The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 33 solve many,if not most conflicts.Finally,even in those cases where force is ultimately introduced,the lack of urgency that was associated with many cold war crises means that states are likely to apply economic sanctions as an early method of influence in a conflict.Thus sanctions are often an im- portant intermediate form of statecraft that complement the use of force. Despite some notable advances in the past decade,our understanding of economic sanctions remains limited.One reason for this is that economic sanctions are principally discussed in aggregate terms.Typically,references are made to the sender,the target,and the sanction.This article argues that disaggregating these elements will enhance our understanding of how eco- nomic sanctions work.A microfoundations approach looks not at eco- aunf nomic sanctions in general,but at the differences between various forms of economic statecraft.Instead of considering how those sanctions hurt the target state,this approach emphasizes how groups within the target are af- fected differentially,and how these consequences change with the form of statecraft chosen.2 Further study of these microfoundations will increase the understanding of when and why economic sanctions will be successful.We must take care, however,with the issue of“success'”and“failure'”regarding economic 1.See David Baldwin,Economic Stateorgf (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1985); Klaus Knorr,The Power of Nations (New York:Basic Books,1975);Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J.Schott,and Kimberly Ann Elliot,Economic Sanctions Reconridered,vol.1,History and Current Polisy,vol.2,Supplemental Case Histories,2nd ed.Washington,D.C:Institute for Inter- national Economics,1990);David Leyton-Brown,cd.,The Utility of International Economie Sanctions New York:St.Martin's,1987);Robin Renwick,Economic Sanctions (Cambridge: Harvard Studies in International Affairs,no.45,1981);Margaret P.Doxey,International Sane- tions in Contemporary Perspective (New York:St.Martin's,1987);and Doxey,Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (New York:Oxford University Press,1980);M.S.Daoudi and M. S.Dajani,Economic Sanctions:Ideals and Experience (London:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1983). This is not to say that there has been no disaggregation with regard to the study of eco- nomic sanctions.Although all of these works aggregate targets and senders,some distinc- tions between the forms of sanctions has been considered.Baldwin and Knorr each have separate chapters on aid and trade,although these are primarily in the service of general ar- guments regarding conomic statecraft.Hufbauer,Schott and Elliot distinguish between 'cxport,”“import''and“financial'”sanctions,but the analysis on this issue is limited:see Hirtory and Current Poligy,70-71,also the table on p.106 which notes greater success associ- ated with financial sanctions.In general,all of the studies contain passing references to ideas associated with disaggregation,but pause only momentarily to consider the consequences: see Leyton-Brown,The Utility of International Economic Sanctions,297,Renwick,Economic Sanc- io,37,Doxey,International Sanctions in Conter帅prary Perspectit说，37；Doxey,.Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement,145;Daoudi and Dajani,Economic Sanctions:Ideals and Experience, 164. 2.The sender state can also be disaggregated.This would show how different domestic political structures affect the ability of states to introduce certain types of sanctions.This paper will focus on disaggregating sanctions and targets,which will explain when sanctions will have their greatest chance of success,and not dwell on those factors which lead states to introduce sanctions in the first place.The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 3 3 solve many, if not most conflicts. Finally, even in those cases where force is ultimately introduced, the lack of urgency that was associated with many cold war crises means that states are likely to apply economic sanctions as an early method of influence in a conflict. Thus sanctions are often an im￾portant intermediate form of statecraft that complement the use of force. Despite some notable advances in the past decade, our understanding of economic sanctions remains limited. One reason for this is that economic sanctions are principally discussed in aggregate terms. Typically, references are made to the sender, the target, and the sanction.1 This article argues that disaggregating these elements will enhance our understanding of how eco￾nomic sanctions work. A microfoundations approach looks not at eco￾nomic sanctions in general, but at the differences between various forms of economic statecraft. Instead of considering how those sanctions hurt the target state, this approach emphasizes how groups within the target are af￾fected differentially, and how these consequences change with the form of statecraft chosen.2 Further study of these microfoundations will increase the understanding of when and why economic sanctions will be successful. We must take care, however, with the issue of "success" and "failure" regarding economic 1. See David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, vol. 1, History and Current Policy, vol. 2, Supplemental Case Histories, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Inter￾national Economics, 1990); David Leyton-Brown, ed., The Utility of International Economic Sanctions (New York: St. Martin's, 1987); Robin Renwick, Economic Sanctions (Cambridge: Harvard Studies in International Affairs, no. 45, 1981); Margaret P. Doxey, International Sanc￾tions in Contemporary Perspective (New York: St. Martin's, 1987); and Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); M. S. Daoudi and M. S. Dajani, Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983). This is not to say that there has been no disaggregation with regard to the study of eco￾nomic sanctions. Although all of these works aggregate targets and senders, some distinc￾tions between the forms of sanctions has been considered. Baldwin and Knorr each have separate chapters on aid and trade, although these are primarily in the service of general ar￾guments regarding economic statecraft. Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot distinguish between "export," "import" and "financial" sanctions, but the analysis on this issue is limited: see History and Current Policy, 70-71, also the table on p. 106 which notes greater success associ￾ated with financial sanctions. In general, all of the studies contain passing references to ideas associated with disaggregation, but pause only momentarily to consider the consequences: see Leyton-Brown, The Utility of International Economic Sanctions, 297, Renwick, Economic Sanc￾tions, 37, Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective, 37; Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, 145; Daoudi and Dajani, Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience, 164. 2. The sender state can also be disaggregated. This would show how different domestic political structures affect the ability of states to introduce certain types of sanctions. This paper will focus on disaggregating sanctions and targets, which will explain when sanctions will have their greatest chance of success, and not dwell on those factors which lead states to introduce sanctions in the first place. Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013