Eco514 Game Theory Forward Induction Marciano Siniscalchi January 10, 2000 Introduction One of the merits of the notion of sequential equilibrium is the emphasis on out-of- equilibrium beliefs-that is, on beliefs (about past and future play)at information sets that should not be reached if given equilibrium is played. The key insight of extensive-form analysis is that out-of-equilibrium beliefs deter
Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 8.5: More on Auctions; PS#1 Marciano Siniscalchi October 14, 1999 Introduction These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first-and second-price auctions I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2
Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 6: Interactive Epistemology(1) Marciano Siniscalchi October 5, 1999 Introduction This lecture focuses on the interpretation of solution concepts for normal-form games. You will recall that, when we introduced Nash equilibrium and Rationalizability, we mentioned numerous reasons why these solution concepts could be regarded as yielding plausible restric- tions on rational play, or perhaps providing a consistency check for our predictions about
Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 4: Games with Payoff Uncertainty(1) Marciano Siniscalchi September 28, 1999 Introduction The vast majority of games of interest in economics, finance, political economy etc. involve some form of payoff uncertainty. A simple but interesting example is provided by auctions: an object is offered for sale, and individuals are required to submit their bids in sealed
Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 2: (Iterated)Best Response Operators Marciano Siniscalchi September 21, 1999 Introduction This lecture continues the analysis of normal-form games. We analyze general, non-zerosum games, emphasizing the informal\equation\: Rational Behavior+ Assumptions about Beliefs=Solution Concepts
Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 15: Sequential Equilibrium Marciano Siniscalchi November 11, 1999 Introduction The theory of extensive games is built upon a key notion, that of sequential rationality, and a key insight, the centrality of off-equilibrium beliefs. The definition of sequential equilibrium
Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 13: Repeated Games(2) Marciano Siniscalchi October 28, 1999 Introduction [Again, by and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so will keep these notes to a minimum.] Review of key definitions
Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 11: Subgame Perfection Marciano Siniscalchi October 21, 1999 Introduction The notion of subgame perfection is the cornerstone of the theory of extensive embodies its key intuitions-and provides a vivid example of the difficulties inhere games
Chapter 1 Objectives After you have read and studied this chapter, you should be able to Name the basic components of object-oriented programming. Differentiate classes and objects. Differentiate class and instance methods. Differentiate class and instance data values
