American Political Science Review (2018)112.4.1120-1124 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000539 American Political Science Association 2018 Letter Exit,Voice,and Public Reason KEVIN VALLIER Bowling Green State University ublic reason liberals appeal to public deliberation to ensure that a legal order can be publicly justified to its citizens.I argue that this voice mechanism should be supplemented by exit mech- anisms.By allowing citizens to exit legal orders they believe cannot be publicly justified,citizens can pressure states to change their laws.This exit pressure is sometimes more effective than deliberation. I explore federalism as an exit mechanism that can help public deliberation establish a publicly justified polity. he theories of deliberative democracy and pub- Both mechanisms create incentives for institutional lic reason liberalism are tightly connected.Theo- change,and so both mechanisms can be used to align rists in both camps hold that political institutions the legal order with what is publicly justified for cit- are legitimate when they are based on the reason of the izens.But as Hirschman noted.voice and exit mech- public.Deliberative democrats specify this condition anisms can limit the effectiveness of the other in by claiming that legitimate institutions make decisions bringing about social change.Thus,voice and exit based on open,equal,democratic discussion among cit- mechanisms must be carefully balanced in establishing izens in the public square.Public reason liberals hold a publicly justified polity. that legitimate institutions are those that can be justi- Introducing exit into public reason greatly alters how fied to multiple reasonable points of view,that is,to the public reason liberals should understand their view as 4号元 public as a whole.Many theorists regard the two the- well as how they should address institutional problems. oretical traditions as roughly equivalent because they They have focused exclusively on how to use deliber- equate public deliberation with the idea of public justi- ation to establish a publicly justified polity.If exit can fication;the idea of public justification in public reason also yield public justification,normative and social sci- liberalism is understood as a series of public,deliber- entific inquiry within public reason liberalism should ative acts aimed at justifying certain laws and public shift dramatically,with balanced investment in explor- policies. ing the promise of voice and exit.Even the modest But public justification and public deliberation are thesis that exit can be an effective supplement to voice distinct ideas.Public justification is a social state where is highly consequential for the dominant branch of lib- each person has sufficient moral reason to endorse the eral political theory.A second contribution of this essay 是 political power and legal order to which she is subject: is to situate public reason views within the turn to exit public deliberation is simply one method of reaching in political theory found in contemporary republican that social state.Once we grasp the distinction between (Taylor 2017)and classical liberal (Somin 2016)theo- the justification relation and the social processes by rizing;many political theories should pay more atten- which this relation is established,we can see that social tion to exit. processes other than deliberation may play an impor- I explore exit through political decentralization,es- tant role in achieving public justification. pecially federalist arrangements.By decentralizing le- In this paper,I distinguish between methods of gal authority to states or localities and allowing persons reaching public justification and argue that public rea- to move freely between them,citizens can find legal son liberals should appeal to social exit as a supplement regimes closer to what they have most reason to ac- to democratic deliberation.As Albert O.Hirschman cept.2 This self-sorting process not only moves people (1969)taught us long ago,social change can occur to legal orders they prefer,but pressures smaller polit- through voice,where persons openly express con- ical bodies to alter their laws to attract citizens,such as cerns and demand institutional change,or through exit, changing tax rates or eligibility for social services. where persons leave institutions that they dislike or dis- I'll sketch these ideas in five further sections in the agree with. hopes of pointing toward avenues for further research. eys Kevin Vallier is an Associate Professor of Philosophy.Bowling Green State University,Shatzel 310,Bowling Green,Ohio,43403 (kevinvallier@gmail.com) I am grateful to Christie Hartley,Brian Kogelmann,Andrew Lis. ter,Ilya Somin.Robert Talisse.and for comments and conversations about this piece and the issues it addresses.I am also grateful to a For instance,we can now see the benefits of employing models of reading group with my graduate students,especially for comments exit behavior to determine what can be publicly justified,such as the from Ryan Fischbeck,Ian Irwin,and Colin Manning.Several anony- Tiebout (1956)sorting model,which predicts the policy implications of movement between localities. mous referees provided me with extensive,helpful comments. 士 I apply public justification to individual laws,with Quong(2011 Received:January 23.2018:revised:May 11,2018:accepted:July 20. 273-87)and Gaus (2011,490-7),though this assumption is not neces- 2018.First published online:August 23,2018. sary to vindicate my thesis. 1120American Political Science Review (2018) 112, 4, 1120–1124 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000539 © American Political Science Association 2018 Letter Exit, Voice, and Public Reason KEVIN VALLIER Bowling Green State University Public reason liberals appeal to public deliberation to ensure that a legal order can be publicly justified to its citizens. I argue that this voice mechanism should be supplemented by exit mech￾anisms. By allowing citizens to exit legal orders they believe cannot be publicly justified, citizens can pressure states to change their laws. This exit pressure is sometimes more effective than deliberation. I explore federalism as an exit mechanism that can help public deliberation establish a publicly justified polity. The theories of deliberative democracy and pub￾lic reason liberalism are tightly connected. Theo￾rists in both camps hold that political institutions are legitimate when they are based on the reason of the public. Deliberative democrats specify this condition by claiming that legitimate institutions make decisions based on open, equal, democratic discussion among cit￾izens in the public square. Public reason liberals hold that legitimate institutions are those that can be justi￾fied to multiple reasonable points of view, that is, to the public as a whole. Many theorists regard the two the￾oretical traditions as roughly equivalent because they equate public deliberation with the idea of public justi￾fication; the idea of public justification in public reason liberalism is understood as a series of public, deliber￾ative acts aimed at justifying certain laws and public policies. But public justification and public deliberation are distinct ideas. Public justification is a social state where each person has sufficient moral reason to endorse the political power and legal order to which she is subject; public deliberation is simply one method of reaching that social state.Once we grasp the distinction between the justification relation and the social processes by which this relation is established, we can see that social processes other than deliberation may play an impor￾tant role in achieving public justification. In this paper, I distinguish between methods of reaching public justification and argue that public rea￾son liberals should appeal to social exit as a supplement to democratic deliberation. As Albert O. Hirschman (1969) taught us long ago, social change can occur through voice, where persons openly express con￾cerns and demand institutional change, or through exit, where persons leave institutions that they dislike or dis￾agree with. Kevin Vallier is an Associate Professor of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University, Shatzel 310, Bowling Green, Ohio, 43403 (kevinvallier@gmail.com). I am grateful to Christie Hartley, Brian Kogelmann, Andrew Lis￾ter, Ilya Somin, Robert Talisse, and for comments and conversations about this piece and the issues it addresses. I am also grateful to a reading group with my graduate students, especially for comments from Ryan Fischbeck, Ian Irwin, and Colin Manning. Several anony￾mous referees provided me with extensive, helpful comments. Received: January 23, 2018; revised: May 11, 2018; accepted: July 20, 2018. First published online: August 23, 2018. Both mechanisms create incentives for institutional change, and so both mechanisms can be used to align the legal order with what is publicly justified for cit￾izens. But as Hirschman noted, voice and exit mech￾anisms can limit the effectiveness of the other in bringing about social change. Thus, voice and exit mechanisms must be carefully balanced in establishing a publicly justified polity. Introducing exit into public reason greatly alters how public reason liberals should understand their view as well as how they should address institutional problems. They have focused exclusively on how to use deliber￾ation to establish a publicly justified polity. If exit can also yield public justification, normative and social sci￾entific inquiry within public reason liberalism should shift dramatically, with balanced investment in explor￾ing the promise of voice and exit.1 Even the modest thesis that exit can be an effective supplement to voice is highly consequential for the dominant branch of lib￾eral political theory.A second contribution of this essay is to situate public reason views within the turn to exit in political theory found in contemporary republican (Taylor 2017) and classical liberal (Somin 2016) theo￾rizing; many political theories should pay more atten￾tion to exit. I explore exit through political decentralization, es￾pecially federalist arrangements. By decentralizing le￾gal authority to states or localities and allowing persons to move freely between them, citizens can find legal regimes closer to what they have most reason to ac￾cept.2 This self-sorting process not only moves people to legal orders they prefer, but pressures smaller polit￾ical bodies to alter their laws to attract citizens, such as changing tax rates or eligibility for social services. I’ll sketch these ideas in five further sections in the hopes of pointing toward avenues for further research. 1 For instance, we can now see the benefits of employing models of exit behavior to determine what can be publicly justified, such as the Tiebout (1956) sorting model, which predicts the policy implications of movement between localities. 2 I apply public justification to individual laws, with Quong (2011, 273-87) and Gaus (2011, 490-7), though this assumption is not neces￾sary to vindicate my thesis. 1120 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 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