This lecture continues our analysis of games with payoff uncertainty. The three main objec- tives are: (1) to illustrate the flexibility of the Harsanyi framework (or our version thereof); (2)to highlight the assumptions implicit in the conventional usage of the framework, and the possible departures; (3) to discuss its potential problems, as well as some solutions to the latter
One of the merits of the notion of sequential equilibrium is the emphasis on out-of- equilibrium beliefs-that is, on beliefs (about past and future play)at information sets that should not be reached if given equilibrium is played. The key insight of extensive-form analysis is that out-of-equilibrium beliefs deter. mine equilibrium behavior. For instance, consider the simple two-stage entry deter- rence game in which potential entrant decides whether to enter a market or stay out, and the incumbent decides whether to fight or acquiesce after the entrant's move
This lecture continues the analysis of normal-form games. We analyze general, non-zeros ames, emphasizing the informalequation Rational Behavior Assumptions about Beliefs= Solution Concepts Before we tackle the new material. let us review what we have learned about zerosum games in light of this \equation\. Rational behavior in the context of normal-form games
Outline 4.1: Amino Acids: Building Blocks of Proteins 4.2: Acid-Base Chemistry of Amino Acids 4.3: Reactions of Amino Acids 4.4: Optical Activity and Stereochemistry of Amino Acids 4.5: Spectroscopic Properties of Amino Acids 4.6: Separation and Analysis of a.a. Mixtures
