These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first- and second-price auctions. I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2

复旦大学经济学院：《发展经济学 Economics of Development》教学资源_课堂作业

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This lecture focuses on the interpretation of solution concepts for normal-form games. You will recall that, when we introduced Nash equilibrium and Rationalizability, we mentioned numerous reasons why these solution concepts could be regarded as yielding plausible restric-

This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\ to the the- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e. behavioral)characterization of rationalizability. A review of the basic definitions For your convenience, summarize the essential definitions pertaining to models of interactive

The theory of extensive games is built upon a key notion, that of sequential rationality, and a key insight, the centrality of off-equilibrium beliefs. The definition of sequential equilibrium brings both to the fore in a straightforward manner, and emphasizes their interrelation. From subgame perfection to sequential rationality