Economic Expansion and Security in Pre-WWI Europe 211 tions of service were a major cause of the navy's personnel problems.A British report found that revolutionary agitators often worked on sailors'"grievances as regards pay,rations,and clothing,and [that]the unheard of outbreaks in the Black Sea Fleet, and the ferment among the men generally which commenced in 1905 may be attrib- uted directly to this source."Even after the revolution,mutinies continuedto plague the fleet and by 1914 had fully undermined its effectiveness.83 The army's labor supplies came almost exclusively from the peasantry.84 Although the terms of military service had improved greatly in the late nineteenth century,the army was unable to mobilize sufficient quantities of reliable labor.85 It suffered an acute shortage of NCOs,and despite reforms in 1907,had fewer NCOs among its ranks in 1914 than the armies of Italy or Austria-Hungary.Similar problems also affected the officer corps,which suffered both from shortages of officers and declines in their quality.In 1907,for example,the Russian infantry had approximately 20 percent fewer officers than it required.87 Again,the state's difficulties in compensat- ing for the rising opportunity costs of military service appears to be an important reason for this predicament.According to one British report, No doubt the officer question is...most serious...and it is difficult to see how it is to be overcome.The class that furnishes the German officer corps appears not to be forthcoming in Russia....Either a less educated class would have to be drawn on,or else advantages offered that would entail an impracticable ex- penditure.88 Most important,however,were problems among the rank and file.Between 1905 and 1907,simmering soldier discontent caused one-third of the infantry units in European Russia to mutiny,a figure that does not include more passive forms of soldier resistance that were even more common.89 The two primary sources of soldier discontent support the hypothesis that rising retums to land (and hence the rising opportunity costs of military service for the peasantry)were increasing the state's difficulty in mobilizing the peasantry.One source was growing disaffection over the burdens of military service.Soldier demands for higher pay,shorter active duty,and an end to the onerous practice of hiring out conscripts to local landowners,for example, featured prominently in almost every mutiny.90 The other source of discon- 82.War0ice1907.160. 83.Lieven1983,108-10 84.Bushnell 1985,2. 85.In 1874 compulsory military service was reduced from twenty years to six years active service and nine years reserves;in 1888 it was reduced to four years active service and eighteen years reserves.In response to the soldier mutinies of 1905-1907,active duty was reduced to three years,with fifteen years reserves.Wildman 1980,25-27. 86.See Gatrell 1994,297;and Jones 1988,281. 87.Foreign Office 1908.Contrary to popular image,the nobility predominated only at the uppermost ranks of the officer corps.Wildman 1980,20-23;also Stone 1975,20-21;Bushnell 1981;and Fuller 1985. 13. 88.Foreign Office 1908.folio 489.See also Fuller 1985.14. 89.Bushnell 1985,77. 90.Bushnell1980,563669,and1985,100-101.tions ofservice were a major cause of the navy’s personnel problems.A British report found that revolutionary agitators often worked on sailors’‘‘grievances as regards pay, rations, and clothing, and [that] the unheard of outbreaksin the Black Sea Fleet, and the ferment among the men generally which commenced in 1905 may be attrib￾uted directly to thissource.’’ 82 Even after the revolution,mutinies continued to plague the  eet and by 1914 had fully undermined its effectiveness.83 The army’s laborsupplies came almost exclusively from the peasantry.84 Although the terms of military service had improved greatly in the late nineteenth century, the army was unable to mobilize sufficient quantities of reliable labor.85 It suffered an acute shortage of NCOs, and despite reforms in 1907, had fewer NCOs among its ranks in 1914 than the armies of Italy or Austria-Hungary.86 Similar problems also affected the officer corps, which suffered both from shortages of officers and declines in their quality. In 1907, for example, the Russian infantry had approximately 20 percent fewer officers than it required.87 Again, the state’s difficulties in compensat￾ing for the rising opportunity costs of military service appears to be an important reason for this predicament.According to one British report, No doubt the officer question is . . . most serious . . . and it is difficult to see how it is to be overcome. The class that furnishes the German officer corps appears not to be forthcoming in Russia. . . . Either a less educated class would have to be drawn on, or else advantages offered that would entail an impracticable ex￾penditure.88 Most important, however, were problems among the rank and Ž le. Between 1905 and 1907, simmering soldier discontent caused one-third of the infantry units in European Russia to mutiny, a Ž gure that does not include more passive forms of soldierresistance that were even more common.89 The two primary sources ofsoldier discontent support the hypothesis that rising returns to land (and hence the rising opportunity costs of military service for the peasantry) were increasing the state’s difficulty in mobilizing the peasantry. One source was growing disaffection over the burdens of military service. Soldier demands for higher pay, shorter active duty, and an end to the onerous practice of hiring out conscriptsto local landowners,for example, featured prominently in almost every mutiny.90 The other source of discon- 82. War Office 1907, 160. 83. Lieven 1983, 108–10. 84. Bushnell 1985, 2. 85. In 1874 compulsory military service was reduced from twenty years to six years active service and nine years reserves; in 1888 it was reduced to four years active service and eighteen years reserves. In response to the soldier mutinies of 1905–1907, active duty was reduced to three years, with Ž fteen years reserves. Wildman 1980, 25–27. 86. See Gatrell 1994, 297; and Jones 1988, 281. 87. Foreign Office 1908. Contrary to popular image, the nobility predominated only at the uppermost ranks of the officer corps. Wildman 1980, 20–23; also Stone 1975, 20–21; Bushnell 1981; and Fuller 1985, 13. 88. Foreign Office 1908, folio 489. See also Fuller 1985, 14. 89. Bushnell 1985, 77. 90. Bushnell 1980, 563–669, and 1985, 100–101. Economic Expansion and Security in Pre–WWI Europe 211