FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 Cold War History 511 In the 1950s,a 'second intermediate zone'began to emerge and set the two superpowers further apart.'As far as I can see,Mao told a delegation of the British Labour Party in Beijing in August 1954,[Washington's]first set of priorities still is to control the intermediate zone between Japan and Britain.America's goal was to bring 85 under its control all the nations within this 'vast'zone 'so as to bully them,control their economies,build military bases on their territories,and make sure that these nations will forever remain weak:s Along the same lines,Zhou had explained to his associates in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June 1953 that the Cold War politics had been further diversified and the two-dimensional confrontation between 90 Washington and Moscow had become 'four-dimensional':'war versus peace; democracy versus anti-democracy;imperialist countries versus colonial nations;and between the imperialists.The contradictions among all the capitalist countries began to gain currency.With the Cold War in full play,Zhou believed,the three groups of capitalist nations that Washington had relied on were falling apart:first,the 'vanguard' 95 nations including South Korea,Taiwan,and Indochina along with the Philippines, Greece,and Turkey proved 'unreliable';second,the core allies of West Europe were against any expansion of armed conflict,evident in their unwillingness to cooperate with the US in Korea;and,third,the rearmament of Japan and(West)Germany was a distant possibility,offering no immediate help. 100 What strategic implications would these new changes mean to China?The CCP leadership calculated that the new situation offered China both risks and opportunities.Fighting for the two 'intermediate zones,Mao asserted in August 1954,the US found China standing in the way of it taking complete control over the countries falling in the zones;as a result,US hostilities toward the People's Republic of 105 China(PRC)would surely be intensified and last for a long time.Along with its effort to create the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization(SEATO)and persistent support for Jiang Jieshi's harassment'of China's mainland,US advocacy for a continued international economic embargo against the PRC was strong evidence.'If a great power like the United States does not want peace,the CCP chairman stressed,we 110 won't have [a minute of]tranquillity,and no one else can have [a minute of] tranquillity:10On the hand,however,China faced no imminent danger of US invasion. The law of imperialist war,Zhou said in June 1953,'is that the weakest will be the first target of attack.'As long as China continued to build up its strength and influence,it was highly likely that the US may not dare to attack China.In order to win time to 115 become 'as strong as walls of bronze [Tonggiang tiebi],China should strike for peaceful coexistence in diplomacy. To this end,Zhou told senior Chinese diplomats in June 1953,the current focus of China's foreign policy was that we advocate resolving all international disputes through peaceful negotiations....We should practice peaceful coexistence and peaceful 120 competition among all different systems.This type of diplomacy was possible,he explained,[because]the US war threats will widen the gap between the US and the Western European countries and cause most of the nations in Asia,Middle East andIn the 1950s, a ‘second intermediate zone’ began to emerge and set the two superpowers further apart. ‘As far as I can see’, Mao told a delegation of the British Labour Party in Beijing in August 1954, ‘[Washington’s] first set of priorities still is to control the intermediate zone between Japan and Britain.’ America’s goal was to bring under its control all the nations within this ‘vast’ zone ‘so as to bully them, control their economies, build military bases on their territories, and make sure that these nations will forever remain weak’.8 Along the same lines, Zhou had explained to his associates in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June 1953 that the Cold War politics had been further diversified and the two-dimensional confrontation between Washington and Moscow had become ‘four-dimensional’: ‘war versus peace; democracy versus anti-democracy; imperialist countries versus colonial nations; and between the imperialists’. The contradictions among all the capitalist countries began to gain currency. With the Cold War in full play, Zhou believed, the three groups of capitalist nations that Washington had relied on were falling apart: first, the ‘vanguard’ nations including South Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina along with the Philippines, Greece, and Turkey proved ‘unreliable’; second, the core allies of West Europe were against any expansion of armed conflict, evident in their unwillingness to cooperate with the US in Korea; and, third, the rearmament of Japan and (West) Germany was a distant possibility, offering no immediate help.9 What strategic implications would these new changes mean to China? The CCP leadership calculated that the new situation offered China both risks and opportunities. Fighting for the two ‘intermediate zones’, Mao asserted in August 1954, the US found China standing in the way of it taking complete control over the countries falling in the zones; as a result, US hostilities toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would surely be intensified and last for a long time. Along with its effort to create the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and persistent support for Jiang Jieshi’s ‘harassment’ of China’s mainland, US advocacy for a continued international economic embargo against the PRC was strong evidence. ‘If a great power like the United States does not want peace’, the CCP chairman stressed, ‘we won’t have [a minute of] tranquillity, and no one else can have [a minute of] tranquillity.’10 On the hand, however, China faced no imminent danger of US invasion. ‘The law of imperialist war’, Zhou said in June 1953, ‘is that the weakest will be the first target of attack.’ As long as China continued to build up its strength and influence, it was highly likely that ‘the US may not dare to attack China’. In order to win time to become ‘as strong as walls of bronze [Tongqiang tiebi]’, China should strike for peaceful coexistence in diplomacy.11 To this end, Zhou told senior Chinese diplomats in June 1953, the current focus of China’s foreign policy was that ‘we advocate resolving all international disputes through peaceful negotiations.... We should practice peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition among all different systems’. This type of diplomacy was possible, he explained, ‘[because] the US war threats will widen the gap between the US and the Western European countries and cause most of the nations in Asia, Middle East and FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 Cold War History 511 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 120