第四章组合逻辑模块及其应用 4.1编码器 一编码器的基本概念及工作原理 编码——将特定的逻辑信号编为一组二进制代 码。 能够实现编码功能的逻辑部件称为编码器。 一般而言,N个不同的信号,至少需要n位二进制 数编码

第六章时序逻辑电路 6.1时序逻辑电路的基本概念 一、时序逻辑电路的结构及特点 时序逻辑电路———任何一个时刻的输出状态不仅取决于当时的输入信号,还与电路的原状态有关。 时序电路的特点: (1)含有具有记忆元件(最常用的是触发器) (2)具有反馈通道

工作原理 (1)4脚为复位输入端(R),当R为低电平时,不管其他输入端的状 态如何,输出v为低电平。正常工作时,应将其接高电平。 (2)5脚为电压控制端,当其悬空时,比较器C1和C2的比较电压分别为23Vcc和1/3Vcc (3)2脚为触发输入端,6脚为阈值输入端,两端的电位高低控制比较器C1和C2的输出,从而控制RS触发器,决定输出状态

Eco514Game Theory 1. Game Theory Multiperson Decision Theory; Zero-Sum games Marciano Siniscalchi September 16, 1999 Administrative Stuff Class: Tue-Thu 10: 40-12: 10 [?] Room 317, Bendheim. OH, by appointment. The Big Picture Most of you will already have used some of the tools of GT in your core courses

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 11: Subgame Perfection Marciano Siniscalchi October 21, 1999 Introduction The notion of subgame perfection is the cornerstone of the theory of extensive embodies its key intuitions-and provides a vivid example of the difficulties inhere games

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 13: Repeated Games(2) Marciano Siniscalchi October 28, 1999 Introduction [Again, by and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so will keep these notes to a minimum.] Review of key definitions

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 15: Sequential Equilibrium Marciano Siniscalchi November 11, 1999 Introduction The theory of extensive games is built upon a key notion, that of sequential rationality, and a key insight, the centrality of off-equilibrium beliefs. The definition of sequential equilibrium

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 2: (Iterated)Best Response Operators Marciano Siniscalchi September 21, 1999 Introduction This lecture continues the analysis of normal-form games. We analyze general, non-zerosum games, emphasizing the informal\equation\: Rational Behavior+ Assumptions about Beliefs=Solution Concepts

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 4: Games with Payoff Uncertainty(1) Marciano Siniscalchi September 28, 1999 Introduction The vast majority of games of interest in economics, finance, political economy etc. involve some form of payoff uncertainty. A simple but interesting example is provided by auctions: an object is offered for sale, and individuals are required to submit their bids in sealed

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 6: Interactive Epistemology(1) Marciano Siniscalchi October 5, 1999 Introduction This lecture focuses on the interpretation of solution concepts for normal-form games. You will recall that, when we introduced Nash equilibrium and Rationalizability, we mentioned numerous reasons why these solution concepts could be regarded as yielding plausible restric- tions on rational play, or perhaps providing a consistency check for our predictions about