cooperation with an "inferior"power.In Japan,diplomacy persisted throughout the two decades of alliance.This sense still remained the provenance primarily of a small circle of of difference limited the scope of the partnership,with the elites.Moreover,the alliance enjoyed natural support in British expressing none of the cultural or political affinity Japanese society since a formal pact with a European power that they demonstrated toward the United States.The elevated the country's prominence and prestige.The Japanese were well aware of Britain's racial condescension absence of domestic engagement on either side meant that and regularly worried that Western fear of the "yellow the alliance had shallow societal roots,contributing to its peril,"which was particularly prominent in the dominions atrophy after the close of World War I. and the United States,would ultimately compromise the alliance-which it did.7 In the Anglo-German case,domestic politics had exactly the opposite effect than it did in the Anglo-American case. In the Anglo-German case,a sense of cultural difference Rather than propagating narratives of amity,elites in both grew in step with the naval race and mounting hostility. Germany and Britain whipped up patriotic zeal-in part to The change in narrative was most pronounced in Britain, garner support for the increases in defense spending that where elites constructed a narrative of an autocratic resulted from the mounting rivalry.In Germany,elites also Germany that was bent on geopolitical conquest and used nationalist propaganda as a means of disarming the opposed to the advance of liberalism and democracy. growing political power of the left and the threat it posed to Differences in regime type did little to impair Anglo- the domestic alliance between the Junkers and the German relations prior to 1902.But once embedded in the industrialists.German elites found themselves entrapped context of geopolitical rivalry,they became politically salient in their own rhetoric,unable to reverse course even when and contributed to the mounting estrangement. they recognized the perils to national security resulting from their pursuit of Weltpolitik. The Domestic Politics of Grand Strategy:Intended and Unintended Culture Consequences Culture matters.In the Anglo-American case, The Onset of World War I rapprochement was facilitated by a shared sense of Anglo- Between 1898 and 1914,Britain undertook one of the most Saxon heritage.That heritage alone was hardly sufficient to impressive strategic adjustments in history.It used a ensure stability,as made clear by two Anglo-American wars combination of diplomacy,rearmament,and naval and over a century of animosity.But once peace began to redistribution to dramatically reduce its strategic presence break out,officials,lobby groups,and the media readily in the imperial periphery and concentrate its military picked up on cultural commonalities to make the case for a capability in the European theater.Although the British lasting partnership.Richard Olney,who was U.S.secretary government,as outlined above,faced domestic pressures of state from 1895 to 1897,declared soon after leaving office that contributed to the intensification of Anglo-German that the United States and Britain constituted a "close naval rivalry,British strategy was generally reasoned and community...in origin,speech,thought,literature, reasonable;the home islands faced a rising threat from institutions,ideals-in the kind and degree of civilization Germany and London took the steps necessary to provide enjoyed by both."26 for deterrence and defense.What is remarkable is that deterrence failed despite Britain's timely strategic If culture facilitated rapprochement between Britain and adjustment-and despite the fact that it faced in Germany a the United States,it did exactly the opposite for Britain and rising power,but not one that was intent on predatory Japan.A profound sense of cultural and racial difference aggression.The great powers should have been able to NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE 9new america foundation page 9 cooperation with an “inferior” power. In Japan, diplomacy still remained the provenance primarily of a small circle of elites. Moreover, the alliance enjoyed natural support in Japanese society since a formal pact with a European power elevated the country’s prominence and prestige. The absence of domestic engagement on either side meant that the alliance had shallow societal roots, contributing to its atrophy after the close of World War I. In the Anglo-German case, domestic politics had exactly the opposite effect than it did in the Anglo-American case. Rather than propagating narratives of amity, elites in both Germany and Britain whipped up patriotic zeal – in part to garner support for the increases in defense spending that resulted from the mounting rivalry. In Germany, elites also used nationalist propaganda as a means of disarming the growing political power of the left and the threat it posed to the domestic alliance between the Junkers and the industrialists. German elites found themselves entrapped in their own rhetoric, unable to reverse course even when they recognized the perils to national security resulting from their pursuit of Weltpolitik. Culture Culture matters. In the Anglo-American case, rapprochement was facilitated by a shared sense of Anglo￾Saxon heritage. That heritage alone was hardly sufficient to ensure stability, as made clear by two Anglo-American wars and over a century of animosity. But once peace began to break out, officials, lobby groups, and the media readily picked up on cultural commonalities to make the case for a lasting partnership. Richard Olney, who was U.S. secretary of state from 1895 to 1897, declared soon after leaving office that the United States and Britain constituted a “close community . . . in origin, speech, thought, literature, institutions, ideals – in the kind and degree of civilization enjoyed by both.”26 If culture facilitated rapprochement between Britain and the United States, it did exactly the opposite for Britain and Japan. A profound sense of cultural and racial difference persisted throughout the two decades of alliance. This sense of difference limited the scope of the partnership, with the British expressing none of the cultural or political affinity that they demonstrated toward the United States. The Japanese were well aware of Britain’s racial condescension and regularly worried that Western fear of the “yellow peril,” which was particularly prominent in the dominions and the United States, would ultimately compromise the alliance – which it did.27 In the Anglo-German case, a sense of cultural difference grew in step with the naval race and mounting hostility. The change in narrative was most pronounced in Britain, where elites constructed a narrative of an autocratic Germany that was bent on geopolitical conquest and opposed to the advance of liberalism and democracy. Differences in regime type did little to impair Anglo￾German relations prior to 1902. But once embedded in the context of geopolitical rivalry, they became politically salient and contributed to the mounting estrangement. The Domestic Politics of Grand Strategy: Intended and Unintended Consequences The Onset of World War I Between 1898 and 1914, Britain undertook one of the most impressive strategic adjustments in history. It used a combination of diplomacy, rearmament, and naval redistribution to dramatically reduce its strategic presence in the imperial periphery and concentrate its military capability in the European theater. Although the British government, as outlined above, faced domestic pressures that contributed to the intensification of Anglo-German naval rivalry, British strategy was generally reasoned and reasonable; the home islands faced a rising threat from Germany and London took the steps necessary to provide for deterrence and defense. What is remarkable is that deterrence failed despite Britain’s timely strategic adjustment – and despite the fact that it faced in Germany a rising power, but not one that was intent on predatory aggression. The great powers should have been able to