Contents Dominant strategy Nash equilibrium Prisoner's' dilemma and repeated games Multiple equilibria and sequential games Pure and mixed strategies

14,1采购与供应链的关系 14.1.1传统采购模式 1.传统的采购过程是典型的非信息对称的 博弈过程 2.质量控制不及时 3.供需双方的合作关系短暂 4.响应用户需求的能力迟钝

《博弈论》（英文版） ps5 Due Tuesday, November

1. Machines Extend Proposition 151. 1(the Perfect Folk Theorem with discounting)to arbitrary mixtures of payoff profiles of the original game G=(N, (Ai, lilieN Allow for both rational and real weights on the set of profiles u(a): aE A]; note that the statement of the result will involve an approximation of the payoff profile Construct a machine that implements the strategies in your proof

Player i is rational\;R=nieN Ri. Also, Bi(E) is the event \Player i is certain that E is true\ and B(E)=neN Bi(E). This is as in Lecture 7. Let me introduce the following notation for iterated mutual certainty: B()(E)=E B()(E)=B(B-I)(E)). Then the definition of Bk in Lecture 7 can be rewritten as Bk

Introduction: Invariance In their seminal contribution, Von Neumann and Morgenstern argue that the normal form of a game contains all\strategically relevant\information. This view, note well, does not invalidate or trivialize extensive-form analysis; rather, it leads those who embrace it to be uspicious of extensive-form solution concepts which yield different predictions in distinct

Introduction One of the merits of the notion of sequential equilibrium is the emphasis on out-of- equilibrium beliefs-that is, on beliefs (about past and future play)at information sets that should not be reached if given equilibrium is played. The key insight of extensive-form analysis is that out-of-equilibrium beliefs deter

Introduction This lecture, as well as the next, exemplify applications of the framework and techniques developed so far to problems of economic interest. Neither lecture attempts to cover the example applications in any generality, of course; you may however find these topics of sufficient interest to warrant further study Auction theory is generally indicated as one of the \success stories\of game theory There is no doubt that the game-theoretic analysis of auctions has informed design decisions

Introduction This lecture focuses on the interpretation of solution concepts for normal-form games. You will recall that, when we introduced Nash equilibrium and Rationalizability, we mentioned numerous reasons why these solution concepts could be regarded as yielding plausible restric- tions on rational play, or perhaps providing a consistency check for our predictions about

The vast majority of games of interest in economics, finance, political economy etc. involve some form of payoff uncertainty. A simple but interesting example is provided by auctions: an object is offered for sale, and individuals are required to submit their bids in sealed envelopes. The object is then allocated to the highest bidder at a price which depends on every bid, according to some prespecified rule (e.g. \first-price\ or \second-price\rule). In