Eco514 Game Theory Signaling Games Marciano Siniscalchi January 10, 2000 Introduction Signaling games are used to model the following situation: Player 1, the Sender, receives some private information and sends a message m E M to Player 2, the Receiver. The latter, in turn, observes m but not 0, and

Eco514 Game Theory Problem Set 1: Due Friday, September 30 oTE: On the“ethics”of problem sets Some of the theoretical exercise I will assign are actually well-known results; in other cases, you may be able to find the answer in the literature. This is certainly the case for the current problem set. My position on this issue is that, basically, if you look up the answer somewhere, it's your problem. After all, you can buy answer keys to most textbooks... The fact is, you will not

Logistics We(provisionally) meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays 10: 40a-12: 10p, in Bendheim 317. I will create a mailing list for the course. Therefore please send me email at your earliest convenience so I can add you to the list. You do not want to miss important announcements, do you? the course has a web page at http://www.princeton.edw

Introduction Beginning with this lecture, we focus our attention on dynamic games. The majority of games of economic interest feature some dynamic component, and most often payoff uncertainty as The analysis of extensive games is challenging in several ways. At the most basic level describing the possible sequences of events(choices) which define a particular game form is not problematic per se; yet, different formal definitions have been proposed, each with its Representing the players information as the play unfolds is nontrivial: to some extent

Introduction By and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. ] The theory of repeated games is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it indicates how payoff profiles that are not consistent with Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game might be achieved when the latter is played repeatedly, in a manner consistent with Nash or even subgame-perfect equilibrium On the other hand, it shows that essentially every individually rational payoff profile can

Introduction This lecture continues our analysis of games with payoff uncertainty. The three main objec- tives are: (1) to illustrate the flexibility of the Harsanyi framework (or our version thereof); (2)to highlight the assumptions implicit in the conventional usage of the framework, and the possible departures; (3) to discuss its potential problems, as well as some solutions to the latter

第一章 导论 第二章 需求、供给与均衡价格决定 第三章 消费者行为理论 第四章 厂商行为 第五章 完全竞争条件下的局部均衡分析 第六章 完全垄断条件下的局部均衡分析 第七章 不完全竞争条件下的局部均衡分析 第八章 要素价格决定与收入分配 第九章 一般均衡理论与福利经济学 第十章 博弈论 Game Theory

Introduction This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\to thethe- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e behavioral) characterization of rationalizability a review of the basic definitions For your convenience, I summarize the essential definitions pertaining to models of interactive

Dept. of Electrical Computer Engineering OOCL Transportation Co Dept, of Economics University of Ilinois at Urbana-Champaign 300 Central Ave Urbana IL 6180 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Mountain view, CA 94043 Champaign, IL 61820 Abstract We provide a brief review of the EWPP operation [1].The Pool dispatcher is charged with determining on a daily basis We formulate a general framework of a competitive electric- the schedule for the so-called availability declaration period ity generation supply market(CEM, embodying the salient (ADP),a 39-bour

下面这个故事摘自山东人民出版社出版的《社会学家茶座》2003 年第 4 期，作者是庄朝晖。这个故事蕴含着丰富的博弈论思想，也可 以从中看到一个社会是如何陷入“囚徒困境”的。 有几个朋友凑成一桌饭局，酒酣耳热之际，席间上来了一条鱼。 诸位朋友正互相谦让，一阵妖风吹来，灯灭了。在一片沉寂之中，突 然听得数声惨叫