Eco514 Game Theory Problem Set 3: Due Thursday, October 28 1. Asymmetric Auctions Consider an interdependent-values auction with two bidders, each of whom observes an i.i.d uniform signal E [0, 1]. Bidder i's valuation for the object is equal to vi

Eco514 Game Theory The Trembling Hand: Normal-Form Analysis and Extensive-Form Implications Marciano Siniscalchi January 10, 2000 Introduction: Invariance In their seminal contribution, Von Neumann and Morgenstern argue that the normal form of a game contains all \strategically relevant\ information. This view, note well, does not invalidate or trivialize extensive-form analysis; rather, it leads those who embrace it to be suspicious of extensive-form solution concepts which yield different predictions in distinct

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 8.5: More on Auctions; PS#1 Marciano Siniscalchi October 14, 1999 Introduction These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first-and second-price auctions I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 7: Interactive Epistemology(2) Marciano Siniscalchi October 7, 1999 Introduction This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\ to the the- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e. behavioral)characterization of rationalizability

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 4: Games with Payoff Uncertainty(1) Marciano Siniscalchi September 28, 1999 Introduction The vast majority of games of interest in economics, finance, political economy etc. involve some form of payoff uncertainty. A simple but interesting example is provided by auctions: an object is offered for sale, and individuals are required to submit their bids in sealed

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 16: Applications of Sequential and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Marciano Siniscalchi November 16, 1999 Introduction The purpose of this lecture is to help you familiarize with the workings of sequential equi- librium and \sequential equilibrium lite, i.e. perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The main focus is the \reputation\ result of Kreps and Wilson(1982). You should refer

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 13: Repeated Games(2) Marciano Siniscalchi October 28, 1999 Introduction [Again, by and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so will keep these notes to a minimum.] Review of key definitions

Registers, formed from collection of flip -flops, are used to store or manipulate data or both. Input and output function associated with registers include Parallel input/ Parallel output Serial input/ Serial output Parallel input/ Serial output OSerial input parallel output

Unit 12 Claim and Settlement Points for attention: When making a claim, plan your letter as follows: Begin by regretting the need to complain Mention the date of the order, the date of delivery and the goods complained about

1)信头(letterhead) 1 Structure －－－ 2）编号，日期 3）封内名称和地址 (inside address) (reference and date) 4）经办人(attention) 5）称呼(salutation) 6）事由（标题）(subject) 7）正文(body) 8）结尾敬词(complimentary) 9）签名(signature) 10）附件 (enclosure) 11）抄送(cc to XX) 12）附言(postscript)