Transparency balanced against Germany largely for reasons of Britain and the United States were able to move from geopolitical interest-and elites then appropriated critiques mutual suspicion to a shared sense of trust in part because of the German regime in building support for the transparency afforded by democracy afforded each party confrontational policies,increases in defense spending,and the ability to discern the broader motives of the other.The preparations for a continental commitment.As Ido Oren motives behind changes in British policy toward the United has argued,Britain attributed malign character to German States were on show in Parliament and in the lively British institutions as a product of the country's foreign policy press.British elites had similarly unchecked access to policy behavior,not vice versa.24 debates in the United States.Such transparency enabled both sides to be confident of the benign intentions of the Managing Domestic Politics other;concessions were correctly interpreted as Managing the domestic politics of relations between investments in amity rather than as ruses or idiosyncratic reigning hegemon and rising challenger is critical to aberrations in policy.Accordingly,over time,the attribution orchestrating a peaceful power transition.In the Anglo- of benign intent became dispositional,not situational, American case,elites in both Britain and the United States clearing the way for the onset of rapprochement. laid the domestic foundations for rapprochement through explicit efforts to shape public discourse.As rapprochement The lack of transparency was a major impediment to advanced and moved from the realm of high politics to managing relations between Britain and Japan.British broader societal engagement,officials in both countries elites consistently complained about the closed nature of propagated narratives of friendship,shared heritage,and decision making in Tokyo and their inability to discern cultural commonality.Leaders and opinion makers started Japanese intentions.As mentioned above,the British to refer to the prospect of Anglo-American conflict as tended to see the Japanese as an "enigma."Absent a clearer tantamount to a civil war or "fratricide."These changes in sense of Japanese intentions,the British tended to interpret discourse were important steps in building domestic Japanese behavior as motivated by self-interest,not shared support for rapprochement and undercutting domestic strategic objectives.The lack of transparency helped ensure opposition to ongoing efforts to reach out to the adversary. that the alliance did not develop beyond a marriage of Even so,the British government hid from the public certain convenience. moves-such as the dropping of the United States from the two-power standard used to set the size of the battle fleet- Regime type and transparency had a mixed impact on to avoid a nationalist backlash.And the U.S.Senate shot Anglo-German relations.Although Germany was not a down a general arbitration treaty signed by the United liberal democracy,British elites did not complain about States and Britain early in 1897-a sign of domestic insufficient access to German politics and the opposition to reconciliation and of the need to move slowly considerations shaping policy.Indeed,the aggressive in pursuing Anglo-American rapprochement. strains of nationalism affecting debates in the Reichstag and shaping public attitudes were on full display-one of The Anglo-Japanese alliance enjoyed much less the reasons London was worried about German intentions. prominence in both British and Japanese politics;there was In addition,the illiberal nature of the German government little effort by either government to engage domestic did ultimately come to influence Britain's decision to react constituencies or broader publics.In the words of Ian Nish, firmly to the rise of German power.However,the British the Anglo-Japanese pact remained a "secretariat alliance."25 were not basing their reaction to Germany's growing power In Britain,elites deliberately gave the alliance a low profile, on the nature of its domestic institutions.Rather,Britain fearing parliamentary and public opposition to British NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 8new america foundation page 8 Transparency Britain and the United States were able to move from mutual suspicion to a shared sense of trust in part because the transparency afforded by democracy afforded each party the ability to discern the broader motives of the other. The motives behind changes in British policy toward the United States were on show in Parliament and in the lively British press. British elites had similarly unchecked access to policy debates in the United States. Such transparency enabled both sides to be confident of the benign intentions of the other; concessions were correctly interpreted as investments in amity rather than as ruses or idiosyncratic aberrations in policy. Accordingly, over time, the attribution of benign intent became dispositional, not situational, clearing the way for the onset of rapprochement. The lack of transparency was a major impediment to managing relations between Britain and Japan. British elites consistently complained about the closed nature of decision making in Tokyo and their inability to discern Japanese intentions. As mentioned above, the British tended to see the Japanese as an “enigma.” Absent a clearer sense of Japanese intentions, the British tended to interpret Japanese behavior as motivated by self-interest, not shared strategic objectives. The lack of transparency helped ensure that the alliance did not develop beyond a marriage of convenience. Regime type and transparency had a mixed impact on Anglo-German relations. Although Germany was not a liberal democracy, British elites did not complain about insufficient access to German politics and the considerations shaping policy. Indeed, the aggressive strains of nationalism affecting debates in the Reichstag and shaping public attitudes were on full display – one of the reasons London was worried about German intentions. In addition, the illiberal nature of the German government did ultimately come to influence Britain’s decision to react firmly to the rise of German power. However, the British were not basing their reaction to Germany’s growing power on the nature of its domestic institutions. Rather, Britain balanced against Germany largely for reasons of geopolitical interest – and elites then appropriated critiques of the German regime in building support for confrontational policies, increases in defense spending, and preparations for a continental commitment. As Ido Oren has argued, Britain attributed malign character to German institutions as a product of the country’s foreign policy behavior, not vice versa.24 Managing Domestic Politics Managing the domestic politics of relations between reigning hegemon and rising challenger is critical to orchestrating a peaceful power transition. In the Anglo￾American case, elites in both Britain and the United States laid the domestic foundations for rapprochement through explicit efforts to shape public discourse. As rapprochement advanced and moved from the realm of high politics to broader societal engagement, officials in both countries propagated narratives of friendship, shared heritage, and cultural commonality. Leaders and opinion makers started to refer to the prospect of Anglo-American conflict as tantamount to a civil war or “fratricide.” These changes in discourse were important steps in building domestic support for rapprochement and undercutting domestic opposition to ongoing efforts to reach out to the adversary. Even so, the British government hid from the public certain moves – such as the dropping of the United States from the two-power standard used to set the size of the battle fleet – to avoid a nationalist backlash. And the U.S. Senate shot down a general arbitration treaty signed by the United States and Britain early in 1897 – a sign of domestic opposition to reconciliation and of the need to move slowly in pursuing Anglo-American rapprochement. The Anglo-Japanese alliance enjoyed much less prominence in both British and Japanese politics; there was little effort by either government to engage domestic constituencies or broader publics. In the words of Ian Nish, the Anglo-Japanese pact remained a “secretariat alliance.”25 In Britain, elites deliberately gave the alliance a low profile, fearing parliamentary and public opposition to British