Introduction: Invariance In their seminal contribution, Von Neumann and Morgenstern argue that the normal form of a game contains all \strategically relevant\ information. This view, note well, does not invalidate or trivialize extensive-form analysis; rather, it leads those who embrace it to be suspicious of extensive-form solution concepts which yield different predictions in distinct

This lecture focuses on the interpretation of solution concepts for normal-form games. You will recall that, when we introduced Nash equilibrium and Rationalizability, we mentioned numerous reasons why these solution concepts could be regarded as yielding plausible restric-

The notion of subgame perfection is the cornerstone of the theory of extensive games. It embodies its key intuitions-and provides a vivid example of the difficulties inherent in such a theor But, above all, it has proved to be extremely profitable in a variety of applications. More- over, it has spawned a huge theoretical literature which has attempted(often successfully

By and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. ] The theory of repeated games is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it indicates how payoff profiles that are not consistent with Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game might be achieved when the latter is played repeatedly, in a manner consistent with Nash or even subgame-perfect equilibrium

Outline 5.1 Proteins Linear Polymers of Amino acids 5.2 Architecture 5.3 Many Biological Functions 5.4 May be Conjugated with Other Groups 5.6 Purification 5.7 Primary Structure Determination 5.8 Consider the Nature of Sequences

This chapter will explain the origin of the spontaneity of physical and chemical change. Two simple processes are examined. It shows that a property, the entropy can be defined, measured, and used to discuss spontaneous changes quantitatively. This chapter also introduces a major subsidiary thermodynamic property, the Gibbs energy