Logistics We(provisionally) meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays 10: 40a-12: 10p, in Bendheim 317. I will create a mailing list for the course. Therefore please send me email at your earliest convenience so I can add you to the list. You do not want to miss important announcements, do you? the course has a web page at http://www.princeton.edw

Introduction Beginning with this lecture, we focus our attention on dynamic games. The majority of games of economic interest feature some dynamic component, and most often payoff uncertainty as The analysis of extensive games is challenging in several ways. At the most basic level describing the possible sequences of events(choices) which define a particular game form is not problematic per se; yet, different formal definitions have been proposed, each with its Representing the players information as the play unfolds is nontrivial: to some extent

Introduction By and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. ] The theory of repeated games is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it indicates how payoff profiles that are not consistent with Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game might be achieved when the latter is played repeatedly, in a manner consistent with Nash or even subgame-perfect equilibrium On the other hand, it shows that essentially every individually rational payoff profile can

Introduction By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 1l and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. J Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made for payoff uncertainty

Introduction The purpose of this lecture is to help you familiarize with the workings of sequential equi- librium and \sequential equilibrium lite, i.e. perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The main focus is the \reputation\ result of Kreps and Wilson(1982). You should refer to OR for details and definitions: I am following the textbook quite closely. of the game in which an incumbent faces a sequence of K (potential) entrants. It is clear that, in the subgame in which the last entrant gets a chance to play, the incumbent will

Introduction Nash equilibrium has undoubtedly proved to be the most influential idea in game theory. enabled fundamental breakthroughs in economics and the social sciences. Its development was a major intellectual achievement; what is perhaps more important, it Recent foundational research has emphasized the subtleties in the interpretation of Nash

Introduction This lecture continues our analysis of games with payoff uncertainty. The three main objec- tives are: (1) to illustrate the flexibility of the Harsanyi framework (or our version thereof); (2)to highlight the assumptions implicit in the conventional usage of the framework, and the possible departures; (3) to discuss its potential problems, as well as some solutions to the latter

Introduction This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\to thethe- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e behavioral) characterization of rationalizability a review of the basic definitions For your convenience, I summarize the essential definitions pertaining to models of interactive

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对策论也称博弈论，是研究具有竞争或斗争性质的现象，并为参加者各方提供对策方法的数学理论，它是运筹学的一个分支。对策自古有之，只是在科学技术高度发展的现代社会，更进一步引起越来越多人的重视和研究