formation of the same blocking coalition that defeated plausible that the United States and China could replicate Germany in World War I.Fourth,isolationist sentiment in the dynamic that led to conflict between Britain and the United States long delayed its direct involvement in Germany.China will unquestionably continue to expand its confronting Germany and Japan. naval strength in a manner commensurate with it growing economic might.The United States,barring unforeseen Each for His Own changes in its current strategic commitments to Korea, The Great Depression was followed not only by under- Japan,and Taiwan,will unquestionably balance against the balancing,but also by the spread of sauve qui peut attitudes growth of Chinese power. among status quo powers.Countries went off the gold standard and adopted protectionist policies in order to Several key questions follow.Will China and the United cordon themselves off from the global economy.The result States be able to arrive at a stable equilibrium in Northeast was the deepening of the economic crisis and the Asia,or will one or both countries,perhaps driven largely fragmentation of the international system.Institutions such by domestic pressures,be unwilling or unable to rein in a as the League of Nations and the Versailles Treaty lost their potential arms race?As the steady intensification of Anglo- credibility,undermining confidence in the potential for German naval rivalry made clear,arresting the security cooperative efforts to confront geopolitical and economic dilemma requires the cooperation of both parties;if one challenges.This unraveling of the collaborative side insists on pursuing unilateral increases in capability, infrastructure was exploited by Germany and Japan, the other side is likely to respond in kind.China may be creating a self-reinforcing dynamic in which unchecked committed to its own peaceful rise.And the United States aggression only further eroded confidence in collective may be ready to accommodate China's ascent.But the security. history of Anglo-German antagonism makes clear that irresolvable conflicts of interest can result from the Conclusion:Lessons for the Future unintended interplay of shifts in the balance of power and The purpose of this concluding section is to draw from the domestic politics. above historical examination of previous power transitions conclusions for today -in particular,for Chinese grand A key issue in this respect is geography.Tirpitz calculated strategy and for the international community's policies that the British would not concentrate their fleet in the toward China amid the country's continuing ascent.To be European theater due to their imperial commitments.He sure,the coming transition in power stemming from was wrong-but for a self-evident reason:Germany's naval China's rise could be much different in character than the buildup threatened Britain's homeland.Not so for China power transitions associated with World War I and World and the United States.For at least the next decade or two, War II.The existence of nuclear weapons,for example,may the geographic focus of China's naval buildup will be its well encourage a degree of strategic caution that did not own regional waters-what Beijing calls its "near-seas."In exist during previous power transitions.Nonetheless,the effect,China is likely to promulgate a contemporary version history of the twentieth century yields important lessons for of the U.S.Monroe Doctrine,claiming strategic hegemony the future. in its own region.The United States will have more latitude than did Britain when Germany built its battle fleet simply Multiple Pathways to Hegemonic Competition because the U.S.homeland is thousands of miles from the Hegemonic rivalry can build through multiple pathways.As western Pacific.Nonetheless,in light of America's strategic the onset of World War I demonstrates,power transitions commitments in Northeast Asia,Washington would have can trigger unintended spirals of hostility.It is entirely to make hard choices in deciding whether to cede strategic NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION PAGE I2new america foundation page 12 formation of the same blocking coalition that defeated Germany in World War I. Fourth, isolationist sentiment in the United States long delayed its direct involvement in confronting Germany and Japan. Each for His Own The Great Depression was followed not only by under￾balancing, but also by the spread of sauve qui peut attitudes among status quo powers. Countries went off the gold standard and adopted protectionist policies in order to cordon themselves off from the global economy. The result was the deepening of the economic crisis and the fragmentation of the international system. Institutions such as the League of Nations and the Versailles Treaty lost their credibility, undermining confidence in the potential for cooperative efforts to confront geopolitical and economic challenges. This unraveling of the collaborative infrastructure was exploited by Germany and Japan, creating a self-reinforcing dynamic in which unchecked aggression only further eroded confidence in collective security. Conclusion: Lessons for the Future The purpose of this concluding section is to draw from the above historical examination of previous power transitions conclusions for today – in particular, for Chinese grand strategy and for the international community’s policies toward China amid the country’s continuing ascent. To be sure, the coming transition in power stemming from China’s rise could be much different in character than the power transitions associated with World War I and World War II. The existence of nuclear weapons, for example, may well encourage a degree of strategic caution that did not exist during previous power transitions. Nonetheless, the history of the twentieth century yields important lessons for the future. Multiple Pathways to Hegemonic Competition Hegemonic rivalry can build through multiple pathways. As the onset of World War I demonstrates, power transitions can trigger unintended spirals of hostility. It is entirely plausible that the United States and China could replicate the dynamic that led to conflict between Britain and Germany. China will unquestionably continue to expand its naval strength in a manner commensurate with it growing economic might. The United States, barring unforeseen changes in its current strategic commitments to Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, will unquestionably balance against the growth of Chinese power. Several key questions follow. Will China and the United States be able to arrive at a stable equilibrium in Northeast Asia, or will one or both countries, perhaps driven largely by domestic pressures, be unwilling or unable to rein in a potential arms race? As the steady intensification of Anglo￾German naval rivalry made clear, arresting the security dilemma requires the cooperation of both parties; if one side insists on pursuing unilateral increases in capability, the other side is likely to respond in kind. China may be committed to its own peaceful rise. And the United States may be ready to accommodate China’s ascent. But the history of Anglo-German antagonism makes clear that irresolvable conflicts of interest can result from the unintended interplay of shifts in the balance of power and domestic politics. A key issue in this respect is geography. Tirpitz calculated that the British would not concentrate their fleet in the European theater due to their imperial commitments. He was wrong – but for a self-evident reason: Germany’s naval buildup threatened Britain’s homeland. Not so for China and the United States. For at least the next decade or two, the geographic focus of China’s naval buildup will be its own regional waters – what Beijing calls its “near-seas.” In effect, China is likely to promulgate a contemporary version of the U.S. Monroe Doctrine, claiming strategic hegemony in its own region. The United States will have more latitude than did Britain when Germany built its battle fleet simply because the U.S. homeland is thousands of miles from the western Pacific. Nonetheless, in light of America’s strategic commitments in Northeast Asia, Washington would have to make hard choices in deciding whether to cede strategic