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Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 8.5: More on Auctions; PS#1 Marciano Siniscalchi October 14, 1999 Introduction These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first-and second-price auctions I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2
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Eco514 Game Theory Forward Induction Marciano Siniscalchi January 10, 2000 Introduction One of the merits of the notion of sequential equilibrium is the emphasis on out-of- equilibrium beliefs-that is, on beliefs (about past and future play)at information sets that should not be reached if given equilibrium is played. The key insight of extensive-form analysis is that out-of-equilibrium beliefs deter
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Eco514 Game Theory The Trembling Hand: Normal-Form Analysis and Extensive-Form Implications Marciano Siniscalchi January 10, 2000 Introduction: Invariance In their seminal contribution, Von Neumann and Morgenstern argue that the normal form of a game contains all \strategically relevant\ information. This view, note well, does not invalidate or trivialize extensive-form analysis; rather, it leads those who embrace it to be suspicious of extensive-form solution concepts which yield different predictions in distinct
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Eco514 Game Theory Problem Set 2: Due Thursday, October 14 Recall the following definitions: in any model M=(, (Ti, a: )eN), Ri is the event \Player i is rational\; R ien. Also, (E) is the event \Player i is certain that E is true\ and(E) NieN B (). This is as in Lecture 7
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Eco514 Game Theory Problem Set 4: Due Tuesday, November 9 1. Machines Extend Proposition 151.1 (the Perfect Folk Theorem with discounting) to arbitrary mixtures of payoff profiles of the original game G =(, (A Ui) ) Allow for both rational and real weights on the set of profiles {u(a): a E A}; note that the statement of the result will involve an approximation of the payoff profile
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Marciano Siniscalchi Game Theory (Economics 514) Fall 1999 Logistics We(provisionally) meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays 10: 40a-12: 10p, in Bendheim 317. I will create a mailing list for the course. Therefore please send me email at your earliest convenience so I can add you to the list. You do not want to miss important announcements, do you?
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第2章C语言程序设计的基础知识 2.1简单C语言程序的组成和格式 2.2简单的数据类型 2.3算术运算 2.4赋值运算、逗号运算和自加、自减运算 2.5 Turbo环境下的上机操作步骤
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第4章分支结构的程序设计 4,1分支结构问版放 4.2判断条件的描述方法 4.3解决单的分文 4.4法多重分支的
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第6章自定义函数的设计和使用 6.1问题的提出 6.2函数的定义 6.3函数的调用 6.4函数的嵌套调 6.5函数的递归调
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第8章一维数组的应用 8.1了解一维数组 8.2一维数组的简单应用 8.3利用地址和指针访问数组元素 8.4与一维数组有关的参数传递 8.5一维数组操作中的常用算法介
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