Task Team of FUNDAMENTAL ACCOUNTING School of Business, Sun Yat-sen University Lesson 1: Introduction to accounting Learning Objectives Understand the concepts of economic man and nature of firm from the perspective of

True and False Questions: 1. Economic interest maximization and risk aversion are two characteristics of an economic man 2. Maslow's theory of the hierarchy of needs believes that man are resourceful evaluator and maximizer 3. Firm is a coalition of economic men. 4. The economic nature of man gives rise to the emerge of accounting

概述(Introduction) 蒸发过程:将含有固体溶质的稀溶液加热沸腾进行浓缩,以 获得固体产品或制取溶剂。蒸发过程实际上是不挥发性的溶 质和挥发性的溶剂分离的过程

概述(Introduction) 搅拌的用途: (1)使两种或多种互溶的液体分散; (2)不互溶的液体之间的分散与混合; (3)气体与液体的混合; (4)使固体颗粒悬浮于液体之中; (5)加速化学反应、传热、传质等过程的进行

1 Introduction Background for New methodology Modern natural science methodology is mainly based on matter and energy Even though matter and energy are still necessitate factors in information system, yet the characteristic feature of information systems, particularly the complex ones, is neither matter nor energy but information Without information, the complex information systems, like brain and intelligent life. cannot be understood

1.前言 Introduction 2.生物多样性及其起源与研究层次? 3.世界生物多样性现状? 4.中国的生物多样性? 5.遗传多样性 Genetic diversity 6.物种多样性 Species diversity

Introduction: Invariance In their seminal contribution, Von Neumann and Morgenstern argue that the normal form of a game contains all\strategically relevant\information. This view, note well, does not invalidate or trivialize extensive-form analysis; rather, it leads those who embrace it to be uspicious of extensive-form solution concepts which yield different predictions in distinct

Introduction Signaling games are used to model the following situation: Player 1, the Sender, receives some private information and sends a message m E M to Player 2, the Receiver. The latter, in turn, observes m but not 0, and chooses response r E R. Players'payoffs depend on 0, m and r. What could be simpler? Yet, there is a huge number of economically interesting games that fit nicely within this framework: Spence's job market signaling model is the leading example, but applications abound in IO (limit pricing, disclosure...) finance (security design) and political economics

Introduction These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first- and second-price auctions. I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2 The first-price auction may be inefficient even with private values Both examples I am going to show are due to Eric Maskin(to the best of my knowledge) The first point I wish to make is that, even in a private-values setting, asymmetries may

Introduction This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\to thethe- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e behavioral) characterization of rationalizability a review of the basic definitions For your convenience, I summarize the essential definitions pertaining to models of interactive