avoid war.That they could not provide a sobering lesson policies fail to produce the desired results.Germany failed about the potential for great-power war to break out even dramatically in this respect.Two developments made amply when the reigning hegemon is reasoned and reasonable clear the failure of Tirpitz's risk-fleet strategy.First,instead and the rising challenger not a predatory aggressor. of leaving their battleships on foreign station and deferring to Germany's new-found power,London brought most of Drilling down into this case points to domestic dysfunction the fleet to home waters and built new battleships.Second, in Germany as tipping the balance and ensuring that a instead of winning Germany greater diplomatic latitude,its containable episode of great-power rivalry turned into an buildup triggered the formation of the Triple Entente, unstoppable march to hegemonic war.Confronted with making it clear to German leaders that their strategy had political stalemate and a rising threat to the old order from backfired.Nonetheless,due to the deep domestic roots of the working class,Germany's leaders embraced Weltpolitik Germany's building program,they found it impossible to as a means of both consolidating the alliance between iron reverse course.Instead,Germany responded to its self- and rye-ships for the industrialists and tariffs for the encirclement by intensifying the arms race,only tightening landed gentry-and using patriotism to isolate the left. the noose. From the start,German grand strategy was deeply intertwined with domestic politics and,in particular, Creating Conflicts of Interest popular nationalism-precisely why the naval program was At the turn of the twentieth century,Britain and Germany attached to "massive government-instigated propaganda." enjoyed strong political and economic ties and were not The intimate connection between policy and politics meant plagued by ongoing conflicts of interest.On the contrary, that German elites were unable to reverse course and back Germany was profiting from the free trade regime and away from rivalry with Britain even when they recognized open sea lanes of communication provided by Britain; the need to do so;they were cornered by their own Berlin benefited from the existing international order.The nationalist propaganda.Especially after the breakdown of same was true in reverse.Despite minor forays into the the logroll between iron and rye,political paralysis meant imperial periphery,Germany in no way threatened Britain's that Berlin was pushed along by strong currents of imperial interests or its control over key naval choke points. nationalism toward a war it did not want. Berlin established a small number of colonies in Africa and the Pacific,but not on a scale that was detrimental to the World War I was not an accidental war;the great powers British Empire. headed toward it with eyes wide open.But it was an unnecessary war,launched by a modernizing power that Conflicts of interest developed only as the unintended succeeded in exacerbating its own vulnerability and consequence of policy initiatives-actions and reactions launching a self-destructive war.The episode makes clear that fueled the security dilemma.Moreover,Germany that great-power war can emerge as the unintended ultimately sought to change the European balance of power consequence of an interaction between international not because the existing order worked to its disadvantage, conditions and domestic pathologies-one that has the but primarily for reasons of prestige and nationalism-to potential to produce self-reinforcing spirals of hostility. recast the pecking order in a manner consistent with Germany's rising power position.From this perspective, The Lessons of History even two powers with no direct conflicts of interests can Unintended Consequences find themselves at war when disputes over the balance of Strategic moves often do not play as intended,making it power remain unchecked. important for leaders to leave open exit strategies if their NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE IOnew america foundation page 10 avoid war. That they could not provide a sobering lesson about the potential for great-power war to break out even when the reigning hegemon is reasoned and reasonable and the rising challenger not a predatory aggressor. Drilling down into this case points to domestic dysfunction in Germany as tipping the balance and ensuring that a containable episode of great-power rivalry turned into an unstoppable march to hegemonic war. Confronted with political stalemate and a rising threat to the old order from the working class, Germany’s leaders embraced Weltpolitik as a means of both consolidating the alliance between iron and rye – ships for the industrialists and tariffs for the landed gentry – and using patriotism to isolate the left. From the start, German grand strategy was deeply intertwined with domestic politics and, in particular, popular nationalism – precisely why the naval program was attached to “massive government-instigated propaganda.” The intimate connection between policy and politics meant that German elites were unable to reverse course and back away from rivalry with Britain even when they recognized the need to do so; they were cornered by their own nationalist propaganda. Especially after the breakdown of the logroll between iron and rye, political paralysis meant that Berlin was pushed along by strong currents of nationalism toward a war it did not want. World War I was not an accidental war; the great powers headed toward it with eyes wide open. But it was an unnecessary war, launched by a modernizing power that succeeded in exacerbating its own vulnerability and launching a self-destructive war. The episode makes clear that great-power war can emerge as the unintended consequence of an interaction between international conditions and domestic pathologies – one that has the potential to produce self-reinforcing spirals of hostility. The Lessons of History Unintended Consequences Strategic moves often do not play as intended, making it important for leaders to leave open exit strategies if their policies fail to produce the desired results. Germany failed dramatically in this respect. Two developments made amply clear the failure of Tirpitz’s risk-fleet strategy. First, instead of leaving their battleships on foreign station and deferring to Germany’s new-found power, London brought most of the fleet to home waters and built new battleships. Second, instead of winning Germany greater diplomatic latitude, its buildup triggered the formation of the Triple Entente, making it clear to German leaders that their strategy had backfired. Nonetheless, due to the deep domestic roots of Germany’s building program, they found it impossible to reverse course. Instead, Germany responded to its self￾encirclement by intensifying the arms race, only tightening the noose. Creating Conflicts of Interest At the turn of the twentieth century, Britain and Germany enjoyed strong political and economic ties and were not plagued by ongoing conflicts of interest. On the contrary, Germany was profiting from the free trade regime and open sea lanes of communication provided by Britain; Berlin benefited from the existing international order. The same was true in reverse. Despite minor forays into the imperial periphery, Germany in no way threatened Britain’s imperial interests or its control over key naval choke points. Berlin established a small number of colonies in Africa and the Pacific, but not on a scale that was detrimental to the British Empire. Conflicts of interest developed only as the unintended consequence of policy initiatives – actions and reactions that fueled the security dilemma. Moreover, Germany ultimately sought to change the European balance of power not because the existing order worked to its disadvantage, but primarily for reasons of prestige and nationalism – to recast the pecking order in a manner consistent with Germany’s rising power position. From this perspective, even two powers with no direct conflicts of interests can find themselves at war when disputes over the balance of power remain unchecked