Eco514 Game Theory Lecture8: Applications(1)Simultaneous Auctions Marciano Siniscalchi October 12, 1999 Introduction This lecture, as well as the next, exemplify applications of the framework and techniques developed so far to problems of economic interest. Neither lecture attempts to cover the example applications in any generality, of course; you may however find these topics of sufficient interest to warrant further study

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 7: Interactive Epistemology(2) Marciano Siniscalchi October 7, 1999 Introduction This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\ to the the- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e. behavioral)characterization of rationalizability

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 5: Games with Payoff Uncertainty(2) Marciano Siniscalchi September 30, 1999 Introduction This lecture continues our analysis of games with payoff uncertainty. The three main objec- tives are: (1) to illustrate the flexibility of the Harsanyi framework (or our version thereof);

Eco514Game Theory Lecture 3: Nash Equilibrium Marciano Siniscalchi September 23, 1999 Introduction Nash equilibrium has undoubtedly proved to be the most influential idea in game theory. enabled fundamental breakthroughs in economics and the social sciences. Its development was a major intellectual achievement; what is perhaps more important, it Recent foundational research has emphasized the subtleties in the interpretation of Nash

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 16: Applications of Sequential and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Marciano Siniscalchi November 16, 1999 Introduction The purpose of this lecture is to help you familiarize with the workings of sequential equi- librium and \sequential equilibrium lite, i.e. perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The main focus is the \reputation\ result of Kreps and Wilson(1982). You should refer

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 14: General Extensive Games Marciano Siniscalchi November 10, 1999 Introduction [By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 11 and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum.] Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 12: Repeated Games(1) Marciano Siniscalchi October 26, 1999 Introduction [By and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum.] The theory of repeated games is double-edged sword. On one hand, it indicates how payoff profiles that are not consistent with Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game might be achieved when the latter is played repeatedly, in a manner consistent with Nash or

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 10: Extensive Games with (Almost)Perfect Information Marciano Siniscalchi October 19, 1999 Introduction Beginning with this lecture, we focus our attention on dynamic games. The majority of games of economic interest feature some dynamic component, and most often payoff uncertainty as well. The analysis of extensive games is challenging in several ways. At the most basic level describing the possible sequences of events (choices)which define a particular game form is not problematic per se; yet, different formal definitions have been proposed, each with its pros and cons

INTRODUCTION Level five Complex Systems, Function Units from levels Two through Four Level four More complex Function Logic Units, e.g. microprocessor Third IC level (VLSI) Level three Function Logic Units, e.g. adders, Second IC level counters, multiplexers (MSI and LSI) Level two Function Logic Units, e.g. gates, NOT, AND, NAND, EX-OR First IC level (SSI)

Chapter 0 Objectives After you have read and studied this chapter,you should be able to State briefly a history of computers. Name and describe four major components of the computer. Convert binary numbers to decimal numbers and vice versa. State the difference between the low-level and high-level programming languages