faced considerable pressure from the public and the press -the border of Venezuela,fishing rights in the Barents Sea, to block Germany's rising ambition.23 the Panama Canal,the border between Alaska and Canada -dampening rivalry and sending signals of benign intent. In 1907,Britain joined France and Russia in fashioning the To be sure,Britain was motivated by necessity,not Triple Entente,a pact meant to hem in German ambition. altruism;it faced a serious strategic deficiency and needed This countervailing coalition fueled fears of encirclement in to reduce imperial commitments,prompting it to pursue Germany.Berlin reacted by increasing its armaments, rapprochement with the United States.But it was London's which only escalated competition with the Triple Entente- practice of strategic restraint and Washington's readiness to and especially with Britain.Although the London and reciprocate that transformed the Anglo-American Berlin at times explored the possibility of a negotiated relationship from enmity to amity.Britain was then able to agreement to end the spiraling naval race,such efforts were cede naval primacy in the western Atlantic to a partner repeatedly foiled by hardliners on both sides. rather than retreat from the region under pressure from an adversary.Diplomacy cleared the way for strategic Britain did not want war,but took prudent steps to balance retrenchment. against Germany's growing battle fleet.Germany also did not want war,but Berlin eventually decided it needed to go The case of Britain and Japan demonstrates that strategic to war to break out of the encircling coalition that its naval cooperation,even if it entails formal alliance,does not have buildup had itself triggered.To be sure,Germany began its the same pacifying effects as the practice of reciprocal naval buildup to increase its geopolitical sway.But when it restraint.Britain and Japan coordinated fleet strength and took the decision for war in the summer of 1914,Berlin was naval operations,but each viewed the other side as motivated by an insecurity of its own making,not a boastful pursuing its own self-interest,not joint gains.Britain saw confidence in its ability to prevail.Germany from 1898 Japan as taking advantage of the alliance to expand its onwards set in motion a set of actions and reactions that led strategic reach in East Asia.Japan saw Britain as using the to an unintended hegemonic war. alliance to defend its imperial interests in the Far East and Indian Ocean.Absent the concessions and mutual The Lessons of History accommodation that indicate benign intent,strategic As the twentieth century opened,Britain faced the cooperation did not deepen into durable rapprochement. unenviable task of overhauling its grand strategy to respond to the simultaneous rise of the United States,Japan,and In the case of Britain and Germany,neither side practiced Germany.Britain succeeded in ending geopolitical rivalry strategic restraint;instead,a classic insecurity spiral set in, with the United States,but soon found itself at war with with a tit-for-tat naval rivalry leading to the escalation of Germany and,later,Japan.A number of important hostility.British and German elites both appreciated the historical lessons emerge from the divergent trajectories of potential for diplomacy and arms control to forestall the Britain's relations with these three rising powers. naval race.But domestic pressures on both sides virtually precluded conciliatory moves.Once the naval race had Strategic restraint and mutual accommodation begun,a combination of strategic imperative and domestic The critical ingredient making possible lasting constraints produced a self-reinforcing dynamic.It was this rapprochement between the United States and Great dynamic that led to Germany's self-encirclement and, Britain was the reciprocal practice of strategic restraint. ultimately,to a hegemonic war that neither Germany nor Both parties were willing to withhold their power and give Britain wanted or intended. ground on issues over which there were conflicts of interest NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 7new america foundation page 7 faced considerable pressure from the public and the press to block Germany’s rising ambition.23 In 1907, Britain joined France and Russia in fashioning the Triple Entente, a pact meant to hem in German ambition. This countervailing coalition fueled fears of encirclement in Germany. Berlin reacted by increasing its armaments, which only escalated competition with the Triple Entente – and especially with Britain. Although the London and Berlin at times explored the possibility of a negotiated agreement to end the spiraling naval race, such efforts were repeatedly foiled by hardliners on both sides. Britain did not want war, but took prudent steps to balance against Germany’s growing battle fleet. Germany also did not want war, but Berlin eventually decided it needed to go to war to break out of the encircling coalition that its naval buildup had itself triggered. To be sure, Germany began its naval buildup to increase its geopolitical sway. But when it took the decision for war in the summer of 1914, Berlin was motivated by an insecurity of its own making, not a boastful confidence in its ability to prevail. Germany from 1898 onwards set in motion a set of actions and reactions that led to an unintended hegemonic war. The Lessons of History As the twentieth century opened, Britain faced the unenviable task of overhauling its grand strategy to respond to the simultaneous rise of the United States, Japan, and Germany. Britain succeeded in ending geopolitical rivalry with the United States, but soon found itself at war with Germany and, later, Japan. A number of important historical lessons emerge from the divergent trajectories of Britain’s relations with these three rising powers. Strategic restraint and mutual accommodation The critical ingredient making possible lasting rapprochement between the United States and Great Britain was the reciprocal practice of strategic restraint. Both parties were willing to withhold their power and give ground on issues over which there were conflicts of interest – the border of Venezuela, fishing rights in the Barents Sea, the Panama Canal, the border between Alaska and Canada – dampening rivalry and sending signals of benign intent. To be sure, Britain was motivated by necessity, not altruism; it faced a serious strategic deficiency and needed to reduce imperial commitments, prompting it to pursue rapprochement with the United States. But it was London’s practice of strategic restraint and Washington’s readiness to reciprocate that transformed the Anglo-American relationship from enmity to amity. Britain was then able to cede naval primacy in the western Atlantic to a partner rather than retreat from the region under pressure from an adversary. Diplomacy cleared the way for strategic retrenchment. The case of Britain and Japan demonstrates that strategic cooperation, even if it entails formal alliance, does not have the same pacifying effects as the practice of reciprocal restraint. Britain and Japan coordinated fleet strength and naval operations, but each viewed the other side as pursuing its own self-interest, not joint gains. Britain saw Japan as taking advantage of the alliance to expand its strategic reach in East Asia. Japan saw Britain as using the alliance to defend its imperial interests in the Far East and Indian Ocean. Absent the concessions and mutual accommodation that indicate benign intent, strategic cooperation did not deepen into durable rapprochement. In the case of Britain and Germany, neither side practiced strategic restraint; instead, a classic insecurity spiral set in, with a tit-for-tat naval rivalry leading to the escalation of hostility. British and German elites both appreciated the potential for diplomacy and arms control to forestall the naval race. But domestic pressures on both sides virtually precluded conciliatory moves. Once the naval race had begun, a combination of strategic imperative and domestic constraints produced a self-reinforcing dynamic. It was this dynamic that led to Germany’s self-encirclement and, ultimately, to a hegemonic war that neither Germany nor Britain wanted or intended