根据问题的实际情况不断寻找可利用的 知识,从而构造一条代价较少的推理路 线,使问题得到圆满解决的过程称为搜 索。搜索实用于:结构不良问题,无成 熟算法;或有算法,但问题复杂,如 博弈

1.使用范围:第一章导论 2.要考核的知识点:影响供求的因素; 均衡价格的决定及其变动趋势;

毫无疑问贸易保护对世界福利是一种损害,但如何才能消除贸易壁垒实现自由贸易 呢?我们在前一章已经指出,寄希望于各国自觉采取单边贸易自由化是行不通的,必须各国 达成共识,一起采取行动,才能最终实现自由贸易。但是根据博弈论的观点,国家数目越多, 达成合作结果就越困难,反之当国家数目较少时,就比较容易达成合作

对策论 对策是有厉害冲突的各方所分别采取的决策. 对策论,亦称为博弈论,研究具有对抗、竞争、冲突性质的 问题 最早利用数学方法来研究对策论的是数学家E. Zermelo,他于 1912年发表了论文《关于集合论在象棋对策中的应用》.1944 年, Von Neumann和O. Morgenstern总结了前人关于对策论 的研究成果,合著了《对策论与经济行为》(Theory of Games and Economic Behavior)一书,使得对策论的研究开 始系统化和公理化,并具有了深刻的经济背景.1994年,在对 策论研究中作出突出贡献的Nash, HarsanyiSe和获得诺贝尔经济学奖

◆知识表示 演绎系统、产生式系统、框架结构、语义网络、过程性 知识 ◆搜索技术 无变量盲目搜索算法、带变量盲目搜素算法、启发式搜 索算法、博弈树搜索 ◆人工智能程序设计语言 PROLOG

Marciano Siniscalchi Game Theory (Economics 514) Fall 1999 Logistics We(provisionally) meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays 10: 40a-12: 10p, in Bendheim 317. I will create a mailing list for the course. Therefore please send me email at your earliest convenience so I can add you to the list. You do not want to miss important announcements, do you?

Eco514 Game Theory Problem Set 4: Due Tuesday, November 9 1. Machines Extend Proposition 151.1 (the Perfect Folk Theorem with discounting) to arbitrary mixtures of payoff profiles of the original game G =(, (A Ui) ) Allow for both rational and real weights on the set of profiles {u(a): a E A}; note that the statement of the result will involve an approximation of the payoff profile

Eco514 Game Theory Problem Set 2: Due Thursday, October 14 Recall the following definitions: in any model M=(, (Ti, a: )eN), Ri is the event \Player i is rational\; R ien. Also, (E) is the event \Player i is certain that E is true\ and(E) NieN B (). This is as in Lecture 7

Eco514 Game Theory The Trembling Hand: Normal-Form Analysis and Extensive-Form Implications Marciano Siniscalchi January 10, 2000 Introduction: Invariance In their seminal contribution, Von Neumann and Morgenstern argue that the normal form of a game contains all \strategically relevant\ information. This view, note well, does not invalidate or trivialize extensive-form analysis; rather, it leads those who embrace it to be suspicious of extensive-form solution concepts which yield different predictions in distinct

Eco514 Game Theory Forward Induction Marciano Siniscalchi January 10, 2000 Introduction One of the merits of the notion of sequential equilibrium is the emphasis on out-of- equilibrium beliefs-that is, on beliefs (about past and future play)at information sets that should not be reached if given equilibrium is played. The key insight of extensive-form analysis is that out-of-equilibrium beliefs deter