The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 35 about the success of cutting off any particular level of aid.Solely as a con- sequence of the goal of the sanction,there will be cases when a $250 mil- lion suspension will be successful and a $1 billion suspension unsuccessful. A second group of variables is also held constant.There are a number of identities,which have been explored by many scholars but can be associ- ated with the methodology of Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliot's study Economi Sanctions Reconsidered.Three principal identities should be noted:those asso- ciated with size,exposure,and cooperation.5 Size simply means that the greater the disparity of power between the sender and the target,the greater the prospects for success.(Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliot,for example,use a 5100 10:1 ratio of target/sender GNP as a rule of thumb for potential sanction- ers.)Exposure measures the relative vulnerability of targets:with trade sanctions,this would mean that chances of success are increased the larger the target's ratio of trade/GNP.6 Cooperation refers to the fact that (once again,ceteris paribus),the more states that support the sanctions effort against the target,the greater the likelihood that the target will ultimately capitulate.As with the set of contextual variables,these influences are taken as given in the analysis below.?Together they explain why only relative (or comparative static)as opposed to absolute conclusions can be drawn about 5 the prospects for the success of economic sanctions.They also underscore the need to reconceptualize sanctions as a form of statecraft,just like the Suojoelf use of force.As with force,greater attention needs to be paid to practical questions of tactics,strategy,and contingency,and less on sweeping state- ments of whether statecraft works. reyueyS] 名 4.As one reviewer pointed out,even the apparent truism that a $1 billion suspension will be more "effective"than a $250 million one requires closer scrutiny.The larger sanction might result in a change of government,but the goal of the sanction could be to change the behavior of the existing regime without forcing it from power.In that case,the smaller sanc- tion would be more effective.This argument illustrates two fundamental aspects of the mi- crofoundations approach:the need to differentiate between the force of a sanction and its political consequence,and the difficulty of making noncontextualized claims about the pros- pects for success or failure of a given policy instrument. 5.See also Knorr,Power of Nations,156;P.A.G.van Bergeijk,"Success and Failure of Economic Sanctions,"Kyelos 42,no.3 (1989):385-404,esp.398;and Lisa Martin, "Credibility,Costs,and Institutions:Cooperation on Economic Sanctions,"WVorld Politics 45, no.3 (April 1993):406-32.For comparison of Baldwin and Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliot,see Stephanie Lenway,"Between War and Commerce:Economic Sanctions as a Tool of State- craft,"International Organization 42,no.2(spring 1988):397-426. 6.With aid,the target government's exposure can be measured by comparing the assis- tance with overall state revenue. 7.These variables are held constant to enhance the focus of this paper.Complementary paths of inquiry could explore the relationship between these variables and different forms of sanctions.Cooperation,for example,might be more important with trade sanctions than with sanctions involving aid or monetary relations.The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 35 about the success of cutting off any particular level of aid.4 Solely as a con￾sequence of the goal of the sanction, there will be cases when a $250 mil￾lion suspension will be successful and a $1 billion suspension unsuccessful. A second group of variables is also held constant. There are a number of identities, which have been explored by many scholars but can be associ￾ated with the methodology of Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot's study Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Three principal identities should be noted: those asso￾ciated with size, exposure, and cooperation.5 Size simply means that the greater the disparity of power between the sender and the target, the greater the prospects for success. (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, for example, use a 10:1 ratio of target/sender GNP as a rule of thumb for potential sanction￾ers.) Exposure measures the relative vulnerability of targets: with trade sanctions, this would mean that chances of success are increased the larger the target's ratio of trade/GNP.6 Cooperation refers to the fact that (once again, ceteris paribus), the more states that support the sanctions effort against the target, the greater the likelihood that the target will ultimately capitulate. As with the set of contextual variables, these influences are taken as given in the analysis below.7 Together they explain why only relative (or comparative static) as opposed to absolute conclusions can be drawn about the prospects for the success of economic sanctions. They also underscore the need to reconceptualize sanctions as a form of statecraft, just like the use of force. As with force, greater attention needs to be paid to practical questions of tactics, strategy, and contingency, and less on sweeping state￾ments of whether statecraft works. 4. As one reviewer pointed out, even the apparent truism that a $1 billion suspension will be more "effective" than a $250 million one requires closer scrutiny. The larger sanction might result in a change of government, but the goal of the sanction could be to change the behavior of the existing regime without forcing it from power. In that case, the smaller sanc￾tion would be more effective. This argument illustrates two fundamental aspects of the mi￾crofoundations approach: the need to differentiate between the force of a sanction and its political consequence, and the difficulty of making noncontextualized claims about the pros￾pects for success or failure of a given policy instrument. 5. See also Knorr, Power of Nations, 156; P. A. G. van Bergeijk, "Success and Failure of Economic Sanctions," Kyklos 42, no. 3 (1989): 385-404, esp. 398; and Lisa Martin,4 "Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions," World Politics 45, no. 3 (April 1993): 406-32. For comparison of Baldwin and Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, see Stephanie Lenway, "Between War and Commerce: Economic Sanctions as a Tool of State￾craft," International Organisation 42, no. 2 (spring 1988): 397-426. 6. With aid, the target government's exposure can be measured by comparing the assis￾tance with overall state revenue. 7. These variables are held constant to enhance the focus of this paper. Complementary paths of inquiry could explore the relationship between these variables and different forms of sanctions. Cooperation, for example, might be more important with trade sanctions than with sanctions involving aid or monetary relations. Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013