Eco514 Game Theory Problem Set 1: Due Friday, September 30 oTE: On the“ethics”of problem sets Some of the theoretical exercise I will assign are actually well-known results; in other cases, you may be able to find the answer in the literature. This is certainly the case for the current problem set. My position on this issue is that, basically, if you look up the answer somewhere, it's your problem. After all, you can buy answer keys to most textbooks... The fact is, you will not

Eco514 Game Theory Signaling Games Marciano Siniscalchi January 10, 2000 Introduction Signaling games are used to model the following situation: Player 1, the Sender, receives some private information and sends a message m E M to Player 2, the Receiver. The latter, in turn, observes m but not 0, and

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture8: Applications(1)Simultaneous Auctions Marciano Siniscalchi October 12, 1999 Introduction This lecture, as well as the next, exemplify applications of the framework and techniques developed so far to problems of economic interest. Neither lecture attempts to cover the example applications in any generality, of course; you may however find these topics of sufficient interest to warrant further study

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 7: Interactive Epistemology(2) Marciano Siniscalchi October 7, 1999 Introduction This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\ to the the- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e. behavioral)characterization of rationalizability

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 5: Games with Payoff Uncertainty(2) Marciano Siniscalchi September 30, 1999 Introduction This lecture continues our analysis of games with payoff uncertainty. The three main objec- tives are: (1) to illustrate the flexibility of the Harsanyi framework (or our version thereof);

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 2: (Iterated)Best Response Operators Marciano Siniscalchi September 21, 1999 Introduction This lecture continues the analysis of normal-form games. We analyze general, non-zerosum games, emphasizing the informal\equation\: Rational Behavior+ Assumptions about Beliefs=Solution Concepts

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 16: Applications of Sequential and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Marciano Siniscalchi November 16, 1999 Introduction The purpose of this lecture is to help you familiarize with the workings of sequential equi- librium and \sequential equilibrium lite, i.e. perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The main focus is the \reputation\ result of Kreps and Wilson(1982). You should refer

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 14: General Extensive Games Marciano Siniscalchi November 10, 1999 Introduction [By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 11 and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum.] Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made

从本门课程一开始，我们就强调从最宏观的角度：微波工程有两种方法——场论的方法和网络的方法。首先，我们要把传输线理论推广到波导，由微波双导线发展到波导是因为当其它人或物靠近双导线时会产生较大影响。这说明：传输线与外界有能量交换，它带来的直接问题是：能量损失和工作不稳定。究其原因是开放(Open)造成的特点

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 10: Extensive Games with (Almost)Perfect Information Marciano Siniscalchi October 19, 1999 Introduction Beginning with this lecture, we focus our attention on dynamic games. The majority of games of economic interest feature some dynamic component, and most often payoff uncertainty as well. The analysis of extensive games is challenging in several ways. At the most basic level describing the possible sequences of events (choices)which define a particular game form is not problematic per se; yet, different formal definitions have been proposed, each with its pros and cons