Blowback Meanwhile,ideological inhibitions prevented Britain and Blowback -a situation in which a country suffers France from allying with the Soviet Union.And isolationist pernicious effects from its own behavior -played a constraints on the other side of the Atlantic kept dominant role in leading Europe toward a hegemonic war. Washington above the fray until it was attacked at Pearl Germany fell into the trap of blowback both internationally Harbor late in 1941.Strategic excess among rising powers and domestically.On the international front,a unified and under-balancing among status quo powers proved to be Germany that was not directly threatened by any of its a lethal combination. neighbors orchestrated the one strategic alignment that would leave it strategically exposed-a countering coalition The Lessons of History of Britain,France,and Russia.Germany was justified in Economic Duress and Virulent Nationalism feeling encircled by the Triple Entente after 1907.But it was The economic duress stemming from the Depression, encirclement wholly of its own making.On the domestic especially when mixed with weak and underdeveloped front,German leaders suffered blowback from their own political institutions,cleared the way for militaristic and nationalist rhetoric.Some elites came to believe in the predatory regimes to take power in Germany and Japan. grandiose designs they had propagated.Others felt Unforeseen economic shocks can thus have quite profound hemmed in by domestic constraints -unable to swim geopolitical consequences.So too can the change in foreign against the strong current of popular nationalism that they policy occur quite quickly.Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 had themselves stirred up.The result was the same-an and Germany rearmed and violated the Versailles Treaty in inability to reverse course even when doing so made 1935,only two years after the Nazis took power.Germany imminent strategic sense-and instead the unleashing of a and Japan engaged in successive acts of predatory self-destructive war.28 aggression through the second half of the 193os,unchecked by either the League of Nations or the status quo powers The Onset of World War Il until the end of the decade. World War I was a classic case of an unintended great- power war caused by tit-for-tat balancing,the operation of Obstacles to Balancing the security dilemma,and unchecked domestic pressures Four main obstacles stood in the way of effective balancing fueling armament and confrontation.World War II was the against the unmistakable threat posed by Germany and opposite:a war triggered by predatory aggressors-Nazi Japan.First,the loss of life and hardship suffered by Britain Germany and Imperial Japan-against a coalition that during World War I led to a strong aversion during the failed to balance against the rising challenger,in no small inter-war period to again assuming a continental part due to domestic impediments.The economic shock of commitment.The "never again"syndrome led to a grand the Great Depression led to both strategic excess among strategy focused on the defense of peripheral imperial rising powers and under-balancing among status quo commitments and the avoidance of entanglements in powers.Economic dislocation spawned regimes in Europe.Second,British preoccupation with the weakness Germany and Japan running on the fuel of virulent of its economy and its financial vulnerability acted as a nationalism.Meanwhile,economic vulnerability,coupled strong brake on rearmament during the most of the 193os. with the"never again"syndrome that was a legacy of World Voices in favor of preparation for great-power war were War I,prompted Britain to postpone rearmament until the consistently overridden by those more concerned with end of the 193os.With no military deterrent to back him minding Britain's finances and the stability of the pound. up,Prime Minister Chamberlain had little option but to Third,anti-communism in Britain and France prevented capitulate to Hitler's demands in Munich in 1938. alliance with the Soviet Union,virtually precluding the NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE IInew america foundation page 11 Blowback Blowback – a situation in which a country suffers pernicious effects from its own behavior – played a dominant role in leading Europe toward a hegemonic war. Germany fell into the trap of blowback both internationally and domestically. On the international front, a unified Germany that was not directly threatened by any of its neighbors orchestrated the one strategic alignment that would leave it strategically exposed – a countering coalition of Britain, France, and Russia. Germany was justified in feeling encircled by the Triple Entente after 1907. But it was encirclement wholly of its own making. On the domestic front, German leaders suffered blowback from their own nationalist rhetoric. Some elites came to believe in the grandiose designs they had propagated. Others felt hemmed in by domestic constraints – unable to swim against the strong current of popular nationalism that they had themselves stirred up. The result was the same – an inability to reverse course even when doing so made imminent strategic sense – and instead the unleashing of a self-destructive war.28 The Onset of World War II World War I was a classic case of an unintended great￾power war caused by tit-for-tat balancing, the operation of the security dilemma, and unchecked domestic pressures fueling armament and confrontation. World War II was the opposite: a war triggered by predatory aggressors – Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan – against a coalition that failed to balance against the rising challenger, in no small part due to domestic impediments. The economic shock of the Great Depression led to both strategic excess among rising powers and under-balancing among status quo powers. Economic dislocation spawned regimes in Germany and Japan running on the fuel of virulent nationalism. Meanwhile, economic vulnerability, coupled with the “never again” syndrome that was a legacy of World War I, prompted Britain to postpone rearmament until the end of the 1930s. With no military deterrent to back him up, Prime Minister Chamberlain had little option but to capitulate to Hitler’s demands in Munich in 1938. Meanwhile, ideological inhibitions prevented Britain and France from allying with the Soviet Union. And isolationist constraints on the other side of the Atlantic kept Washington above the fray until it was attacked at Pearl Harbor late in 1941. Strategic excess among rising powers and under-balancing among status quo powers proved to be a lethal combination. The Lessons of History Economic Duress and Virulent Nationalism The economic duress stemming from the Depression, especially when mixed with weak and underdeveloped political institutions, cleared the way for militaristic and predatory regimes to take power in Germany and Japan. Unforeseen economic shocks can thus have quite profound geopolitical consequences. So too can the change in foreign policy occur quite quickly. Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 and Germany rearmed and violated the Versailles Treaty in 1935, only two years after the Nazis took power. Germany and Japan engaged in successive acts of predatory aggression through the second half of the 1930s, unchecked by either the League of Nations or the status quo powers until the end of the decade. Obstacles to Balancing Four main obstacles stood in the way of effective balancing against the unmistakable threat posed by Germany and Japan. First, the loss of life and hardship suffered by Britain during World War I led to a strong aversion during the inter-war period to again assuming a continental commitment. The “never again” syndrome led to a grand strategy focused on the defense of peripheral imperial commitments and the avoidance of entanglements in Europe. Second, British preoccupation with the weakness of its economy and its financial vulnerability acted as a strong brake on rearmament during the most of the 1930s. Voices in favor of preparation for great-power war were consistently overridden by those more concerned with minding Britain’s finances and the stability of the pound. Third, anti-communism in Britain and France prevented alliance with the Soviet Union, virtually precluding the