Exit.Voice.and Public Reason PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION AND PUBLIC that can bridge this space are seldom provided in the DELIBERATION literature.So it is unclear the extent to which delib- erative principles can,by themselves,establish public As noted,public reason liberals say that political power justification.Fortunately,exit can help. must be subject to a multilateral justification to be le- gitimate.Political power must be acceptable to mul- tiple reasonable points of view in a society suffused VOICE AND EXIT with incompatible views about what the good and jus- tice require (Rawls 2005,136).Thus,a political order Hirschman identified exit and voice as two approaches is only legitimate when its coercive governmental ap- to organizational reform.Organization members who op//s paratus is endorsed by the reason of each member of wish to change the decisions and structure of their or- the public.Public reason liberals have many internal ganization can exercise power either by leaving the or- disagreements,but most think public reason implies ganization or by communicating concerns and propos- principles of justification and principles of deliberation ing improvements.Consumers exercise exit when they Principles of justification specify when political power stop buying a company's product;they exercise voice is justified for each member of the public,whereas prin- when they complain to the producer.Employees ex- ciples of deliberation require citizens to engage in the ercise exit when they quit and find another job;they deliberative act of attempting to justify their preferred exercise voice when they appeal to a union to generate principles to one another(395).But the relationship better working conditions.Citizens exercise exit when between justification and deliberation has often gone they emigrate;they exercise voice when they vote. unexplored. Exit and voice have different advantages.Voice com- As I understand the idea of public reason,it is fore- municates more information and gives constituents on- vc士 most a justificatory principle;it determines when po- going political power.Exit can often be more effec- litical coercion is justified for each person.This means tive,however,given that the organization member is that deliberative principles can be grounded in justi- no longer present and so no longer subject to the or- ficatory principles in three steps:(i)establish an ap- ganization's flaws.Further,losing a member is often propriate conception of public justification,(ii)demar. a greater cost to an organization than addressing her cate the set of justificatory reasons-the reasons that complaints.Voice and exit also impact one another's can justify coercion-and (iii)argue that a deliberative effectiveness.Voice can forestall exit by giving the or- practice will ensure that genuine justificatory reasons ganization member more ways to express her dissat- largely determine the shape of the law.Only successful isfaction.Exit can discourage voice by removing the arguments for each step can connect justification and voice of those who exit,as well as discouraging those deliberation.This insight is easily missed.Again,some who would expend the effort to use voice to improve public reason liberals think public justification imme- their organization.If persons can cheaply exit institu- diately entails or is to be identified with deliberative tions,the relative costs of using voice increase;more- behavior(Cohen 1989,21). over,watching others exit may lead deliberators to be- Assuming deliberative principles can be justified, come despondent and inactive. they usually take the form of doctrines of restraint, Exit and voice mechanisms are both relevant for de- since these principles morally require citizens to re- termining the content of the law.Citizens can use voice strain themselves from offering and acting upon cer- to change the law.or they can respond to laws they dis tain kinds of reasons in political life.Restraint typi- like by leaving or no longer participating in their politi- cally requires that the reasons we offer and act upon cal institutions.Public reason liberals have overlooked in politics be shared,shareable,or accessible reasons the fact that exit can move the law into closer alignment (Vallier 2018).John Rawls(2005,450)argues that citi- with what is publicly justified.If laws are justified for zens only reason publicly when they deliberate "within each reasonable point of view,we can expect some de- a framework of what he or she sincerely regards as the gree of satisfaction and stability from the citizenry;but most reasonable political conception of justice."Amy unjustified laws are often seen as immoral,unjust,and Gutmann and Dennis Thompson(1996,55)argue that. illegitimate,and so will create dissatisfaction.Dissatis- in a deliberative democracy,citizens are duty-bound faction can be expressed and ameliorated by exit.Polit- to only use reasons that "can be shared by fellow citi- ical officials who want to keep their citizens around will zens who are similarly motivated."Micah Schwartzman change the law to meet citizens'needs,at least when of- 四 (2011,378)argues that justifications are public only ficials must compete with the officials of other polities when they are"based on reasons drawn from a family or provinces. of shared moral and political values." That said,citizens are sometimes mistaken about Gerald Gaus (2011.41)and I (Vallier 2014)allow what they have reason to do and sometimes fail to unshared and inaccessible reasons into the set of justi- act on the reasons they have.Consequently,exit mech- ficatory reasons.We also reject deliberative principles anisms may conform a polity's laws to what citizens while retaining justificatory principles,so some pub- want,not what is justified for them.This means we must lic reason liberals,at least the "convergence"theorists, eventually establish a correlation between citizens'jus- stress the deliberation-justification distinction. tificatory reasons and the reasons they act upon. Justificatory and deliberative principles are sepa- Establishing the correlation would require consider- rated by considerable logical space;and the arguments able empirical work that I lack the ability to conduct. 1121Exit, Voice, and Public Reason PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION AND PUBLIC DELIBERATION As noted, public reason liberals say that political power must be subject to a multilateral justification to be le￾gitimate. Political power must be acceptable to mul￾tiple reasonable points of view in a society suffused with incompatible views about what the good and jus￾tice require (Rawls 2005, 136). Thus, a political order is only legitimate when its coercive governmental ap￾paratus is endorsed by the reason of each member of the public. Public reason liberals have many internal disagreements, but most think public reason implies principles of justification and principles of deliberation. Principles of justification specify when political power is justified for each member of the public, whereas prin￾ciples of deliberation require citizens to engage in the deliberative act of attempting to justify their preferred principles to one another (395). But the relationship between justification and deliberation has often gone unexplored. As I understand the idea of public reason, it is fore￾most a justificatory principle; it determines when po￾litical coercion is justified for each person. This means that deliberative principles can be grounded in justi￾ficatory principles in three steps: (i) establish an ap￾propriate conception of public justification, (ii) demar￾cate the set of justificatory reasons—the reasons that can justify coercion—and (iii) argue that a deliberative practice will ensure that genuine justificatory reasons largely determine the shape of the law. Only successful arguments for each step can connect justification and deliberation. This insight is easily missed. Again, some public reason liberals think public justification imme￾diately entails or is to be identified with deliberative behavior (Cohen 1989, 21). Assuming deliberative principles can be justified, they usually take the form of doctrines of restraint, since these principles morally require citizens to re￾strain themselves from offering and acting upon cer￾tain kinds of reasons in political life. Restraint typi￾cally requires that the reasons we offer and act upon in politics be shared, shareable, or accessible reasons (Vallier 2018). John Rawls (2005, 450) argues that citi￾zens only reason publicly when they deliberate “within a framework of what he or she sincerely regards as the most reasonable political conception of justice.” Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996, 55) argue that, in a deliberative democracy, citizens are duty-bound to only use reasons that “can be shared by fellow citi￾zens who are similarly motivated.”Micah Schwartzman (2011, 378) argues that justifications are public only when they are “based on reasons drawn from a family of shared moral and political values.” Gerald Gaus (2011, 41) and I (Vallier 2014) allow unshared and inaccessible reasons into the set of justi￾ficatory reasons. We also reject deliberative principles while retaining justificatory principles, so some pub￾lic reason liberals, at least the “convergence” theorists, stress the deliberation-justification distinction. Justificatory and deliberative principles are sepa￾rated by considerable logical space; and the arguments that can bridge this space are seldom provided in the literature. So it is unclear the extent to which delib￾erative principles can, by themselves, establish public justification. Fortunately, exit can help. VOICE AND EXIT Hirschman identified exit and voice as two approaches to organizational reform. Organization members who wish to change the decisions and structure of their or￾ganization can exercise power either by leaving the or￾ganization or by communicating concerns and propos￾ing improvements. Consumers exercise exit when they stop buying a company’s product; they exercise voice when they complain to the producer. Employees ex￾ercise exit when they quit and find another job; they exercise voice when they appeal to a union to generate better working conditions. Citizens exercise exit when they emigrate; they exercise voice when they vote. Exit and voice have different advantages. Voice com￾municates more information and gives constituents on￾going political power. Exit can often be more effec￾tive, however, given that the organization member is no longer present and so no longer subject to the or￾ganization’s flaws. Further, losing a member is often a greater cost to an organization than addressing her complaints. Voice and exit also impact one another’s effectiveness. Voice can forestall exit by giving the or￾ganization member more ways to express her dissat￾isfaction. Exit can discourage voice by removing the voice of those who exit, as well as discouraging those who would expend the effort to use voice to improve their organization. If persons can cheaply exit institu￾tions, the relative costs of using voice increase; more￾over, watching others exit may lead deliberators to be￾come despondent and inactive. Exit and voice mechanisms are both relevant for de￾termining the content of the law. Citizens can use voice to change the law, or they can respond to laws they dis￾like by leaving or no longer participating in their politi￾cal institutions. Public reason liberals have overlooked the fact that exit can move the law into closer alignment with what is publicly justified. If laws are justified for each reasonable point of view, we can expect some de￾gree of satisfaction and stability from the citizenry; but unjustified laws are often seen as immoral, unjust, and illegitimate, and so will create dissatisfaction. Dissatis￾faction can be expressed and ameliorated by exit. Polit￾ical officials who want to keep their citizens around will change the law to meet citizens’ needs, at least when of￾ficials must compete with the officials of other polities or provinces. That said, citizens are sometimes mistaken about what they have reason to do and sometimes fail to act on the reasons they have. Consequently, exit mech￾anisms may conform a polity’s laws to what citizens want, not what is justified for them.This means we must eventually establish a correlation between citizens’ jus￾tificatory reasons and the reasons they act upon. Establishing the correlation would require consider￾able empirical work that I lack the ability to conduct. 1121 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:56:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000539