All the models considered so far have one thing in common. There is no uncertainty. This is a very restrictive assumption. Often in economic situations there is less than perfect information. Both production and consumption often involve unknown variables that affect the profits and utility of the agents

Consumer surplus is a measure of how much money a consumer would need to be given, in order to be just willing to give up their entire consumption of a particular good. Consumer surplus is approximately the area behind the demand curve. The change in consumer surplus following aprice change is illustrated in the second graph

1. Who am I? Chris Wallace, Lecturer at the Department of Economics, Oxford University and Fellow in Economics at Trinity College. 2. What do I do? Teach economics and research in the field of game theory. 3. Who are you? First year students taking either the Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) degree

一、商和市场类型 二、完全竞争厂商的需求曲线和收益曲线 三、利润最大化 四、完全竞争市场的短期均衡和短期供给曲线 五、完全竞争行业的短期供给曲线 六、完全竞争市场的长期均衡 七、完全竞争行业的长期供给曲线

一、厂商 1、厂商的组织形式 (1)个人企业:单个人独资经营的厂商组织。 (2)合伙制企业:两个人以上合资经营的厂商组织。 (3)公司制企业:按公司法建立和经营的具有法人资格的厂商组织。 2、交易成本:围绕着交易所产生的成本。 一类交易成本产生于签约时交易双方面临的偶然因素所带来的损失。这些偶然因素太多而无法写进契约

This formula applies to any type of firms in the output market 1. Competitive Output Market Competitive industry: Many firms: Firms are independent of each other in decision making Identical product: Each firm faces a horizontal demand curve at the market price Free entry: Zero profit in the long run A competitive firm takes the market price as given. For a given market price p

1. Producer Theory 1. Technology yi =input of good i, y =output of good i, i= yi-yi=net output, y yn) is a production plan Production possibility set Y=technologically feasible production plans yE Rn) y E Y is technologically efficient if there is no yE Y s.t. y>y

Problem set 1 Micro Theory S. Wang Question1.1. Show that“f(X)=f(x),Vx∈R,A>1” implies“f(A)= Af(x),Vx∈R,A>0.” estion 1.2. Use a Lagrange function to solve c(w1, w2, y) for the following problem

Problem set 3 Micro Susen Wang Try to do most problems in MWG(1995), Chapters 7-9 Question 3.1.(Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium). A principal hires an agent to perform some service at a price(which is supposed to equal the cost of the service The principal and the agent have initial

Thus, to find Nash equilibria in IN=N, A(Si)), uin, we use the conditions: for ach player i (1)he is indifferent among all strategies in St,and (2)any strategy in St is at least as good as any strategy in S Example 3.7.(Meeting in an Airport ). Mr Wang and Ms Yang are to meet in an irport. However, they do not know whether they are to meet at door a or door B. The payoffs are specified in the following