210 Interational Organization the Habsburg monarchy from its earlier dependence on foreign suppliers.73 The most striking development was the transformation of the Habsburg navy from a coastal defense force to a modem Mediterranean naval power.The percentage increase in Austro-Hungarian warship tonnage was second only to that of Germany,and be- tween 1910 and 1914 it outpaced all other great powers.74 Demand for new arma- ments was so strong that arms production displaced the railroads as the leading sector of the Austrian economy.75 And,in contrast to Britain,France,and Germany,but similar to Russia,there is little evidence to suggest that this expansion placed an undue strain on the Habsburg monarchy's finances.76 Russia-Mixed Effects Abundant in land and labor but scarce in capital,Russia,the theory predicts,will experience increasing difficulties recruiting labor into the military,both among its workers and among its peasantry-the holders and intensive users of land-whereas its ability to mobilize capital should grow. Different branches of Russia's military mobilized their supplies of labor from dif- ferent sectors of the economy.The navy drew labor largely from the country's urban and industrial centers,because it believed that sailors with industrial backgrounds could master the complex machinery of modern warships better than illiterate peas- ants.77 As the theory predicts,the Russian navy experienced an acute shortage of NCOs and a growing shortage of sailors.According to one British intelligence re- port,reenlistment in the navy was practically nonexistent because "there is so much demand for skilled labour in the country that nearly all...[skilled sailors]are able to obtain well paid situations on shore.7 Another report quotes a Russian naval officer who complained that inadequate pay caused"all the energetic and clever men [to] leave the navy,[whose]places are filled up by the dull and unenterprising."79 Inad- equate pay and service conditions also made naval conscripts ripe for revolutionary agitation.The navy responded by inducting only those it thought reliable,and in 1905 it even considered temporarily mothballing the fleet by dismissing all but a handpicked few.80 Yet sailors remained receptive targets of socialist agitation and played a central role in the abortive 1905 revolution.s Again,poor pay and condi- 73.See Stevenson 1996.31-32:and Sondhaus 1994. 74.Kennedy 1987.203.Between 1900 and 1914.the tonnage of the Austro-Hungarian navy grew 328 percent,and Germany's grew 335 percent.Between 1910 and 1914.Austria-Hungary's warship tonnage grew by 77 percent,Russia's 69 percent,Italy's 53 percent,Germany's 35 percent,Britain's 24 percent, and France's only 10 percent.Despite its rapid growth,Austria-Hungary's navy was still the smallest among the European great powers in 1914.This reflected Austria-Hungary's geographic position as a land-based empire whose only outlet to the sea was a short strip of the Adriatic coast. 75.See Rothenberg 1989,128;and Good 1984,166. 76.Eddie1989,857-58. 77.Lieven 1983,108;and Mawdsley 1978,6-7. 78.British Admiralty 1900.51. 79.British Admiralty 1901,10. 80.Bushnell 1985,77. 81.See Lieven 1983.108:and Mawdsley 1978.7-9.the Habsburg monarchy from its earlier dependence on foreign suppliers.73 The most striking development was the transformation of the Habsburg navy from a coastal defense force to a modern Mediterranean naval power. The percentage increase in Austro-Hungarian warship tonnage was second only to that of Germany, and be￾tween 1910 and 1914 it outpaced all other great powers.74 Demand for new arma￾ments was so strong that arms production displaced the railroads asthe leading sector of the Austrian economy.75 And, in contrast to Britain, France, and Germany, but similar to Russia, there is little evidence to suggest that this expansion placed an undue strain on the Habsburg monarchy’s Ž nances.76 Russia—Mixed Effects Abundant in land and labor but scarce in capital, Russia, the theory predicts, will experience increasing difficulties recruiting labor into the military, both among its workers and among its peasantry—the holders and intensive users of land—whereas its ability to mobilize capitalshould grow. Different branches of Russia’s military mobilized their supplies of labor from dif￾ferent sectors of the economy. The navy drew labor largely from the country’s urban and industrial centers, because it believed that sailors with industrial backgrounds could master the complex machinery of modern warships better than illiterate peas￾ants.77 As the theory predicts, the Russian navy experienced an acute shortage of NCOs and a growing shortage of sailors. According to one British intelligence re￾port, reenlistment in the navy was practically nonexistent because ‘‘there is so much demand for skilled labourin the country that nearly all . . . [skilled sailors] are able to obtain well paid situations on shore.’’ 78 Another report quotes a Russian naval officer who complained that inadequate pay caused ‘‘all the energetic and clever men [to] leave the navy, [whose] places are Ž lled up by the dull and unenterprising.’’ 79 Inad￾equate pay and service conditions also made naval conscripts ripe for revolutionary agitation. The navy responded by inducting only those it thought reliable, and in 1905 it even considered temporarily mothballing the  eet by dismissing all but a handpicked few.80 Yet sailors remained receptive targets of socialist agitation and played a central role in the abortive 1905 revolution.81 Again, poor pay and condi- 73. See Stevenson 1996, 31–32; and Sondhaus 1994. 74. Kennedy 1987, 203. Between 1900 and 1914, the tonnage of the Austro-Hungarian navy grew 328 percent, and Germany’s grew 335 percent. Between 1910 and 1914, Austria-Hungary’s warship tonnage grew by 77 percent, Russia’s 69 percent, Italy’s 53 percent, Germany’s 35 percent, Britain’s 24 percent, and France’s only 10 percent. Despite its rapid growth, Austria-Hungary’s navy was still the smallest among the European great powers in 1914. This re ected Austria-Hungary’s geographic position as a land-based empire whose only outlet to the sea was a short strip of the Adriatic coast. 75. See Rothenberg 1989, 128; and Good 1984, 166. 76. Eddie 1989, 857–58. 77. Lieven 1983, 108; and Mawdsley 1978, 6–7. 78. British Admiralty 1900, 51. 79. British Admiralty 1901, 10. 80. Bushnell 1985, 77. 81. See Lieven 1983, 108; and Mawdsley 1978, 7–9. 210 International Organization