concludes,"Racial equality had been an unspoken problem across the political spectrum that Britain,rather than of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance since its beginning."9 accommodating Berlin,had to respond firmly to Germany's naval program. Anglo-German Naval Rivalry,1898-1914 With the Reichstag's passage of the First Naval Law in the Contrary to Tirpitz'expectations,Britain did not leave the spring of 1898,Germany began building a battle fleet, bulk of its battle fleet in peripheral waters as Germany's pursuing Weltpolitik through turning its economic might building program proceeded.Instead,faced with a threat to into geopolitical sway.The Second Naval Law,passed two the home islands,London began pulling its battleships years later,set fleet strength at thirty-eight battleships, from imperial stations to concentrate them in local waters. giving Germany a world-class fleet and ensuring that Indeed,the alliance with Japan and rapprochement with the Germany's building program would upset the stable United States were important diplomatic vehicles balance of power in Europe that had existed since the end facilitating this redistribution of the fleet.Moreover,Britain of the Napoleonic Wars.Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz,the embarked on its own building program to ensure that the chief architect of Germany's buildup,did not intend on Royal Navy would retain a comfortable margin of overtaking Britain as the world's premier naval power. superiority over the German fleet.As Paul Kennedy Rather,he envisaged that the navy would serve as a"risk comments,"Tirpitz'calculations that Germany could fleet"-a means of compelling Britain and the other major develop a formidable naval force in home waters without powers to defer to German dominance in Europe.While the British either noticing it or being able to respond to it Britain's fleet would be dispersed throughout its empire, was flawed from the start."22 Germany would concentrate its boats in the North Sea, thereby enjoying the influence and strategic advantages that So began the naval rivalry between Germany and Britain would accompany naval primacy in Europe.As Tirpitz that would ultimately culminate in World War I.Mounting wrote,"The lever of our Weltpolitik was the North Sea;it antagonism between the two powers was driven principally influenced the entire globe without us needing to be by geopolitical interest;Germany's bid to expand its directly engaged in any other place." strategic reach posed an unacceptable threat to Britain's national interests.Nonetheless,a number of other The British initially reacted cautiously to Germany's naval considerations made the escalation of hostility particularly ambitions,uncertain whether such geopolitical stirrings difficult to arrest.The British were coming to see Germany represented an opportunity or a threat.Britain and as a formidable economic competitor and took umbrage at Germany had strong economic ties and generally good the tariffs Berlin implemented to protect its agricultural relations,prompting London to consider the possibility of and industrial sectors.As tensions mounted,ideological an Anglo-German alliance-a tempting option in the face differences -in particular,British discomfort with of the Franco-Russian coupling that had taken shape in Germany's illiberal politics-became part of the "mental 1892."From 1902 onwards,however,British attitudes furniture"that fueled mutual antagonism on both sides. toward the growth of the German fleet hardened.German And popular sentiment hemmed in leaders on both sides. support for the Boers in their war with Britain helped fuel The Anglophobia and nationalism sold to the German London's distrust of Berlin.Influenced by the mainstream public to disarm the left and win support for naval funding press,anti-German sentiment also spread widely among eventually entrapped officials in Berlin,making it politically the public.And the scope of Tirpitz'program ensured that perilous for them to step back from competition with the German fleet would pose a serious threat to the security Britain.Although Britain lacked Germany's "massive of the home islands.By 1903,a consensus had formed government-instigated propaganda,"officials in London NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 6new america foundation page 6 concludes, “Racial equality had been an unspoken problem of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance since its beginning.”19 Anglo-German Naval Rivalry, 1898-1914 With the Reichstag’s passage of the First Naval Law in the spring of 1898, Germany began building a battle fleet, pursuing Weltpolitik through turning its economic might into geopolitical sway. The Second Naval Law, passed two years later, set fleet strength at thirty-eight battleships, giving Germany a world-class fleet and ensuring that Germany’s building program would upset the stable balance of power in Europe that had existed since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the chief architect of Germany’s buildup, did not intend on overtaking Britain as the world’s premier naval power. Rather, he envisaged that the navy would serve as a “risk fleet” – a means of compelling Britain and the other major powers to defer to German dominance in Europe. While Britain’s fleet would be dispersed throughout its empire, Germany would concentrate its boats in the North Sea, thereby enjoying the influence and strategic advantages that would accompany naval primacy in Europe. As Tirpitz wrote, “The lever of our Weltpolitik was the North Sea; it influenced the entire globe without us needing to be directly engaged in any other place.”20 The British initially reacted cautiously to Germany’s naval ambitions, uncertain whether such geopolitical stirrings represented an opportunity or a threat. Britain and Germany had strong economic ties and generally good relations, prompting London to consider the possibility of an Anglo-German alliance – a tempting option in the face of the Franco-Russian coupling that had taken shape in 1892.21 From 1902 onwards, however, British attitudes toward the growth of the German fleet hardened. German support for the Boers in their war with Britain helped fuel London’s distrust of Berlin. Influenced by the mainstream press, anti-German sentiment also spread widely among the public. And the scope of Tirpitz’ program ensured that the German fleet would pose a serious threat to the security of the home islands. By 1903, a consensus had formed across the political spectrum that Britain, rather than accommodating Berlin, had to respond firmly to Germany’s naval program. Contrary to Tirpitz’ expectations, Britain did not leave the bulk of its battle fleet in peripheral waters as Germany’s building program proceeded. Instead, faced with a threat to the home islands, London began pulling its battleships from imperial stations to concentrate them in local waters. Indeed, the alliance with Japan and rapprochement with the United States were important diplomatic vehicles facilitating this redistribution of the fleet. Moreover, Britain embarked on its own building program to ensure that the Royal Navy would retain a comfortable margin of superiority over the German fleet. As Paul Kennedy comments, “Tirpitz’ calculations that Germany could develop a formidable naval force in home waters without the British either noticing it or being able to respond to it was flawed from the start.”22 So began the naval rivalry between Germany and Britain that would ultimately culminate in World War I. Mounting antagonism between the two powers was driven principally by geopolitical interest; Germany’s bid to expand its strategic reach posed an unacceptable threat to Britain’s national interests. Nonetheless, a number of other considerations made the escalation of hostility particularly difficult to arrest. The British were coming to see Germany as a formidable economic competitor and took umbrage at the tariffs Berlin implemented to protect its agricultural and industrial sectors. As tensions mounted, ideological differences – in particular, British discomfort with Germany’s illiberal politics – became part of the “mental furniture” that fueled mutual antagonism on both sides. And popular sentiment hemmed in leaders on both sides. The Anglophobia and nationalism sold to the German public to disarm the left and win support for naval funding eventually entrapped officials in Berlin, making it politically perilous for them to step back from competition with Britain. Although Britain lacked Germany’s “massive government-instigated propaganda,” officials in London