34 SECURITY STUDIES 6,no.3 statecraft.This article is an exercise in comparative statics:the influence of changes in specific variables is considered,ceteris paribus.Consequentially, results will not show that certain factors will cause sanctions to work,but rather that the presence or absence of those factors will make success more or less likely.That this must be the case is shown by a consideration of the two principal sets of variables which this analysis holds constant. First,and most importantly,the context of the influence attempt is held constant.Any study of sanctions post-Baldwin's Economic Statecraf cannot ignore three contextual variables in evaluating success and failure.These are ≡ the full range of goals for which sanctions were enacted,the costs and benefits of sanctions compared with other forms of coercion,and the value that the target places on continued defiance.The fill range of goal refers to the fact that a state may initiate sanctions not simply to compel action on the part of the target,but to communicate its preferences,support allies, deter others from engaging in similar activity,and dissuade the target from S expanding its objectionable activity.Sanctions may also be designed to punish,weaken,distract,or contain the adversary.Thus sanctions may fail to move the target,but may be successful along a number of other dimen- sions,complement other policies,and remain an appropriate policy instru- 5 ment.3 Attention to comparalive costr serves as a reminder that in choosing policy,statesmen must compare the costs,both political and economic,of introducing specific techniques with the benefits of expected outcomes.It must be remembered that the purpose of all forms of statecraft is to rey3ueyS] achieve political objectives.There will be many cases,then,where the costs of the use of force will outweigh the political benefits of achieving the de- sired outcome.In those cases,the use of force can never work.Success, 名 therefore,can only be calculated with regard to costs and benefits,and as compared with other options.Finally,the value the target places on continued defance eliminates the possibility of absolute claims regarding the success and failure of economic sanctions(or,for that matter,other forms of coer- cion).A given sanction(for example,the suspension of $500 million in aid) will be successful in some cases and unsuccessful in others,largely depend- ing on the target's ranking of the value of defiance and the cost of the sanction.Although it can be said that a suspension of $500 million in aid will be less effective than a $1 billion suspension and more effective than a $250 million suspension,ceteris paribus,no absolute claims can be made 3.The question for statecraft is not "will these measures work"(that is,change target behavior)but rather,"is my strategic position improved if I introduce these measures."34 SECURITY STUDIES 6, no. 3 statecraft. This article is an exercise in comparative statics: the influence of changes in specific variables is considered, ceteris paribus. Consequentially, results will not show that certain factors will cause sanctions to work, but rather that the presence or absence of those factors will make success more or less likely. That this must be the case is shown by a consideration of the two principal sets of variables which this analysis holds constant. First, and most importantly, the context of the influence attempt is held constant. Any study of sanctions post-Baldwin's Economic Statecraft cannot ignore three contextual variables in evaluating success and failure. These are the full range of goals for which sanctions were enacted, the costs and benefits of sanctions compared with other forms of coercion, and the value that the target places on continued defiance. The. full range of goals refers to the fact that a state may initiate sanctions not simply to compel action on the part of the target, but to communicate its preferences, support allies, deter others from engaging in similar activity, and dissuade the target from expanding its objectionable activity. Sanctions may also be designed to punish, weaken, distract, or contain the adversary. Thus sanctions may fail to move the target, but may be successful along a number of other dimen￾sions, complement other policies, and remain an appropriate policy instru￾ment.3 Attention to comparative costs serves as a reminder that in choosing policy, statesmen must compare the costs, both political and economic, of introducing specific techniques wim the benefits of expected outcomes. It must be remembered that the purpose of all forms of statecraft is to achieve political objectives. There will be many cases, then, where the costs of the use of force will outweigh the political benefits of achieving the de￾sired outcome. In those cases, the use of force can never work. Success, therefore, can only be calculated with regard to costs and benefits, and as compared with other options. Finally, the value the target places on continued defiance eliminates the possibility of absolute claims regarding the success and failure of economic sanctions (or, for that matter, other forms of coer￾cion). A given sanction (for example, the suspension of $500 million in aid) will be successful in some cases and unsuccessful in others, largely depend￾ing on the target's ranking of the value of defiance and the cost of the sanction. Although it can be said that a suspension of $500 million in aid will be less effective than a $1 billion suspension and more effective than a $250 million suspension, ceteris paribus, no absolute claims can be made 3. The question for statecraft is not "will these measures 'work'" (that is, change target behavior) but rather, "is my strategic position improved if I introduce these measures." Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013