Extend Proposition 151.1 (the Perfect Folk Theorem with discounting) to arbitrary mixtures of payoff profiles of the original game G =(, (A Ui) ) Allow for both rational and real weights on the set of profiles {u(a): a E A}; note that the statement of the result will involve an approximation of the payoff profile

ome of the theoretical exercise I will assign are actually well-known results; in other cases you may be able to find the answer in the literature. This is certainly the case for the current My position on this issue is that, basically, if you look up the answer somewhere it's your problem. After all, you can buy answer keys to most textbooks. The fact is, you will not

一、联立方程模型随机误差项方差—协方差矩阵 二、三阶段最小二乘法简介 三、完全信息最大似然法简介

一、识别的概念 二、从定义出发识别模型 三、结构式识别条件 四、简化式识别条件 五、实际应用中的经验方法

一、问题的引出：非平稳变量与经典回归模型 二、时间序列数据的平稳性 三、平稳性的图示判断 四、平稳性的单位根检验 五、单整、趋势平稳与差分平稳随机过程

一、时间序列模型的基本概念及其适用性 二、随机时间序列模型的平稳性条件 三、随机时间序列模型的识别 四、随机时间序列模型的估计 五、随机时间序列模型的检验

The notion of subgame perfection is the cornerstone of the theory of extensive games. It embodies its key intuitions-and provides a vivid example of the difficulties inherent in such a theor But, above all, it has proved to be extremely profitable in a variety of applications. More- over, it has spawned a huge theoretical literature which has attempted(often successfully

By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 1l and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. J Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made

Class: Tue-Thu 10: 40-12: 10 [?] Room 317, Bendheim. OH, by appointment. The Big Picture Most of you will already have used some of the tools of GT in your core courses. You will probably be familiar with the notions of simultaneous us. extensive-form game, perfect vs. imperfect information, complete us. incomplete information, Nash

This lecture continues the analysis of normal-form games. We analyze general, non-zeros ames, emphasizing the informalequation Rational Behavior Assumptions about Beliefs= Solution Concepts Before we tackle the new material. let us review what we have learned about zerosum games in light of this \equation\. Rational behavior in the context of normal-form games