from? Why canit there be other things whose essences have this marvelous feature? and why canit we then prove these other things to exist just as Anselm has proved God to exist? Note that the same form of argument can be offered in support of the existence of a perfect island. Suppose X is a superisle iff x is an absolutely perfect island If you substitute'superisle'for'God' in the argument above, it should show that there exists a superisle. But there is no superisle So something must be wrong with the argument 2. Can't define things into existence The inference from(4)-(5)is problematic. Premise(4)is ambiguous and might mean either of two things (4a)To satisfy the God-concept you have to exist (4b) Some existing thing satisfies the God-concept Consider a different example A realunicorn=df an existing unicorn. a non-existing unicorn Now contrast RU4a) To satisfy the realunicorn-concept you have to exist. (True!) RU4b) Some existing thing satisfies the realunicorn-concept.(False!) From the fact that a realunicorn is defined as an existing unicorn, it doesnit follow that there are any. That is, to satisfy the realunicorn-concept you must exist, but it doesnit follow that anything satisfies the realunicorn-concept Of these, itis(4b) that we need to reach the conclusion (5)that God exists. but it seems itis( 4a)that follows from(1-3 Note: (1) basically says that the concept can only be satisfied by a perfect being, and(2-3)add that such a being will have to exist; so putting them together we get the result (4a)that to satisfy the concept you have to exist. Trouble is, there is no clear way of getting from(4a)to(4b ). However, the squircle argument is different. We can get from the equivalent of (4a) to(4b) (S4a) To satisfy the Squircle-concept you must not exist (S4b)No existing thing satisfies the Squircle-concept 3. Existence is not a property For several reasons(mentioned in lecture), many philosophers have concluded that existence is not a property of objects Rather, to say something exists is to say that a concept of that sort of thing has instances. If this is correct, then premise(2) is problematic. It isn't clear how to apply the idea that existence is a perfection to God. Should we say that the concept of God would be more perfect if God exists? But no one has suggested that the concept of God is perfect Conclusion You'll note that Rowe seems to think that some of the arguments are stronger than I do. E. g. he tries to defend Anselm against the"perfect island"argument, and against the charge that existence is not a property. I think that Rowe is mistakenfrom? Why canít there be other things whose essences have this marvelous feature? And why canít we then prove these other things to exist just as Anselm has proved God to exist? Note that the same form of argument can be offered in support of the existence of a perfect island. Suppose: X is a superisle iff x is an absolutely perfect island. If you substitute 'superisle' for 'God' in the argument above, it should show that there exists a superisle. But there is no superisle. So something must be wrong with the argument. 2. Can't define things into existence. The inference from (4) - (5) is problematic. Premise (4) is ambiguous and might mean either of two things: (4a) To satisfy the God-concept you have to exist. (4b) Some existing thing satisfies the God-concept. Consider a different example: A realunicorn =df an existing unicorn. An ununicorn =df a non-existing unicorn. Now contrast: RU4a) To satisfy the realunicorn-concept you have to exist. (True!) RU4b) Some existing thing satisfies the realunicorn-concept. (False!) From the fact that a realunicorn is defined as an existing unicorn, it doesnít follow that there are any. That is, to satisfy the realunicorn-concept you must exist, but it doesnít follow that anything satisfies the realunicorn-concept. Of these, itís (4b) that we need to reach the conclusion (5) that God exists. But it seems itís (4a) that follows from (1-3). Note: (1) basically says that the concept can only be satisfied by a perfect being, and (2-3) add that such a being will have to exist; so putting them together we get the result (4a) that to satisfy the concept you have to exist. Trouble is, there is no clear way of getting from (4a) to (4b). However, the squircle argument is different. We can get from the equivalent of (4a) to (4b): (S4a) To satisfy the Squircle-concept you must not exist. (S4b) No existing thing satisfies the Squircle-concept. 3. Existence is not a property. For several reasons (mentioned in lecture), many philosophers have concluded that existence is not a property of objects. Rather, to say something exists is to say that a concept of that sort of thing has instances. If this is correct, then premise (2) is problematic. It isn't clear how to apply the idea that existence is a perfection to God. Should we say that the concept of God would be more perfect if God exists? But no one has suggested that the concept of God is perfect. Conclusion You'll note that Rowe seems to think that some of the arguments are stronger than I do. E.g., he tries to defend Anselm against the "perfect island" argument, and against the charge that existence is not a property. I think that Rowe is mistaken