Economic Expansion and Security in Pre-WWI Europe 209 actually conscripted a diminishing proportion of the empire's growing population each year.Although this situation increased the pool of potential military recruits over time and thus should have enabled the army to maintain fairly high personnel standards,the army instead confronted a number of severe personnel problems that caused its strength to decay steadily before the war.Compulsory military service generated considerable resentment among Austria-Hungary's workers,which the em- pire's socialists,like socialists elsewhere in labor abundant Europe,sought to exploit by making antimilitarism a central feature of their attempts to mobilize labor.63 In non-German areas,socialist antimilitarism often merged with antidynastic national- ism.64 Both raised severe doubts about the reliability of troops.The government sought to minimize these problems by drawing more heavily on conscripts from agricultural regions,but this strategy failed to provide a lasting solution.Many poten- tial conscripts shirked military duty "by the simplest method-running away,"and others often gained exemptions that allowed them to evade military service.65 The army also suffered from shortages of NCOs,despite enlistment bonuses and a guar- anteed civil service post after twelve years of service.66 Likewise,economic expan- sion before the war meant fewer officer candidates presented themselves,because the middle classes found better outlets for their talents.67 The army sought to compensate for these shortages by relying more heavily on reserve officers,but this group as a whole tended to be of much lower quality than career officers.68 The net effect was eroding military capabilities.In 1911,General Ritter von Auffenberg complained that the army needed more than 30,000 recruits to bring its cadres up to strength and characterized its training and readiness as"a farce."69 To make up the shortfall,the army cannibalized some units to keep others at strength.70 When war broke out in 1914,Austria-Hungary fielded fewer infantry battalions than it had in 1866,even though its population had grown by nearly 20 million.71 In sharp contrast to its labor problems,but as the theory predicts,Austria-Hungary appears to have increased its ability to mobilize capital.In the early 1900s it em- barked on an impressive program of rearmament,and arms expenditures rose by some 64 percent between 1906 and 1914.By 1908 the military's purchase of indus- trial products was 3.8 times its level in 1904.Hungarian industry,in particular,proved readily able to meet these very large increases in armaments orders.22 The state also shifted from foreign to domestic sources of supply for most of the navy's armament needs,suggesting that the cost of using domestic capital had fallen sufficiently to free 63.Stone 1966.102.Of course,other factors,such as the army's role in maintaining domestic order, also played a role in socialist antimilitarism. 64.Hanak1975,126-27. 65.Stone1984,333,and1975,71 66.Rothenberg 1976.151,n.89. 67.See Rothenberg 1976,151;and Deak 1990,120-21. 68.Rothenberg 1976,108. 69.Foreign Office 1911. 70.Stone1975.71.and1984.318. 71.Stone1975,101,and1984,106 72.Eddie1989,870-71.actually conscripted a diminishing proportion of the empire’s growing population each year. Although this situation increased the pool of potential military recruits over time and thus should have enabled the army to maintain fairly high personnel standards, the army instead confronted a number of severe personnel problems that caused its strength to decay steadily before the war. Compulsory military service generated considerable resentment amongAustria-Hungary’s workers, which the em￾pire’s socialists, like socialists elsewhere in labor abundant Europe, sought to exploit by making antimilitarism a central feature of their attempts to mobilize labor.63 In non-German areas, socialist antimilitarism often merged with antidynastic national￾ism.64 Both raised severe doubts about the reliability of troops. The government sought to minimize these problems by drawing more heavily on conscripts from agriculturalregions, but thisstrategy failed to provide a lasting solution.Many poten￾tial conscripts shirked military duty ‘‘by the simplest method—running away,’’ and others often gained exemptions that allowed them to evade military service.65 The army also suffered from shortages of NCOs, despite enlistment bonuses and a guar￾anteed civil service post after twelve years of service.66 Likewise, economic expan￾sion before the war meant fewer officer candidates presented themselves, because the middle classes found better outletsfor their talents.67 The army sought to compensate for these shortages by relying more heavily on reserve officers, but this group as a whole tended to be of much lower quality than career officers.68 The net effect was eroding military capabilities. In 1911, General Ritter von Auffenberg complained that the army needed more than 30,000 recruits to bring its cadres up to strength and characterized its training and readiness as ‘‘a farce.’’ 69 To make up the shortfall, the army cannibalized some units to keep others at strength.70 When war broke out in 1914, Austria-Hungary Ž elded fewer infantry battalions than it had in 1866, even though its population had grown by nearly 20 million.71 In sharp contrast to its labor problems, but as the theory predicts,Austria-Hungary appears to have increased its ability to mobilize capital. In the early 1900s it em￾barked on an impressive program of rearmament, and arms expenditures rose by some 64 percent between 1906 and 1914. By 1908 the military’s purchase of indus￾trial productswas 3.8 timesitslevel in 1904. Hungarian industry, in particular, proved readily able to meet these very large increases in armaments orders.72 The state also shifted from foreign to domestic sources of supply for most of the navy’s armament needs,suggesting that the cost of using domestic capital had fallen sufficiently to free 63. Stone 1966, 102. Of course, other factors, such as the army’s role in maintaining domestic order, also played a role in socialist antimilitarism. 64. Hanak 1975, 126–27. 65. Stone 1984, 333, and 1975, 71. 66. Rothenberg 1976, 151, n.89. 67. See Rothenberg 1976, 151; and Deak 1990, 120–21. 68. Rothenberg 1976, 108. 69. Foreign Office 1911. 70. Stone 1975, 71, and 1984, 318. 71. Stone 1975, 101, and 1984, 106. 72. Eddie 1989, 870–71. Economic Expansion and Security in Pre–WWI Europe 209