"The 9/11 commission did not learn of any u.s.government knowledge prior to /11 of surveillance of Mohammed Atta or of his cell,"said Hamilton,a forme Democratic congressman from Indiana "Had we learned of it obviously it would've been a major focus of our investigation. The Sept.11 commission's final report,issued last year,recounted numerous government mistakes that allowed the hijackers to succeed.Among them was a failure to share intelligence within and among agencies. According to Weldon,Able Danger identified Atta.Marwan al-Shehhi,Khalid al-Mihdar and Nawaf al-Hazmi as members of a cell the unit code-named"Brooklyn" because of some loose connections to New York City. Weldon said that in September 2000 Able Danger recommended that its information on the hiiackers be given to the FBI"so they could bring that cell in and take out the terrorists."However,Weldon said Pentagon lawyers rejected the recommendation cause the nd the vere in them could not be shared wth country legally Weldon did not provide details on how the intelligence officials identified the future hijackers and determined they might be part of a cell. Defense Department documents shown to an Associated Press reporter Tuesday said the Able Danger team was set up in 1999 to identify potential al-Qaida operatives for U.S.Special Operations Command.At some point,information provided to the team by the Army's Information Dominance Center pointed to a possible al-Qaida ell in Brooklyn,the documents said. However,because of concerns about pursuing information on"U.S.persons"-a legal term that includes U.S.citizens as well as foreigners admitted to the country esdence Special Operations Command did not provide information to the FBI.It is unclear ethe information t anyone else The command instead turned its focus to overseas threats. The documents provided no information on whether the team identified anyone connected to the Sept.11 attack If the team did identify Atta and the others,it's unclear why the information wasn't forwarded.The prohibition against sharing intelligence on"U.S.persons"should not ve applied since they were in the country on visas -they did not have permanent resident status. Weldon,considered something of a maverick on Capitol Hill,initially made his allegations about Atta and the others in afoor speech in June that attention.His talk came at the end of a legislative day during a period describe under House rules as "special orders"-a time slot for lawmakers to get up and speak on issues of their choosing."The 9/11 commission did not learn of any U.S. government knowledge prior to 9/11 of surveillance of Mohammed Atta or of his cell," said Hamilton, a former Democratic congressman f rom Indiana. "Had we learned of it obviously it would've been a major focus of our investigation." The Sept. 11 commission's final report, issued last year, recounted numerous government mistakes that allowed the hijackers to succeed. Among them was a failure to share intelligence within and among agencies. According to Weldon, Able Danger identified Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdar and Nawaf al-Hazmi as members of a cell the unit code-named "Brooklyn" because of some loose connections to New York City. Weldon said that in September 2000 Able Danger recommended that its information on the hijackers be given to the FBI "so they could bring that cell in and take out the terrorists." However, Weldon said Pentagon lawyers rejected the recommendation because they said Atta and the others were in the country legally so information on them could not be shared with law enforcement. Weldon did not provide details on how the intelligence officials identified the future hijackers and determined they might be part of a cell. Defense Department documents shown to an Associated Press reporter Tuesday said the Able Danger team was set up in 1999 to identify potential al-Qaida operatives for U.S. Special Operations Command. At some point, information provided to the team by the Army's Information Dominance Center pointed to a possible al-Qaida cell in Brooklyn, the documents said. However, because of concerns about pursuing information on "U.S. persons" - a legal term that includes U.S. citizens as well as foreigners admitted to the country for permanent residence - Special Operations Command did not provide the Army information to the FBI. It is unclear whether the Army provided the information to anyone else. The command instead turned its focus to overseas threats. The documents provided no information on whether the team identified anyone connected to the Sept. 11 attack. If the team did identify Atta and the others, it's unclear why the information wasn't forwarded. The prohibition against sharing intelligence on "U.S. persons" should not have applied since they were in the country on visas - they did not have permanent resident status. Weldon, considered something of a maverick on Capitol Hill, initially made his allegations about Atta and the others in a floor speech in June that garnered little attention. His talk came at the end of a legislative day during a period described under House rules as "special orders" - a time slot for lawmakers to get up and speak on issues of their choosing