Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 14: General Extensive Games Marciano Siniscalchi November 10, 1999 Introduction [By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 11 and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum.] Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 16: Applications of Sequential and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Marciano Siniscalchi November 16, 1999 Introduction The purpose of this lecture is to help you familiarize with the workings of sequential equi- librium and \sequential equilibrium lite, i.e. perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The main focus is the \reputation\ result of Kreps and Wilson(1982). You should refer

Eco514Game Theory Lecture 3: Nash Equilibrium Marciano Siniscalchi September 23, 1999 Introduction Nash equilibrium has undoubtedly proved to be the most influential idea in game theory. enabled fundamental breakthroughs in economics and the social sciences. Its development was a major intellectual achievement; what is perhaps more important, it Recent foundational research has emphasized the subtleties in the interpretation of Nash

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 5: Games with Payoff Uncertainty(2) Marciano Siniscalchi September 30, 1999 Introduction This lecture continues our analysis of games with payoff uncertainty. The three main objec- tives are: (1) to illustrate the flexibility of the Harsanyi framework (or our version thereof);

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 7: Interactive Epistemology(2) Marciano Siniscalchi October 7, 1999 Introduction This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\ to the the- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e. behavioral)characterization of rationalizability

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture8: Applications(1)Simultaneous Auctions Marciano Siniscalchi October 12, 1999 Introduction This lecture, as well as the next, exemplify applications of the framework and techniques developed so far to problems of economic interest. Neither lecture attempts to cover the example applications in any generality, of course; you may however find these topics of sufficient interest to warrant further study

Eco514 Game Theory Signaling Games Marciano Siniscalchi January 10, 2000 Introduction Signaling games are used to model the following situation: Player 1, the Sender, receives some private information and sends a message m E M to Player 2, the Receiver. The latter, in turn, observes m but not 0, and

Eco514 Game Theory Problem Set 1: Due Friday, September 30 oTE: On the“ethics”of problem sets Some of the theoretical exercise I will assign are actually well-known results; in other cases, you may be able to find the answer in the literature. This is certainly the case for the current problem set. My position on this issue is that, basically, if you look up the answer somewhere, it's your problem. After all, you can buy answer keys to most textbooks... The fact is, you will not

Eco514 Game Theory Problem Set 3: Due Thursday, October 28 1. Asymmetric Auctions Consider an interdependent-values auction with two bidders, each of whom observes an i.i.d uniform signal E [0, 1]. Bidder i's valuation for the object is equal to vi

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