epistemic flaws of democracy,however,he asks: 9I make no distinctions here between democratic institu. why not conditionalize suffrage upon morally relevant tional frameworks-for example,parliamentarism versus presidentialism-but three observations epistemic qualifications?Prospective drivers must are relevant. 名 First,a variety of competitive systems could conceivably generate the sort pass a driving test,and prospective doctors must of incentives which sustain independent checks.Second,the strength attend medical school.Why not issue voting licenses of these incentives should be a primary consideration in choosing in a similar way,through competence testing or between systems.Third,this is likely quite context-dependent educational requirements? making it difficult to draw general conclusions.That is why,despite clear affinities with Ian Shapiro's(2003,2016)approach,I do not share his confidence in pure majoritarianism,which seems to depend on overly optimistic assumptions about retrospective accountability 10 For a more detailed discussion of this analogy.see Bagg(2018b. (see Achen and Bartels 2016,discussed below). 269-73). 897The Power of the Multitude perpetuity.8 Without reinforcement from strong inde￾pendent incentives—such as those provided by institu￾tionalized uncertainty and the separation of parties— principled commitment to maintaining independent power centers will eventually succumb to the siren song of political expediency. Institutions that foster legiti￾mate opposition and open competition for power thus render the capture of the state by tyrannical, extractive elites less likely than institutions that effectively allow incumbents to select their own replacements.9 In my view, the severity of this danger is more than enough reason to abandon the idea of political meritoc￾racy. It is also worth noting, however, that the increased risk of tyrannical rule is not offset by great prospective rewards. Even when incumbents do not actively consol￾idate power, they will still be subject to more mundane forms of capture and corruption, undermining meri￾tocracy’s claim to possess significant advantages over democracy. Consider the strict conditions enabling the progress of natural science—perhaps the most obviously suc￾cessful meritocracy in existence.Especially within Kuh￾nian “normal science,” standards of merit are relatively uncontroversial. Where disagreement exists, it is usu￾ally resolved methodically within structures of open competition, which are themselves supported by a de￾centralized disciplinary structure. Finally, few scientific questions have significant consequences for the distri￾bution of social power, meaning that scientific institu￾tions are rarely targeted for capture by outside inter￾ests. In politics, by contrast, the distributive stakes are far higher. Political meritocracies are thus, predictably, the target of intense competition for capture among fac￾tions seeking to advance their interests. Given the in￾evitable limits to open competition under a central￾ized hierarchy, these factions are forced to displace the weight of their political disagreements onto the def￾inition and application of meritocratic standards. Yet these standards are far more ambiguous than those of science—thanks partly to wider disagreement on the ultimate ends to be served (Jenco 2016)—and consequently less capable of withstanding such strain. Though scientific meritocracies have enabled remark￾able progress through the methodical resolution of dis￾agreements, therefore, this is only in virtue of several 8 See Andrew Nathan (2016, 155), who contests Bell’s “perfected” conception of human nature, and (citing Madison) expresses doubt that “any political system can be induced to operate on the basis of moral virtue alone.” Lynette Ong (2016) voices similar concerns. 9 I make no distinctions here between democratic institu￾tional frameworks—for example, parliamentarism versus presidentialism—but three observations are relevant. First, a variety of competitive systems could conceivably generate the sort of incentives which sustain independent checks. Second, the strength of these incentives should be a primary consideration in choosing between systems. Third, this is likely quite context-dependent, making it difficult to draw general conclusions. That is why, despite clear affinities with Ian Shapiro’s (2003, 2016) approach, I do not share his confidence in pure majoritarianism, which seems to depend on overly optimistic assumptions about retrospective accountability (see Achen and Bartels 2016, discussed below). features that cannot be replicated by a centralized po￾litical meritocracy.10 Despite these vastly more favorable conditions, of course, even science is hardly a perfect meritocracy. From its origins to the present, systematic biases and exclusions have profoundly affected its character (Longino 2013; Marks 2009). In other realms where it is often invoked, meanwhile, the ideal of meritocracy is even further from realization, and is often simply used to legitimize unjust inequalities (McNamee and Miller 2013). These challenges do not render the concept of meritocracy incoherent or inherently reactionary—on the contrary, meritocracy is a necessary feature of any modern political system, including electoral democ￾racy. Yet no meritocracy is immune to bias, capture, or corruption (Fricker 2009; Medina 2012), and given the intense strains they must bear, such defects will be es￾pecially significant in political meritocracies. Acknowledging the extensive corruption of China’s existing political structure, Bell often draws on the success of political meritocracy in Singapore and Hong Kong to demonstrate that these flaws might be remedied (2015, 31–3, 113, 117). According to many other scholars of the region, however, the opposite trend is more likely. Political meritocracy in Singapore and Hong Kong is already decaying, they observe—and will continue to do so, absent democratization—while China’s is unlikely to become less corrupt (Hui 2015, 2016; Tan 2008). Ironically, they conclude, meritocracies function best under democratic political conditions. That said, we need not deny that political meri￾tocracies can govern well—perhaps even outperform￾ing electoral democracies in certain cases. Rather, my claim here is that political meritocracies are unlikely to enjoy either systematic or substantial advantages over comparably situated electoral democracies in the long run—especially those that successfully integrate healthy meritocratic institutions at other levels. Given this, the increased risk of authoritarian consolidation easily counts as a decisive argument against political meritocracy. Franchise Qualifications and the Necessity of Universal Suffrage We turn next to the franchise qualifications proposed by Brennan (2016, 204–30; see also Caplan 2007, 197–8). He acknowledges the injustice of historical restrictions grounded on morally irrelevant factors such as race, sex, or possession of property. Given the epistemic flaws of democracy, however, he asks: why not conditionalize suffrage upon morally relevant epistemic qualifications? Prospective drivers must pass a driving test, and prospective doctors must attend medical school. Why not issue voting licenses in a similar way, through competence testing or educational requirements? 10 For a more detailed discussion of this analogy, see Bagg (2018b, 269–73). 897 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527