Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 6: Interactive Epistemology(1) Marciano Siniscalchi October 5, 1999 Introduction This lecture focuses on the interpretation of solution concepts for normal-form games. You will recall that, when we introduced Nash equilibrium and Rationalizability, we mentioned numerous reasons why these solution concepts could be regarded as yielding plausible restric- tions on rational play, or perhaps providing a consistency check for our predictions about

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 8.5: More on Auctions; PS#1 Marciano Siniscalchi October 14, 1999 Introduction These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first-and second-price auctions I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2

Eco514 Game Theory Forward Induction Marciano Siniscalchi January 10, 2000 Introduction One of the merits of the notion of sequential equilibrium is the emphasis on out-of- equilibrium beliefs-that is, on beliefs (about past and future play)at information sets that should not be reached if given equilibrium is played. The key insight of extensive-form analysis is that out-of-equilibrium beliefs deter

Eco514 Game Theory The Trembling Hand: Normal-Form Analysis and Extensive-Form Implications Marciano Siniscalchi January 10, 2000 Introduction: Invariance In their seminal contribution, Von Neumann and Morgenstern argue that the normal form of a game contains all \strategically relevant\ information. This view, note well, does not invalidate or trivialize extensive-form analysis; rather, it leads those who embrace it to be suspicious of extensive-form solution concepts which yield different predictions in distinct

Eco514 Game Theory Problem Set 2: Due Thursday, October 14 Recall the following definitions: in any model M=(, (Ti, a: )eN), Ri is the event \Player i is rational\; R ien. Also, (E) is the event \Player i is certain that E is true\ and(E) NieN B (). This is as in Lecture 7

Eco514 Game Theory Problem Set 4: Due Tuesday, November 9 1. Machines Extend Proposition 151.1 (the Perfect Folk Theorem with discounting) to arbitrary mixtures of payoff profiles of the original game G =(, (A Ui) ) Allow for both rational and real weights on the set of profiles {u(a): a E A}; note that the statement of the result will involve an approximation of the payoff profile

Marciano Siniscalchi Game Theory (Economics 514) Fall 1999 Logistics We(provisionally) meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays 10: 40a-12: 10p, in Bendheim 317. I will create a mailing list for the course. Therefore please send me email at your earliest convenience so I can add you to the list. You do not want to miss important announcements, do you?

第2章C语言程序设计的基础知识 2.1简单C语言程序的组成和格式 2.2简单的数据类型 2.3算术运算 2.4赋值运算、逗号运算和自加、自减运算 2.5 Turbo环境下的上机操作步骤

第4章分支结构的程序设计 4,1分支结构问版放 4.2判断条件的描述方法 4.3解决单的分文 4.4法多重分支的

第6章自定义函数的设计和使用 6.1问题的提出 6.2函数的定义 6.3函数的调用 6.4函数的嵌套调 6.5函数的递归调